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On What Socrates Hoped to Achieve in the Agora 
The Socratic act of turning our attention to the truth 
Introduction 
This thesis wants to say that Socrates was a teacher of his fellows. He engaged with 
them through dialogue because he cared for their wellbeing, or as he might have put 
it: for the state of their souls.  
He was an intellectual and he had an intellectualist view of people and reality. He felt 
that right-mindedness was reasonable; and thus he believed that learning and 
developing understanding brought people closer to being virtuous; to goodness; and 
so to mental health. 
Socrates was a philosopher, and he considered this to be the most prudent and exalted 
approach to life. He taught his fellows how to be philosophers, and he urged them as 
best he could to take up the philosophical stance. 
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His form of care for others was ‘intellectualist’. He cared ‘for the souls of others’ and 
for his own with intellectual involvement because he believed that this was the most 
appropriate way. He had a view of the human soul that produced intellectualist views 
of what wellbeing is and how it is achieved.  
He himself was a humble and able thinker, and was fully devoted to being virtuous 
and to helping his fellows to do the same.   
This thesis addresses the question of what Socrates did in the agora (his aims) and 
how he went about doing it (his methodology). 
Our answer might seem obvious. One might wonder what is new about saying that 
Socrates was a philosopher, and that he cared for the souls of his fellows and that he 
urged them to become virtuous. Perhaps nothing of this is new. 
Nevertheless, we find that making this ‘simple’ statement about Socrates is not that 
simple at all. We find that in Socratic scholarship there exist a plethora of contrasting 
voices that make it rather difficult to formulate even such a basic description of what 
Socrates did.  
We do not wish to create a novel and different reading of Socrates. We do not think 
that this is even possible after civilization has been interpreting Socrates for millennia. 
We do not see innovation for its own sake as desirable. We prefer clear understanding 
to the eager ‘originality’. Therefore rather, our aim with this work is to defend and 
clarify a very basic picture of Socrates as an educator.  
We see this work as clearing away clutter so as to begin our life-long study of Socratic 
thought and action: by laying a foundation with which we can read Socratic works 
and discern their meaning. 
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The chapters 
Our first chapter begins by making the case that Socrates was indeed an educator. We 
deal with three problems faced by this assertion. 
Firstly, Socrates himself is seen in the Apology to be denying that he was anyone’s 
teacher. Some scholars have taken this statement literally and have argued that 
Socrates was not therefore in any way concerned with educating others. 
To this we answer that Socrates’ disclaimer cannot be read literally, since the 
pedagogical nature of his engagement with the epistemic state of others is undeniable. 
Therefore, we make the case that more nuanced interpretations of Socrates’ apparent 
disclaimer are more correct. 
Secondly, we deal with an argument made by some scholars that Socrates did not care 
for the souls of his fellows and did not therefore have any program for helping them 
to improve. They claim that he cared only for himself. 
We answer this argument on two points. Firstly we say that there is ample textual 
evidence against such a reading; and secondly, we make the case that helping others 
to improve their relationship to virtue was an integral part of Socrates’ idea of what it 
means to be virtuous. Therefore, helping himself would necessarily have involved 
helping others also. Therefore, as far as Socrates is concerned, it is nonsensical to 
make such a distinction. 
Thirdly, we deal with a somewhat popular view today that Socrates ‘failed’ as a 
teacher. Some scholars have argued that Socrates had no beneficial effect on his 
fellows, or even that he had a harmful one.  
We disagree with this position and we raise a number of objections to it. We make a 
case that Socrates’ impact was vast and multifaceted. We remark on the fact that 
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Socrates had a large effect on the history of thought inspiring many philosophical 
works and schools of thought; his obvious impact on some of his students including 
Plato and Xenophon; his continued influence on the intellectual circles of the Roman 
empire; and all the way up to the modern day.  
We refer also to the impact his has on the readers of Plato’s works, both today and 
throughout history, and claim that this impact is reflective of how he impacted his 
own contemporaries; as well as on the listeners who participated in actuality passively 
to his conversations with a target interlocutor. 
We acknowledge that some degree of ‘failure’ is seen in Plato’s works but we make 
the case that this perceived failure is intentionally portrayed, and we argue that Plato 
himself might have intended it to be felt more as a success. Furthermore, we make the 
point that the event of Socrates’ failure to have a positive effect on his interlocutor 
seen in Plato’s works is exaggerated by scholars and that many indications Plato gives 
us of Socrates great success and deep impact need to be better appreciated. 
In chapter two we address the question of: what was Socrates a teacher of? We deal 
first with the common assumption that Socrates was a teacher of virtue. We say that 
even though such a reading might seem reasonable and somehow intuitive it cannot 
be supported by the texts. We point to the fact that Socrates genuinely believed that he 
had never come across a teacher of virtue, and that this would have included himself.  
We consider the attempt of Daniel Devereux to absolve Socrates of this conviction 
and thus allow us to characterize him as such. He does this by drawing a distinction 
between different meanings of ‘teacher’. However we find that Devereux’s attempt is 
unsuccessful and the problem remains. 
We show that this dilemma is significant: since we want to say that Socrates taught 
something that pertained to helping people become more virtuous. Our own case is 
!  7
that Socrates used educational dialogue as a path to virtue. Therefore, we encounter a 
problem. For in a sense, this amounts to saying that Socrates was a teacher of virtue.  
We answer this problem by clarifying what is meant by philosophy; by discussing the 
relationship of philosophy to virtue; and saying that Socrates was a teacher of 
philosophy rather than of virtue; and showing that these two are significantly different 
and can be distinguished. We use the Protagorean definition of philosophy in order to 
do this and argue that the same meaning is intended at the hand of Plato. 
Chapter three is primarily a work of textual research with the aim of grounding our 
understanding of Socrates’ educational approach. Up to this point we have been 
saying that Socrates cared (through a form of education) for the souls of his fellows. 
Chapter three asks: what is the soul (for Socrates) and what does it mean to care for 
it? 
Our findings prepare us for making sense of Socrates’ educative act of care. By seeing 
how the soul is characterized, we show that learning is of ultimate importance to 
human wellbeing. We make the case that (given Socrates’ conception of the reality 
regarding the human nature) his care for the person is ‘intellectual care’. 
Every educational system contains within it some assumptions regarding 
anthropology. Particularly if one is interested in creating an educational program that 
will ‘benefit’ people. Such a program will be built on some premises as to what is 
beneficial to humans, and how this is best achieved. 
The purpose of this chapter is to make explicit the anthropological assumptions of 
Socrates’ educational approach. It prepares us for better understanding the analysis of 
Socratic educational thought that makes up the remainder of the thesis. 
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Having shown the premises of Socrates’ ‘intellectual approach’ to the care of the souls 
of his fellows, we then go on to deal with the criticism made by some scholars that 
Socrates’ intellectualism was a problem for his persona as a teacher. 
Scholars have argued that Socrates’ intellectualism limited his effectiveness as a 
teacher (or even neutralized it entirely). Some even concluded that the difficulty runs 
so deep that Socrates could not have been a teacher at all, since he would not have 
been able to combine his intellectualism with teaching.     
To the latter we answer that this ‘perception of difficulty’ cannot be attributed to 
Socrates: since in his own view his intellectualism would not have been a barrier to 
teaching. As we have shown in our analysis of his understanding of the soul: Socrates 
would have thought that ‘intellectual care’ was very appropriate. He would have seen 
his intellectualism not as a barrier but as a special ability to care. He might even have 
felt that such an ability brought with it the responsibility to care for his fellows by 
teaching them. 
Secondly, we argue that the criticism that Socrates was too much an intellectualist to 
have a positive effect on learners is based on a misunderstanding of Socratic 
intellectualism.  
We look at the literature around Socratic intellectualism so as to formulate a more 
complex and sensitive understanding of Socratic intellectualism than the one used by 
his critics.  
The case is made that Socrates’ intellectualist educational approach did not disregard 
the sentient and attitudinal aspects of learning (as the critics say), but rather that great 
attention was paid to these. We argue that Socrates saw these aspects of a person as 
critical to their ability to engage in philosophy. We offer an analysis of the Gorgias as 
illustration of this.  
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We take this up again in our concluding chapters (chapters six and seven) where we 
argue that Socrates’ educational methodologies addressed the matter of attitude and 
sentiment closely. 
So what did this intellectual teacher who acted out of care for his fellows do? In 
chapter four take issue with a rather widespread view: which we call the negative or 
skeptical understanding of Socrates. 
On this view what Socrates did amounted to bringing his interlocutors to a realization 
of their own ignorance. He did not engage them in any positive pursuit of truth 
(except perhaps the ‘negative truth’ that they were more ignorant than they thought) 
but acted primarily as a disputant. Some scholars who read Socrates in this way have 
characterized him as a skeptic. 
We argue that this ‘negative’ reading is an impoverished description of Socrates’ act 
in the agora. We look at how Socrates self-predicates when he speaks about himself in 
the Apology and we conclude that as interpreters we have reason to think that Socrates 
did much more than just bring people to an awareness of their lack of knowledge. 
We make the point that Socrates was not a skeptic. In fact, characterizing him as a 
skeptic, or characterizing his effect on others as some how in line with skepticism is 
misleading.  
Both ancient and modern skeptics view the refusal to form beliefs and the 
acknowledgement of one’s ignorance as a form of intellectual integrity. We show that 
such a sentiment was foreign to Socrates, and even contradictory to his own devotion 
to enquiry and his love for truth. 
Furthermore, we show that Socrates thought of ignorance as an evil that was 
particularly harmful for people. We argue therefore that although he might have 
brought people through the stage of realizing their actual epistemic state (and given 
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them reason to revoke and conceit to wisdom they might have entertained) he would 
not have left them in a state of ignorance. Becoming aware of one’s ignorance might 
have been an important tool in Socratic education, but we cannot say that it was its 
primary aim.  
We discuss further the possibility that Socrates was a skeptic in the sense of thinking 
that knowledge was impossible. To this view we raise the objection that Socrates was 
very much devoted to learning and enquiry himself. We are not able to say that 
Socrates merely used dialogical enquiry to show to people that their knowledge was 
lacking because we would then have trouble making sense of why Socrates himself 
enquired. Presumably he would have already known that ‘he knows nothing of value’ 
and he would not have needed enquiry to remind him of this.  
Socrates must somehow benefit from enquiry otherwise; and he thought that he 
benefited his fellows over and above bringing them to the realization of their lack. 
We move on to discuss how scholars have understood Socrates’ disavowal of 
knowledge in the Apology. We address particularly those scholars who have taken a 
‘skeptical’ reading of the text.  
We show that this reading of the text is not supported by the passages; and we suggest 
a different reading. We show that Socrates discussion of himself in the Apology and 
his disavowal of knowledge does not emphasize (as is often thought) his skepticism. 
Rather, it describes (what we call) his intellectual humility. We make an argument that 
we need to shift our focus when interpreting this text. 
Following this we briefly touch on the subject of aporia. Aporia has often been 
understood as an awareness of one’s lack of knowledge regarding a topic. We propose 
that it can be understood rather as a form of self-knowledge (among other things). 
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In chapter five we take up the topic of the knowledge requirements of teaching. We 
speak partly to the problems raised when one tries to understand Socrates’ disavowal 
of knowledge together with his role as a teacher of others. 
We ask whether Socrates can ‘teach without knowing’. Some scholars have made the 
argument that Socrates set a high standard of knowledge required of a teacher of 
virtue; and that he himself failed to meet this standard (by his own admittance). This 
results in a problem. Namely, that Socrates did not qualify, by his own terms, to be a 
teacher of others. 
We answer this position in two ways: firstly we counter the view that Socrates did 
require teachers (pertaining to virtue) to have (what is called) expert knowledge of 
virtue.  
Secondly, we make the case that since Socrates was a teacher of philosophy, he would 
not have in any case been required to meet the supposed standard of knowledge 
regarding virtue. Socrates taught (we argue) philosophy (the process of enquiry and 
its attitude); and in this he was an expert.  
We show that Socrates was an ‘expert enquirer’ and that he knew very well that 
process which he taught to others. We also note that Socrates never denied having this 
knowledge. 
We then introduce our idea of Socratic education as a sort of  ‘apprenticeship in 
philosophy’. He had expert skills in enquiry (and philosophy). Therefore, even if we 
did want to hold him against a supposed criterion of expertise in the subject matter 
taught, Socrates would have had no problems meeting the criteria. 
In chapter six we address the question of Socrates’ teaching method directly. In this 
chapter we bring the learning of the entire thesis together to help us assess the 
different claims regarding Socrates’ methodology. 
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We discuss the standard view that Socrates’ method of dialogical engagement was the 
elenchus. Chapter six is partly in the form of a literature review where we consider 
the problems of the elenchus and its limits as a concept for describing Socrates’ act in 
the agora.  
We look at much of the scholarly disagreement around the elenchus whilst 
concentrating on what scholars actually have agreed on regarding what Socrates did.  
We then go on to make the case that Socrates spoke differently to different people and 
that he would have used more than one ‘technology’ in his attempts to engage his 
fellows in learning and improvement.  
We find that the elenchus is as such too limited of a concept to carry the whole of 
Socrates’ educational act. 
Finally in chapter seven we conclude the thesis by giving a general description of 
what we see as the Socratic educative act in the agora.  
The manner with which we speak about Socrates’ methodology might seem somewhat 
too general. It is. The purpose of doing this is to emphasize the idea that Socratic 
scholarship in the analytic tradition has used too narrow a framework for interpreting 
Socrates’ educational practice. This has limited our understanding of him. My purpose 
is to break open this framework somewhat, and to suggest that a wider lens is needed 
if we are to make any real sense of who Socrates was and what he did.  
His dialogical engagement of others was a practice that can only be properly 
understood if we contextualize it appropriately, as I have tried to do in this thesis, 
within Socrates thought around people, wellbeing and learning. 
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We then finish the thesis by commenting on how the elenchus as a particular teaching 
technology fitted in to Socrates’ more general project of teaching philosophy.  
Our aim is not to say that Socrates did not use ‘elenchus’; neither is it to participate in 
the vast and nuanced discussions in literature regarding the details of the elenchus. 
Our aim is to position the elenchus in a broader description of the Socratic educative 
act.  
With this we conclude our current study of what Socrates did amongst his fellows, 
and what it was that he hoped to achieve with this practices. 
A few practical points 
The reader will notice that I use terms education, pedagogy and andragogy 
interchangeably throughout the thesis. Andragogy is simply a term from adult 
education that is meant to denote the fact that Socrates’ education was directed 
essentially at adults.  
The term pedagogy is used in its modern less precise sense. It should not be taken to 
mean (as it did in the time of Plato’s writing) the education of children. It is merely 
used here as another word for education. Its particular contribution for our purposes is 
that it denotes a well thought out intentional approach to education. It carries the 
feeling of processes of education that are supported by reflection upon the basic 
premises that underlie them.  
We use this term because we do not see Socrates as a ‘casual’ teacher who 
accidentally achieved some learning in his interlocutors. Instead, we see him as a 
philosopher of education who had his own analysis of the epistemic problems that 
people faced, and who had an intentional approach that targeted these epistemic 
problems.  
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However, these three terms are used interchangeably and they always refer to the 
same: Socrates dialogical educative act. 
It also needs to be said that this thesis is speaking about the Socrates that is found in 
Plato’s works. We do not go into the portraits of Socrates that are found in other 
works such as the writings of Xenophon, Aristotle, Aristophanes, Hellenistic 
philosophical schools or the Neo-Platonists. We do not concern ourselves in this 
current work with the question of the historical Socrates.  
We speak only about the Socrates that is known to us from Plato’s dialogues. The 
reader should understand that any reference to Socrates in the thesis (unless otherwise 
indicated) is reference to Plato’s Socrates. 
Furthermore we restrict ourselves largely to the Platonic dialogues that are considered 
by scholars to be ‘Socratic’. This is because we want to avoid what is known as the 
‘Socratic question’. We believe that much of what we say of Socrates can be found in 
more of Plato’s writings; and perhaps we would even dare say that a study of Socrates 
that took all of Plato’s dialogues into consideration would produce a richer and more 
correct portrait of him.  
However, this is not attempted in the current thesis since it would raise many 
scholarly objections and difficulties that we do not have the capacity to address 
satisfactorily in this thesis. 
Most of the dialogues used here are counted as either ‘early’ or ‘transitional’ with the 
exception of the Theaetetus which is generally dated as later middle. However, it is 
still read by many as ‘Socratic’ and it is considered to be a return to the Socrates of 
the ‘early’ works . 1
  
 See Rowe (2009: 34)1
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I. 
‘Socrates is often characterized as one of the greatest teachers the world has seen. Yet he denies that he 
is a teacher…. The resultant dilemma is the problem of Socratic teaching.’  2
I want to begin by asking whether or not Socrates can be characterized as an educator. 
The answer I will give is that yes, the Socrates we know in Plato’s works can 
unreservedly be called an educator. 
Reaching such a conclusion however, is not unproblematic. There are several reasons 
why one might doubt this assertion. Sections I.I to I.III deal with some of the 
difficulties of this statement. 
 Reeve (1990)2
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I. Was Socrates a teacher? 
Yes, he was some sort of an 
Let us first be clear about what we mean with the term ‘educator’. An educator is one 
who educates, and the New Oxford Dictionary of English  defines ‘educate’ in three 3
ways: 
- to give intellectual, moral and social instruction to someone 
- to provide or pay for instruction for someone, especially at a school 
- and, to give someone training in or information on a particular field 
To ‘instruct’ is defined as: 
- to teach someone a subject or skill 
- and, to give a person direction or information. 
Finally, to ‘teach’ is defined as: 
- show or explain to someone how to do something 
I will make the case that each of these terms can assuredly be applied to Socrates. He 
was not linked to any school or institution, nor did he take up the role of teacher in 
any formal sense. Nevertheless, he gave intellectual, moral and social instruction, he 
taught skills, he gave direction, and he showed his fellows ‘how to do something’.     
I.I 
The first problem that my thesis faces is that Socrates himself seems to have outright 
denied any association between education and himself. In the Apology, at 33a5, 
Socrates rejects the impression that the Athenian court had of him – namely that he 
was a teacher. He denies this categorically saying the following :  4
 Edited by Pearsall (1998)3
 Translation by Grube, G.M.A, in Cooper (1997)4
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‘I have never come to an agreement with anyone to act unjustly, neither with anyone else nor with any 
of those who slanderously say are my pupils . I have never been anyone’s teacher . If anyone, young or 5 6
old, desires to listen to me when I am talking and dealing with my own concerns, I have never 
begrudged this to anyone…’ 
and he continues: 
‘And I cannot justly be held responsible for the good or bad conduct of these people, as I never 
promised to teach them anything and have not done so. If anyone says that he has learnt anything from 
me, or that he heard anything privately that the others did not hear, be assured that he is not telling the 
truth.’  7
This text appears to be explicit, and some scholars have accepted that it should be 
interpreted literally . However, scholars have good reason to consider this text as 8
ambiguous and as requiring a more labored interpretation. The reason is that any 
familiarity with Plato’s texts leaves one with the impression that Socrates was 
particularly engaged in educating others. In fact, it might not be an exaggeration to 
say that everything Socrates does in Plato’s works is an act of educating.  
I also hold this view: that we are entitled to see Plato’s Socrates as an educator, since, 
his approach to his interlocutors was first and foremost educational. We can say this 
because, as I will now elaborate, Socrates’ focus in conversation was entirely 
concerned with the epistemic condition of his interlocutors and audience.  
Socrates’ manner of interacting with others directly and thoroughly addressed their 
epistemic state, by attending to the following elements: what the interlocutor knew; 
what they thought they knew; the disputation of any inappropriate claims to 




 See for example Nehamas (1992)8
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Furthermore, having put his hand to ‘correcting’ their existing epistemic state, 
Socrates also tried to assist his interlocutors to make ‘correct’ steps towards learning – 
so as to improve their method of dealing with knowledge generally. 
Consider some occasions when Socrates is seen doing this: 
(a) what they knew 
Socrates appears to have been interested in how well his fellows were being educated, 
and the state of their learning. An example of this is seen in the Theaetetus. From the 
start of the dialogue we see Socrates taking an interest in what Theaetetus knew. 
Socrates begins his conversation with the young man admitting that he wants to 
engage him in dialogue so that he may get to know him . By this he means that he 9
wants to see Theaetetus’ intellectual state.    
Socrates listens with great interest when Theaetetus tells him about a mathematical 
discovery he had made earlier . Socrates and Theaetetus then use this knowledge that 10
Theaetetus already has of how numbers can be categorized, and applies it to the 
concept of definition. In this manner Socrates takes what Theaetetus already knows 
and uses it to teach him something more . He says: 11
‘Excellent…. You gave us a good lead just now. Try to imitate your answer about powers. There you 
brought together the many powers within a single form; now I want you in the same way to give one 
single account of the many branches of knowledge.’  12
Socrates is seen here as giving Theaetetus direction and leading towards learning. 





The same interest is seen at the start of the Charmides. Socrates has been away from 
Athens for some time, and upon his return he visits the wrestling-school. There he 
meets with fellow Athenians, and the first thing he asks them is regarding the state of 
philosophy: ‘…whether any of the young men had distinguished themselves for 
wisdom…’ . 13
(b) what they thought they knew 
Socrates differentiated between knowledge that was had by the interlocutor, as we 
saw in the case of Theaetetus, and false beliefs that were entertained by them. As 
much as Socrates is seen praising Theaetetus for his achieved knowledge, he is 
elsewhere seen deconstructing and disputing beliefs that he considered to be false. 
Socrates was in the habit of identifying what his interlocutors thought they knew 
about a matter – the knowledge they claimed to have regarding it – and of evaluating 
this supposed knowledge, examining whether or not an interlocutor did in fact know 
what they thought they knew. Typically, Socrates would find a way to demonstrate to 
his interlocutor that they did not in fact know what they believed that they knew.  
This practice has come to be known primarily as Socratic elenchus and has been 
deemed by some as the main element of Socratic dialogue . 14
This aspect of Socrates’ engagement with the epistemic condition of his interlocutor is 
perhaps the most central one. Socrates himself refers to this as his practice amongst 
the Athenians whilst he is summarizing his life’s activity for the people of the court. 
In the Apology Socrates tells us the following:  
 153d13
 See for example Vlastos (1982)14
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‘I very reluctantly turned to some such investigation as this: I went to one of those reputed wise…. 
Then, when I examined this man… my experience was something like this: I thought that he appeared 
wise to many people and especially to himself, but he was not. I then tried to show him that he thought 
himself wise, but that he was not.’  15
(c) the disputation of any inappropriate claims to knowledge which they made 
When an interlocutor made a claim to knowledge Socrates would test it to see how 
rigorous it was. As we can see from the above quote, Socrates made it his business to 
demonstrate to people – through dialogue – that they did not in fact know that which 
they believed they knew.  
As Socrates recognizes in the Apology, this practice made him very unpopular. He 
went on to say: ‘As a result he came to dislike me, as so did many of the 
bystanders’ . By Socrates’ own assessment, this is the primary reason why he came 16
to be on trial – the trial at which he was finally sentenced to death .  17
However Socrates did not engage in this practice in order to be a pest to his fellows, 
although he was felt as such – being as annoying as a gadfly. This was a practice that 
Socrates felt was so appropriate that he gave his life for it.  
Socrates gave his life to this practice – both in the sense that he dedicated his life to 
engaging his fellow men to such scrutiny, and in the sense that he was willing to die 
rather than stop this dialogical procedure he enacted repeatedly during his lifetime . 18
What Socrates gave his life for was this: for the practice of liberating people from 




 see Apology 29d18
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misconceptions. As he explains in the Apology at 29b, Socrates did so because he 
believed that ‘surely it is the most blameworthy ignorance to believe that one knows 
what one does not know.’ 
In Socrates’ pedagogical view, a piece of misinformation is harmful because it 
functions as a mental stumbling block for the person. It interferes with his ability to 
be virtuous, and to seek to become virtuous in a variety of ways. In light of this, even 
a person who knows nothing – but who does not presume to know that which he does 
not – is better off than one who was the impression that he knows something that he 
does not in fact know.  
Thinking that one knows what they do not know is a bigger fault than when one 
humbly - unanimously with Socrates – is aware of the limits of their knowledge, who 
knows that they don’t know. 
This position is one we can see clearly in the Theaetetus. In this dialogue Socrates 
reveals to Theaetetus that his is in fact the art of midwifery . He uses the profession 19
of the midwife to metaphorically parallel the elements of this art to his own 
intellectual activity . Of this art he says: that it can identify when one holds a belief 20
which is correct or one that is not correct – which thus needs to be discarded: 
‘the most important thing about my art is the ability to apply all possible tests to the offspring, to 
determine whether the young mind is being delivered of a phantom, that is, an error, or a fertile truth.’  21
Following this Socrates shows that it is harmful for one to entertain errors (beliefs 
which are not true) saying: ‘…because they set more value upon lies and phantoms 
than upon the truth; finally they have been set down for ignorant fools…’ . 22
 149a, all translations are by Levett, M., J in Burnyeat (1990)19




He then goes on to tell Theaetetus that he ought not to be upset if Socrates 
demonstrates to him that he does not know what he thinks that he knows, because if 
this happens it will be for his own benefit: 
‘when I examine what you say, I may perhaps think it is a phantom and not truth, and proceed to take it 
quietly from you and abandon it. Now if this happens, you mustn’t get savage with me…. people have 
often before now got into such a state with me as to be literally ready to bite when I take away some 
nonsense or other from them. They never believe that I am doing this in goodwill…. I don’t do this 
kind of thing out of malice, but because it is not permitted to me to accept a lie and put away truth.’  23
Finally, at the closing of the dialogue, after it was agreed that the definition of 
knowledge which Theaetetus had entertained was false, Socrates says: 
‘Theaetetus, if ever in the future you should attempt to conceive or should succeed in conceiving other 
theories, they will be better ones as the result of this enquiry. And if you remain barren, your 
companions will find you gentler and less tiresome; you will be modest and not think you know what 
you don’t know. This is all my art can achieve…’  24
(d) the evaluation of the opinions they held 
Socrates considered that 'knowledge was not acceptance of second-hand opinion 
which could be handed over...but a personal achievement gained through continual 
self-criticism.'  In other words, Socrates guided people, through discussion, to carry 25
out a critical evaluation of their own beliefs and claims.  
This critical evaluation that Socrates directed was a rather ‘personalized’ act. By this 
it is meant that Socrates assisted people to evaluate the correctness of each claim to 
knowledge by prompting them to weigh it up together with their own other beliefs.  
 151c-d23
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He had an approach in dialogue to push people to personalize their claims to 
knowledge. Together with his interlocutor, Socrates analyzed his interlocutor’s claim 
to knowledge in such a manner that the other was forced to personally evaluate 
whether he believed the claim to be true.  
Socrates’ way of forcing the interlocutor to evaluate seriously his own claims to 
knowledge was this: through dialogue Socrates revealed the consequences of each 
claim. His interlocutor then became sharply aware of the consequences of the claim 
he had been making. Thus, impelled by Socrates to face these consequences, the 
interlocutor was led to evaluate claims that he had assumed to be his knowledge.   
Socrates perhaps would begin by examining one opinion, but from there lead his 
interlocutor to examine his views and attitudes in general. Such dialogical activity 
seems to have been a regular characteristic of his. The introduction made of Socrates 
by Nicias in the Laches gives us a nice summary of this behavior: 
‘You don’t…know that whoever comes into close contact with Socrates and associates with him in 
conversation must necessarily, even if he began by conversing about something quite different in the 
first place, keep on being led about by the man’s arguments until he submits to answering questions 
about himself concerning both his present manner of life and the life he has lived hitherto. And when 
he does submit to this questioning, you don’t realize that Socrates will not let him go before he has well 
and truly tested every last detail.’ 
And he concludes saying: 
‘I realized some time ago that the conversation would not be about the boys but about ourselves, if 
Socrates were present.’  26
(e) assisting them to make ‘correct’ steps towards learning 
At the start of the Theaetetus Socrates says to Theaetetus: 
 Laches 187e-188c26
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‘But with those who associate with me it is different. At first some of them give the impression of 
being ignorant and stupid; but as time goes on and our association continues, all whom God permits are 
seen to make progress – a progress which is amazing…. Yet it is clear that this is not due to anything 
they have learned from me; it is that they discover within themselves a multitude of beautiful things, 
which they bring forth into the light.’ 
‘But it is I, with God’s help, who deliver them of this offspring. And the proof of this may be seen in 
the many cases where people who did not realize this fact took all the credit to themselves and thought 
I was no good.’ 
‘They have then proceeded to leave me sooner than they should…. And after they have gone away 
from me resorted to harmful company, with the result that what remained within them has miscarried; 
while they have neglected the children I helped them to bring forth, and lost them, because they set 
more value upon lies and phantoms than upon truth; finally they have been set down for ignorant 
fools…. Sometimes they come back…. and they begin again to make progress.’   27
In this confession that Socrates makes it is shown that he considered himself as 
serving a vital role: that of helping others to think properly. He guides them, as is 
suggested, to place value upon truth and not upon lies and phantoms, and in this way, 
assisted people to think well and to form correct concepts. Socrates had a method, we 
are told here, of ensuring that people are thinking truthfully. By concentrating on 
truths, and by shunning falsehood and ‘phantoms’, people become able to think 
successfully.  
(f) …so as to improve their method of dealing with knowledge 
  
And finally, consider Socrates’ statement of the truth condition of knowledge. In the 




If we add this to the aforementioned point, then we find that by helping people to 
think more truthfully, Socrates also helps people to deal better with knowledge, and 
subsequently, to come closer to it. 
We have briefly outlined the main elements of Socrates’ preoccupation with the 
epistemic state of others. It is this behavior of his that allows us to say that Socrates 
was indeed an educator of others. He gave them intellectual instruction, he taught 
them the skills of enquiry and of the pursuit of truth, and he gave them direction, both 
in their thought processes and in their life in general, urging them to live the life of 
philosophy. By consciously and intentionally attempting to help others improve their 
epistemic state, Socrates was a teacher. 
Socrates’ denial 
With this in mind then, one is less inclined to understand Socrates’ denial – that he 
was ever anyone’s teacher – in a straightforward manner. The interpretation of this 
claim becomes more complex. There are three possible ways in which Socrates’ 
denial may be understood.  
The first is that Socrates meant what he said literally. Alexander Nehamas, for 
example, took this view and concluded that Socrates was not a teacher at all. He 
argued that the only reason we – as readers of Platonic dialogues – feel Socrates to be 
pedagogical is because Plato, being himself interested in education, misrepresented 
Socrates to us as such.    
The second possibility is that Socrates did not mean his denial truthfully, but that he 
was somehow lying.  
The third possibility is that Socrates did mean his denial, but that he meant it in a 
somewhat more labored sense. This is the most common sort of interpretation. 
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Gregory Vlastos  for example, held that Socrates made this denial using ‘complex 29
irony’. Complex irony is when a word is used in two senses at the same time, where 
the one sense is denied and the other is being asserted. 
Vlastos thus argues that: ‘in the conventional sense, where to “teach” is simply to 
transfer knowledge from a teacher’s to a learner’s mind, Socrates means what he says. 
But in the sense which he would give to “teaching” – engaging would-be learners in 
elenctic argument to make them aware of their own ignorance and enable them to 
discover for themselves… in that sense of teaching Socrates would want to say that he 
is a teacher…’  30
C. D. C. Reeve (1990) offers an interpretation along the same lines. He also 
distinguishes between different sorts of teaching and concludes that Socrates is 
denying that he is a teacher in the sense which would have been familiar to his 
audience. He says that: ‘the beliefs drawn upon by Socrates in the elenctic 
examination are those of his interlocutor. The beliefs he draws out are already 
(implicitly) there. He imparts nothing of his own. This is what renders his disclaimer 
of teaching credible .  31
Gary Alan Scott (2000), in a more recent work, has argued the same point. He 
suggests that it is a common technique of Plato’s to use the refutation of conventional 
labels in order to make a distinction regarding Socrates . This denial then, according 32
to Scott, is used in order to differentiate between the methods and objectives of 
Socrates and those other practices prevalent of his day. 
Scott makes the point that, at the time of Socrates’ life, the notion of a teacher would 






pedagogue, was a sort of escort that youths had whose main role was to make sure 
that the youths do what they are supposed to do. These pedagogues were often slaves. 
The second sort would have been the sophist, a type that Socrates was eager to 
differentiate himself from . 33
Indeed, alongside these two sorts of educators that Scott mentioned, there were others 
in the Athens of Socrates’ time. There were for example the paidotribes (gymnastic 
tutors); those teaching vocational skills; and other philosophers or mathematicians 
who tutored pupils (as were Anaxagoras and Theodoros).  
Arguably though each of these trainers claimed a field of expertise which they passed 
on to the pupil. The point that Scott, Vlastos and Reeve make is that Socrates did not 
teach in this manner. He did not inculcate any body of knowledge into pupils: and 
therefore, they claim, he differentiates himself by denying that he was a teacher . 34
Of the three possible ways to interpret Socrates’ denial, the most acceptable appears to 
be the third: the one held by Vlastos, Reeve and Scott among others. The view that 
Socrates, in voicing this denial, was referring specifically to certain notions of 
‘teacher’ - which would have been familiar to his audience, but from which Socrates 
wanted to be disassociated – seems to be the most correct. For two reasons: 
Firstly, it allows us to continue to conceive of Socrates as an educator, which - as 
argued earlier – any familiarity with Socratic dialogues compels one to do. Secondly, 
as Scott (2000) argued, this would not be an awkward reading of the text but rather a 
commonplace one – since it is often the case that Plato uses such refutation of 
conventional labels when he is giving a description of Socrates. It is a common 
method used by Plato to delineate the Socratic persona. 
 2000: 1333
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Nehamas, who supported the view that Socrates was indeed not a teacher at all, dealt 
with the imposing impression of Socrates as an educator in Plato’s dialogues in the 
following manner: by suggesting that it was Plato’s interest in education that is 
‘written into’ Socrates. Nehamas argued that Socrates himself was not involved in 
education, but that Plato was interested in it, and therefore ‘wrote’ the Socratic 
character in such a way . 35
This however seems unlikely to me and I see no realistic way to approach the 
interpretation of Socrates in this light. I say that because: given the thorough 
educative nature of Socratic dialogue, were we to remove traces of pedagogy from the 
Socrates of the Platonic dialogues, then nothing would be left of him.  
The Socrates whom we know through Plato’s works is so radically pedagogical, that 
if we remove pedagogical elements from his persona, there would be no persona left 
over to speak of. There would be no Socrates left to differentiate from any character 
created by Plato.  
Finally, the second option – that Socrates did not mean what he said at all – would 
amount to saying that Socrates lied to his audience. This would be a most unfortunate 
position to hold and it would be in contradiction with the character of both Socrates 
and the dialogue.  
We should notice that at the start of the dialogue, little before the passage where 
Socrates denies being a teacher, Socrates makes the point of emphasizing the sincerity 
of his speech. ‘From me’, Socrates says, ‘you will hear the whole truth’ . It would in 36
fact require such a convoluted explanation of the text – to support the thesis that 
Socrates was lying – that scholars do not tend to this possible explanation. Socrates 




Could it not be possible though, to characterize Socrates in some other way, which 
would capture the essence of his activity without casting it in the light of education? 
Certain scholars have done so. Chessick (1982) for example names Socrates the first 
psychotherapist . He says: 37
‘This maieutic method is certainly the first practice of individual intensive psychotherapy; Socrates 
encounters and engages an individual in an attempts to make the individual look into himself.’  38
We might agree with Chessick that much of what Socratic education aimed to achieve 
would benefit a person generally, and could be considered personal progress from the 
point of view of psychotherapy today. Notwithstanding this affinity a psychotherapist 
might feel for Socrates, it would be limiting to characterize Socrates as a 
psychotherapist.  
First of all, bringing about learning and intellectual development was the essence of 
the Socratic approach, whereas it is only occasionally an accidental feature of 
psychotherapy.  
Furthermore, although it is correct to say that Socrates turned an individual’s attention 
to ‘look into himself’, the purpose of this was that he would thus better see the 
objective world round about him. The personal engagement of the individual, for 
Socrates, had the aim of enabling that person to learn true knowledge more 
effectively. It had an educational function.  
The purpose of learning, for Socrates, was to lead the better life, the examined life, 
and to thus be better off. However, arguably this is the purpose of all education. 
Admitting this does not place one outside the boundaries of education, but rather 
locates one firmly therein. 
 See also Chessick (1977) 37
 1982: 7638
!  30
Let us therefore proceed having said that Socrates was indeed an educator, or 
otherwise, a teacher. We have agreed with Socrates that he was not one who 
‘transmitted’ bits of information into empty vessels, otherwise known in educational 
theory as a ‘banking educator’ ; but through a process of dialogue with the other, he 39
guided them to a more ‘appropriate’ or ‘correct’ epistemic state. 
I.II 
‘Why, how strange it would be, Lysimachus, to refuse to lend one's endeavours for the highest 
improvement of anybody!’ 
- Socrates, Laches 200e - 
  
Socrates acted as a teacher of others, to great expense to himself. He earned no money 
for his activities, and indeed lost his life to the cause, as many of his fellow citizens 
believed that the influence he was having on youths was negative.  
In a sense, following the suggestion of Paul Shorey (1969) we might say that Socrates 
was a philosopher amongst cave dwellers; whose attitude often provoked laughter and 
 The concept ‘empty vessel’ is used in educational theory to refer to an attitude 39
towards the learner, where the learner is empty of knowledge and the teacher ‘pours’ 
facts into them, as if they were a container of learning to be filled by one who already 
contains the knowledge. This concept was made popular by the educator Paulo Freire 
when he criticized what he called ‘banking education’. Banking education is what 
Freire called processes of education where facts are deposited by a knower (the 
teacher) into the learners (as if they were empty vessels).  
Freire severely criticized such pedagogical processes and argued that they are not 
worthy of the name education. Instead he argues that dialogue is the only natural and 




disdain; and when it became possible to lay hands on him and kill him, his fellows did 
so . 40
A question arises: why would any enlightened person reside in the cave? Why did 
Socrates dedicate himself to this act of ‘turning the mind’ of his fellows ? The 41
answer is simple. Socrates did so because he cared for his fellows. He cared for the 
condition and fate of the ‘souls of men’ .  42
I shall argue that Socrates felt that it was his responsibility to attend to the souls of 
others. It was for this reason that, as we are told in the Apology, he urged people to 
seek virtue, and by his own admittance, doing so benefited them more than any 
service the gods could have bestowed upon the city . 43
Alexander Nehamas (1992) claims a contrary view: he presents Socrates as one who 
concerned himself solely with his own development, who was indifferent to the 
wellbeing of the souls of others, and who therefore did not intentionally engage in any 
act of educating. He states this view again (1999: 130) when speaking about 
Nietzsche’s understanding of Socrates .  44
Nehamas says of Socrates that: he was ‘totally unconcerned with the moral 
improvement of others’; that he did not have ‘even in its most rudimentary form, the 
sort of program for moral education that Plato and Aristotle developed after him’; 
 See Shorey’s comment at point 517a of the Republic, found in Plato, Plato in 40
Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6, translated by Paul Shorey, Harvard University Press, 
London, 1969 
 This characterization of Socratic education is discussed further in chapter VI.41
 Reference to the Theaetetus 150b842
 Apology 30a43
 Nehamas writes: ‘His Socrates…does not attend to “the benefit of the human 44
race,”….His concern is only with the care of himself – in this respect, he is much 
closer to the image we find…in Plato’s early dialogues…’
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and, that ‘all he was concerned about was the salvation of his own and not of any 
other soul.’  45
I will argue that Nehamas is incorrect on this point using two arguments. The first is 
textual, for in the Platonic texts, where Socrates is featured, there is evidence that 
Socrates did care about the state of the souls of his fellows . The second argument 46
made will be that ‘caring for the souls of others’ is in fact a prescription of Socrates’ 
philosophy. 
 1992: 28345
 Nehamas may want to negate the strength of the textual evidence by saying that these 46
sentiments – like the educational concerns we see Socrates expressing – belong rather to 
Plato, and that these were put on the historical Socrates by the writer. 
However, notice that there is a significant problem with such a claim. The fact is that there 
exist very few other sources regarding the character of Socrates. There does not exist a 
historical body of information regarding Socrates which a scholar can compare with the 
personality presented by Plato in his dialogues. If then a scholar, like Nehamas, wants to 
claim that Plato is misleading us in how we view Socrates, they need to provide us with some 
reason as to why we might imagine a Socrates different from the one presented by Plato.   
Indeed, the second main source on Socrates that we have alongside the works of Plato are the 
writings of Xenophon, who, it can be argued, does not at all support Nehamas’ claim. 
Xenophon, whether he be an accurate source or not, presents Socrates as being much 
concerned with education.   
There does not seem to be any reasonable basis from which Nehamas can claim that Socrates 
was different from how Plato presented him to us, because if Socrates really was something 
other than what Plato has presented, we then have no textual evidence for knowing how he 
was. If Plato has projected on to Socrates an interest in education, then we have no way of 
looking behind this projection. 
If Nehamas wanted to counter the textual evidence that we have in Platonic texts regarding 
Socrates then he would need to provide us with a reasonable function that will guide us in our 
imagining a Socrates different from the one Plato has introduced us to. I do not see that there 
is sufficient reason to believe that we can imagine a Socrates behind the Platonic Socrates. I 
cannot conceive of what criteria Nehamas might employ in order to say what Socrates was 
like in contrast to how Plato has described him.  
Until such proof is presented however, we can reasonably hold that evidence taken from the 
Platonic corpus is informative on this matter: as to whether or not Socrates can be said to 
have cared about the souls of his fellows. With this in mind, let us then consider the texts 
which challenge the view that Socrates did not care about the souls of others. 
Gregory Vlastos (1991) has also made a claim that we can separate Socrates the philosopher 
from Plato the philosopher within the Platonic dialogues. However, notice that Vlastos makes 
a very different move. Vlastos has claimed that based on the textual evidence of the Platonic 
dialogues one can distinguish two separate philosophical personalities, which can be taken to 
be representative of the two philosophers Plato and Socrates. Vlastos is making a claim that is 
grounded in the text that are available to us. 
Nehamas on the other hand is making a claim that is impossible to ascertain. He is claiming 
that in his dialogues Plato is giving us the wrong impression about Socrates. Nehamas is 
claiming that he can know something about Socrates despite the Plato’s dialogues. This is a 
difficult case to make as we do not have enough sources to disagree with Plato’s portrayal of 
Socrates in any informed manner. 
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There is ample textual evidence that Socrates cared for the souls of his fellows. The 
strongest and most pronounced direct statement of this from Socrates himself is found 
in Socrates’ most famous speech: the Apology. At 31b, Socrates tells his accusers 
outright that so much did he care for the wellbeing of his fellow citizens, that he 
neglected even his own affairs. He says: 
‘…it does not seem like human nature for me to have neglected all my own affairs and to have 
tolerated this neglect now for so many years while I was always concerned with you, approaching each 
one of you like a father or an elder brother to persuade you to care for virtue.’ 
As Socrates emphasized in this passage, he neglected all of his own affairs for this 
cause, to the extent of bringing himself to poverty . 47
Furthermore, at 30a Socrates says: ‘…there is no greater blessing for the city than my 
service to the god. For I go around doing nothing but persuading both young and old 
not to care for as your body or your wealth’ but ‘for the state of your souls’. 
Other examples can be found in the Theaetetus. After the long dialogue - whose 
function was to examine and evaluate the content of Theaetetus’ episteme – Socrates’ 
makes it clear that he considers this ‘epistemic cleansing’ to have been good and 
profitable for Theaetetus .  48
Again, at 150b6, when Socrates metaphorically introduced his ‘art’ to Theaetetus - the 
activity that has preoccupied his entire life – he tells him that it is to attend to and 
watch over the labor of the souls of his fellows. He here makes it clear that he is 
concerned with the ‘souls’ of his fellows – something which is thought of as linked to 




Another occasion where Socrates declares that his intellectual activities amongst his 
fellows are compatible with his care for the souls of his interlocutor comes in the 
Meno, at 77, where it is indicated that Socrates, would if he could, benefit Meno 
through providing him with learning. He says: ‘I shall certainly not be lacking in 
eagerness to tell you such things, both for your sake and my own…’ 
Having presented occasions where Socrates plainly states that he cared for the souls 
of others, let us now make our point with a further argument. I will now make the 
case that ‘caring for the souls of others’ was a necessary element of Socratic thought.  
For the Socrates we know from Plato’s works, it would be nonsense to try to separate 
the good of the self from the good of the other, and therefore, it cannot be said, as 
Nehamas has tried to say, that Socrates cared ‘only for his own soul’ and not for the 
souls of his fellows. 
Caring as a necessary element of Socrates’ thought 
‘we were right to agree that good men must be beneficent, and that this could not be otherwise. ’ 49
- Socrates -  
I contend that it does not make sense to say that Socrates cared about his own soul 
and not for the souls of his fellows. For Socrates, the caring of one’s own soul 
requires them to cultivate virtues which would be also to the benefit of the others. The 
person who cares for his own soul would be the person who would be just towards all 
people, who would never hurt anyone – not even his enemies – but rather, would aim 
to do good always. 
 Meno 96e49
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Such a person then who cared for his own soul – be he Socrates or someone else – 
would still be obliged by his virtue in each of his interaction with other people, to 
pursue the good of his fellows.  
This is so because: it is for the good of one’s own soul to be just, and to be just to 
another means to act in a way that would not undermine their benefit. It is therefore in 
disregard of Socrates’ understanding of what is good for one’s own soul that one 
would make distinction and the claim that: Socrates cared for his own soul and not for 
that of his fellows. 
My argument cannot be found explicitly stated by Socrates in the Platonic texts, 
however, it can be constructed in three parts:  
1. We can first establish that for Socrates, a man who cares for his own soul 
will seek to develop within himself the virtues, justice being one of these 
primary virtues. We can see this clearly in the Republic. Here Socrates 
challenges the general belief that it is good for a man to benefit his friends and 
harm his enemies and asks if it is the role of a just man to harm anyone .  50
He argues that a person is made more unjust when they are harmed  and that 51
therefore it is an injustice to them to harm them. Socrates then claims that a 
just man would never do such an injustice to another as to cause them harm.  
Saying this he suggests that it is never good to be unjust to anyone. He goes as 




of all adversity, and despite any consequent loss of personal goods . This is 52
also the claim Socrates supports against Polus in the Gorgias . 53
2. Following this we can show that Socrates believed that being just to another 
includes that you defend their wellbeing when your actions are such that they 
would have an effect on the other.  
This can be seen in the Crito. In this dialogue his friend Crito urges Socrates 
to escape from prison so as to save his own life. He responds that ‘one must 
never in any way do wrong willingly’ . He also adds: ‘doing harm to people 54
is no different from wrongdoing’ .  55
Socrates argues with Crito that he ought not to escape from prison and disobey 
the Athenian state, for in disobeying them he would undermine its authority 
and so harm it . 56
It is important to notice from the example of the Crito that Socrates’ precept 
that one ought never to willingly harm another does not merely mean that one 
ought not to aggress another. Socrates and Crito here are not discussing 
whether they should raise a revolt against the Athenian state. Socrates’ precept 
is meant in the strictest sense: that if your actions will bring harm to another 
then you ought not to act in this way.  
 The main content of the Republic begins precisely when Socrates agrees to attempt 52
to defend this view, that being just is better than being under all circumstances, at 
368b.





An occasion when this sentiment is demonstrated by Socrates with regards to 
his intellectual activities in the city is found in the Apology. Speaking of his 
pedagogical activities here Socrates tells the jury that ‘this is my course of 
action even, even if I am to face death many times’ .  57
He reveals here that he believes that his activities are beneficial for his fellows 
when he charges that if the Athenians kill him, they would harm themselves 
more than they would harm him’ . It is because the god has assigned him to 58
procure this benefit for the city that he must go on and do it. Thus he claims 
that, even if the court was to let him go free on the condition that he stop his 
pedagogical dialogues with his fellows, Socrates would refuse to stop. 
3. It is the case that Socrates considered the achievement of good 
philosophical thought to be beneficial for one’s soul. In contributing to how 
his interlocutors processed in their thought, and by enriching them with the 
ability to think in more philosophical manner, Socrates helped to care for the 
soul of his fellows.  
This can be understood if we look at what Socrates says at the opening of the 
Philebus . He clarifies his own position which he will defend thus: 59
‘Philebus holds that what is good for all creatures is to enjoy themselves, to be pleased and 
delighted, and whatever else goes together with that kind of things. We contend that not these, 
but knowing, understanding, and remembering, and what belongs with them, right opinion and 
true calculations, are better than pleasure and more agreeable to all who can attain them; those 
 Apology 30c57
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 I do not hold that the Philebus as a whole represents Socrates. There are reasons to think 59
that in the case of this dialogue the person of Socrates is indeed being used as a literary figure 
and is speaking in a manner which was not his own. These cannot be discussed here, 
however, I consider that the start of the Philebus – and particulalry the quote used here – is 
compatible with the Socrates we know through Plato’s dialogues. The section that is quoted 
here is in line with the Socrates of other dialogues, as for example: what is said about the 
value of knowledge in the Meno as well as in the Euthydemus.   
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who can, get the maximum benefit possible from having them, both those now alive and 
future generations.’  60
We can then assume that Socrates was aware that his activity had a positive 
impact on the souls of his fellows. We can see that this was so again in the 
Apology. Socrates says as much at 36c: ‘I went to each of you… and conferred 
upon him what I say is the greatest benefit…. by trying to persuade him… that 
he himself should be as good and as wise as possible…’ 
Similarly, we know that Socrates believed that a faulty thought-process was 
harmful for a person’s soul. This can also be deduced as the flip-side of what 
is being said at the opening of the Philebus. This is why Socrates esteemed 
philosophy so highly and considered it to be such a worthy act, as he tells us in 
the Phaedo: the philosopher – the one who is practiced in the art of proper 
thought and who has overcome that which inhibits successful contemplation  61
- can be benefited by grasping truth .   62
To complete our argument then, we can say this: Socrates’ activity was a 
noetic one – it engaged with the intellectual activity of persons. If Socrates’ 
influence on the intellect of his fellows had been such that it undermined their 
ability to think philosophically, then by his own term he would have been 
bringing harm to them. Equally, if his effect on them was such that it enabled 
them to think in a better way (as we see in the Theaetetus he thinks he does 




 see Theaetetus 150b-c63
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It is also the case, as we have seen in the Republic, that by Socrates’ definition, 
a person who is virtuous would never bring harm to others. 
Therefore, Socrates, being one who constantly engaged others in dialogue 
could not have been a person who did not care about the effect that he was 
having on the minds and souls of others, but who cared only for his own soul. 
For by Socrates’ own terms, even if he were to be primarily concerned with 
the state of his own soul, the attainment of justice and virtue for himself would 
require him to be attentive to the effect he was having on others and to strive 
for that effect to be a positive one.  
Socrates tells us as much: that he cared about the souls of others when he says 
that he urged others to contemplate their lives and the state of their souls, 
because ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’ . 64
His act was on the intellect of others, and therefore his contribution – for his 
own sake even – would always have to have been the care for the intellectual 
activity of others.  
As we have seen in the Philebus, the proper care for one’s intellect is the same 
as the care of their soul. Therefore, Socrates would have cared for the souls of 
others even if, as Nehamas would have it, Socrates only cared about his own 
soul. Thus, the distinction and point that Socrates cared only about his own 
soul and not for the souls of his fellows becomes, upon closer examination, 
nonsensical.        
We have now thoroughly discussed Nehamas’ claim that Socrates cared only about his 
own soul and not about the souls of his fellows, which was thus phrased: that 
‘Socrates…was totally unconcerned with the moral improvement of others’ and ‘all 
 Apology 38a64
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he was concerned about was the salvation of his own soul and not of any other soul’. 
We have found this charge to be unfounded. 
Let us end by noticing what Socrates told Callicles in the Gorgias: that an orator who 
cared about the well-being of his listeners would ‘always give his attention to how 
justice may come to exist in the souls of his fellow citizens and injustice be gotten rid 
of, how self control may come to exist there and lack of discipline be gotten rid of’ . 65
I.III 
Let us now consider a further objection to the point that Socrates was a teacher to his 
fellows. It could be argued, as some scholars have done, that the Socrates in Plato’s 
dialogues regularly fails to have any positive intended educational effect on his 
interlocutors. If this is so, one might wonder, how can he be considered an educator, if 
not as a comic failure of one .  66
In the Apology Socrates is presented to us as a sort of ‘divinely appointed physician of 
the soul’  who did his utmost to develop in people an interest in becoming virtuous. 67
Nevertheless, scholars have doubted whether we in fact see Plato’s Socrates having 
any positive lasting effect on others. As Scott (2000) put it, there is a view that ‘more 
often than not, [Socrates’] target interlocutors leave their conversations with the 
philosopher wholly unchanged by the experience…’.  
I disagree with this view. I tend to agree with Socrates himself, who in the Gorgias 
claimed to be indeed the most genuine undertaker of the ‘true political art’, that of 
benefiting the moral character of his fellows ; and with Vlastos (1991: 32) I find that 68
Socrates ‘does have, the effect of evoking and assisting … effort at moral self-
improvement’. 
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 Alexander Nehamas for example takes such a view at (1992: 296)66
 This term is borrowed from Scott (2000:1)67
 Gorgias 521d, commentary taken from Vlastos (1991:32) 68
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First, let us say the little that we can about the impact of the historical Socrates. 
Socrates had such a long-lasting consequential influence that he marked a turning 
point in history. Philosophers that lived before him have come to be known as the 
‘pre-Socratics’. Since Socrates did not write anything himself, his impact was 
instigated by his conversations with his fellows. His impact on the history of thought 
began with his impact on the people with whom he spoke. 
Two students of Socrates whom we know had a great respect for their teacher, and 
who were influenced by him greatly, are Plato and Xenophon. One might want to add 
Antisthenes to this list .  69
Alongside these two whom we can name, the time following Socrates’ death saw the 
creation of multiple schools of people, who developed their ideas believing they were 
followers of Socrates. Whether or not we agree that the schools of thought that 
occurred after Socrates were true to his own intentions , we can acknowledge that his 70
influence was a great inspiration for them. Included are: the Cyrenaics; the Cynics; 
the Stoics ; and the Skeptics (Kraut 2013).  71
His influence continued. As Magee (1998: 21) pointed out, by the first century AD, 
Socrates had become a cultural hero in the intellectual circles of the Roman Empire. 
This influence was amongst intellectuals, precisely because they felt impacted by 
engaging with Socrates. Nietzsche saw Socrates not just as the founder of ethics ‘but 
of the whole scientific tradition’ . Morrison (2012: 101) says: ‘Socrates is the mythic 72
 See for example Prince (2006) 69
 Bett (2006) says that even though the skeptics took their link to Socrates very 70
seriously, they even disagreed amongst themselves on how to understand what they 
saw as Socratic skepticism. 
 Brown (2006: 275)71
 See Matson and Leite (1991: 145)72
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father and patron saint of philosophy. One answer to the question, “What is 
philosophy?” is: Philosophy is what Socrates did and what he started.’   
In our day Socrates is the inspiration behind many educational projects . Affected by 73
his teaching, educators still look to Socrates as their inspiration. As noted by Nails 
(2014), even the European Union’s program of life-long learning (running from 1994 
to 2006) borrows its name from Socrates. This is just one of a myriad of such 
examples. Educators throughout history have wanted to honor their teacher by 
referring their work to him .  74
But let us now turn to speak more precisely about Socrates as we know him through 
Plato’s works. Indeed, the reader will note that much of the influence that Socrates 
has had on people throughout history goes beyond the reach of his own person, and 
most of us have had contact with him only through the works of others. In our own 
time, this contact is primarily through Plato’s works. 
Can we then say that the Platonic Socrates, the persona who is seen by some in the 
dialogues as failing to teach his interlocutors, had a notable impact on others? I would 
like to say yes. Indeed, the person of whom I am most confident to speak on behalf of 
is myself. I, like many others who have read Plato’s texts, can say that my contact 
with Plato’s Socrates has had a continuing definite and long-lasting impact on my life 
and thought. 
If we thought of the Platonic dialogues as historical records of a particular 
conversation between Socrates and an interlocutor – as archives of events – then we 
might say that my reaction to them as a reader is irrelevant. However, if we think of 
the dialogues, as is indeed the overwhelming view, as Plato’s purposeful creations, 
intended for a reader, then, my response to them as a reader becomes more relevant.  
 Schneider (2012)73
 See for example Rud, Jr. (1997) 74
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As scholars like Strauss (1964); Krentz (1983); Ausland (1997); and Jansen (2013) 
have noted, Plato’s writings are not in the form of a philosophical treatise, but are in 
dramatic form, precisely because they are designed to act on the reader. They are 
written to offer us an experience of philosophy rather than to transfer to us some 
particular philosophy.   
Ausland (1997) made the case that Plato wrote in such a way that: his texts relate to 
the reader much the same way that Socrates related to with his interlocutors. A 
manner of engagement is used, to awaken one’s mind to the act of philosophy , 75
without giving us any clear conclusive dogmas that we are to incorporate.  
If the inconclusiveness that is so characteristic of Plato’s dialogues has been an 
instigator of learning and growth for so many generations of people up to our own 
day, then could this same inconclusiveness experienced whilst in dialogue with 
Socrates also be fruitful for his contemporaries? Why do we think that we are more 
able today to benefit from Plato’s ambiguity then Socrates’ interlocutors were able, 
over time, benefit from Socrates’?  
As a reader of Plato’s texts today might testify, we often leave a Platonic dialogue 
unsure of what it intended to teach us. Nevertheless, few of us can honestly say that 
they remain untaught by Plato. Something of the sort might be true of Socrates’ 
interlocutors. Therefore, Socrates’ influence on the thought of his fellows, might not 
be reasonably expected to be found stated in plain terms in the exchange that takes 
place in the text. 
Gary Alan Scott (2000: 2) noted the point that when considering the success of an 
exchange, one needs to be aware that the dialogues were written to function on 
several levels. That is to say: that in the act of writing these dialogues Plato involves 
four different sorts of audience simultaneously. These groups are:  
 See Ausland (1997: 382-386)75
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1. Between Socrates and his target interlocutor 
2. Between these primary interlocutors and any third parties gathered and 
‘listening in’ 
3. Between the primary conversation (in ‘real time’) and anyone who might hear 
about the conversation, or hear it rehearsed, or who might be rehearsing it 
themselves later 
4. Between Plato and his audience. 
This list of audiences includes myself; those present as audience in the Protagoras 
who might leave the conversation with the understanding that indeed it is not to be 
taken for granted that Protagoras has something valuable to teach them; and people 
like Appolodorus who ‘conceive the benefit’  that philosophy does them and who 76
therefore spend their time contemplating Socrates’ conversations. 
In light of this, an apparent failure on the part of the interlocutor might have the 
function of achieving success for other intended audiences. Scott (2007: xviii) for 
example suggests that ‘reader or auditors can learn from the mistakes of characters in 
conversation, or they may be able to see why a given conversation stalls or a 
particular line of argument runs into difficulty’.  
Let us though concentrate on what occurs in the direct relationship between Socrates 
and his primary interlocutors in Plato’s dialogues. As several scholars have noticed, 
Plato who had literary freedom to present Socrates as he chose has presented to us a 
dedicated midwife, always about the business of urging people to turn their lives 
towards philosophy, who nevertheless fails on most occasions, at least on appearance, 
to have the desired impact on them .  77
This apparent failure has brought some scholars to the conclusion that Socrates’ 
pedagogical approach was inappropriate and thus ineffective. Such a reading however 
 Symposium 173c, translation by Fowler (in Plato 1925)76
 Scott 2000: 16577
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ignores Plato’s confidence, appearing throughout his works, that Socrates was a very 
valuable and appropriate teacher to his fellows indeed. There are other ways though to 
make sense of this noted ‘dramatic failure’ on the part of Socrates in Plato’s 
dialogues. 
Several answers have already been given to this problem. Scott (2000: 170) for 
example, following Kraut (1984: 225) makes the point that Socrates’ success is 
causing moral perplexity in his interlocutors – this being a protreptic first step in 
moral self improvement – and disabusing them of their conceit of wisdom. These are 
two things that we regularly see Socrates successfully achieving in Plato’s dialogues. I 
agree with Kraut and Scott on this point. These are a degree of success on the part of 
Socrates.  
However, Socrates desired to see these seeds blossom into a more fruitful and 
sustained progress made by his fellows; and we might still ask if and why Socrates 
fails to take people further than this. Socrates is not presented to us merely as a 
midwife who can take away a phantom child, but as one who can see a person through 
a successful intellectual pregnancy, one that bears the fruit of philosophy .  78
As Scott (2000: 167) points out, the fact that Socrates sometimes fails to turn his 
interlocutors to philosophy – as we see in the examples of Alcibiades and Lysis – was 
not intended by Plato as a failure on the part of Socrates, but a failure on the part of 
the interlocutor to participate in any sustained way in the (correct) method outlined by 
Socrates. 
Socratic dialogue required nothing less than complete devotion of one’s self to the 
pursuit of truth. As is often noted, together with Socrates, a true philosopher who 
hoped to benefit from this ‘examined way of life’ would need to neglect his other 
social, financial and political interests, and have no higher aim than the attainment of 
virtue and truth.  
 Theaetetus 150d78
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This is not a small thing to ask, it not a small thing to do, and therefore, as is realistic, 
many of Socrates’ interlocutors chose not to follow Socrates on this path. Their 
attachment to the ‘goods’ they hoped to gain from society prevented from seeking the 
‘goods’ of philosophy.   
As we see in the Gorgias whilst Socrates converses with Polus , Socrates’ idea that 79
the goods of virtue and philosophy are fundamentally more valuable than any other 
goods available in society, seemed to most as an extreme and preposterous idea. One 
would need to spend time with Socrates, and acquire a familiarity with and love for 
philosophy before they were able to appreciate this notion .  80
Some failure then is to be expected, since Socrates was making a very heavy demand 
indeed. It is Scotts (2000) opinion that Plato shows his readers this failure precisely 
with the purpose of giving them a realistic sense of how demanding the true 
philosophical life is, and to what radical extent it requires the turning away of a 
person from their previous attachments.   
Furthermore, I consider that some failure was not a problem for Plato. The life of 
philosophy was for him and exercise in excellence. Although anyone, regardless of 
social rank was invited to do philosophy, only those whose soul tended towards 
excellence might remain in the bosom of philosophy long enough to benefit from it. 
Most people, as Plato might have thought, preferred to be involved with the pettier 
aspects of life.  
 Gorgias 468e7; 473a; 473e679
 At Gorgias 474b7 Socrates begins to prove his point using philosophy; Theaetetus 80
150e
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The philosopher, in most people’s eyes is a social failure. The social cost of 
philosophy then, for people who might have taken her up, appears to be too high . 81
Plato’s texts often give some indication of this. We might say that that people fail to 
benefit from philosophy because they fail to love her and to choose her over other 
concerns of status.  
We have reason to think that Plato was disappointed with the reaction of the majority 
to philosophy. He might have felt that they were unworthy of its fruits, since they 
failed to embrace philosophy, and preferred the honors of societal life to the gifts of 
truth and virtue. This disappointment might explain why Plato emphasized how many 
persons failed to take up philosophy, and he seems to have been concerned with 
explaining why this occurred. Consider this in contrast to Xenophon’s account who 
declares confidently that Socrates often benefited his fellows with dialogue .  82
In Republic 489a for example, Socrates says: ‘…the best among the philosophers are 
useless to the masses. But tell him to blame their uselessness on those who don’t 
make use of them, not on those good philosophers.’ Furthermore, regarding the 
dignity with which we see Socrates acknowledging the rejection he so often 
experiences from people, we might refer to the following quote from the same 
section: ‘It isn’t for the ruler – if he is truly any use – to beg the subjects to accept his 
rule.’ 
One reason that Socrates gives for people failing in the life of philosophy is that they 
leave him and his method of seeking truth too early, before they have matured in the 
process . This might happen, as we have said earlier, because they do not want to 83
 As Schmid (1983: 344) put it: ‘…the person must be willing to endure suffering 81
humiliation, public ridicule for being refuted, just in order to persist and progress in 
the process of Socratic learning – and this means he must be willing to value truth and 
admit error, even at the cost of other, conventionally greater values such as honor 
(disgrace) and pleasure (discomfort).’  
 Memorabilia 4.3.882
 See Theaetetus 150d83
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undergo the complete change demanded of them by philosophy. One might argue that 
Plato is pointing to this as one of the reasons for Alcibiades’ failure when in the 
Symposium he admits that he avoids the company of Socrates so that he will not be 
transformed by him into a philosopher .  84
Notice that even Alcibiades, perhaps Socrates’ most famous ‘failure’, gives an 
emotional speech indicating that if he were to stay by the philosopher’s side, he would 
be completely transformed. He makes it clear that his rejection of Socrates is not 
because the philosopher has no notable effect on him, but because the effect that he is 
capable of is far too great .  85
Indeed Plato has Alcibiades say that Socrates: ‘conquers every one in discourse—not 
once in a while, like you the other day, but always’ . Plato then could not have seen 86
Socrates’ approach as ineffective, even if he felt that many people managed to not be 
benefited by it. 
Again, to refer to the point made by Kraut (1984) and Scott (2000), we might say that 
Socrates failed in being a teacher of virtue, something which he indeed denies being, 
but it is more difficult to deny that he had the effect on people which he is seen to 
attribute to himself as his task: the effect of making them doubt their own conceit of 
wisdom, making them question whether the life they lead is the better one, and 
turning their mind’s eye to the glory of philosophy.  
Another point to consider is that Athens in Socrates’ time was a small place. In his 
lifetime, the philosopher would have met all of the Athenian aristocrats, as well as 
many from other cities. So you might ask whether it is reasonable to say that Socrates 
was a failure because there is no tangible evidence that each person of the city made 





with Socrates was committed to him, since Socrates would have engaged with almost 
everyone.  
Finally, let me end by saying that several people did make progress. Nissias might be 
numbered among them; as well as Plato himself; Appolodorus; and on Myles 
Burnyeat’s account, Polemarchus went on to become a philosopher under Socrates’ 
influence . Diogenes Laertius would add: Aeschines, Phaedo, Euclides, Aristippus . 87 88
 This view was given in a personal conversation with Myles Burnyeat in Cambridge 87
2012




I have thus far been making the point that Socrates was some sort of a teacher; one 
who cared for the wellbeing of others and prodded them to seek virtue in their lives. 
However, this cannot simply be understood as saying that Socrates was a teacher of 
virtue.  
That Socrates was a teacher of virtue is indeed a common assumption amongst 
scholars. It is an easy view to form because we see Socrates always leading his 
interlocutors to interrogate their knowledge of the virtues. He often is heard asking 
‘what is X’, where X is a virtue. 
Of the surviving Platonic dialogues, twenty-seven are generally agreed to be authentic 
works of Plato. These are the: Apology; Charmides; Crito; Euthyphro; Gorgias; 
Hippias Minor; Ion; Laches; Protagoras; Euthydemus; Hippias Major; Cratylus; 
Phaedo; Symposium; Republic; Phaedrus; Parmenides; Theaetetus; Lysis; 
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II. What was Socrates  
a 
teacher of?
Menexenus; Meno; Timaeus; Critias; Sophist; Politicus; Philebus; and the Laws. Of 
these dialogues, twenty-two feature Socrates as the main speaker. Seventeen of these 
– 80% of all dialogues where Socrates leads the dialogue – are clearly concerned with 
ethical matters.  
The Charmides discusses the meaning of sophrosyne. The Crito debates justice, 
injustice, and the appropriate response to injustice. The Euthyphro deals with defining 
piety and holiness; the Laches with courage; the Protagoras with whether virtue can 
be taught; the Hippias Major with the καλόν; the Phaedo with the soul’s immortality 
– and it discusses also the ontological reality of the good. The Hippias Minor 
discusses the benefit of telling the truth rather than lying. 
The Symposium discusses love; the Republic the definition of justice; the Phaedrus 
again deals with love; the Lysis with the meaning of friendship; the Meno with the 
definition of virtue (aretē) and whether it can be taught. The Philebus argues that 
knowledge is more precious than pleasure, on the basis that knowledge has a direct 
relationship to that which is good; the Euthydemus shows eristic to be inferior to 
philosophy by demonstrating that it does not care for the truth, as well as contain a 
discussion of knowledge and happiness; and similarly the Gorgias places philosophy 
as superior to rhetoric because of its morality and its attachment to truth.   
The Apology, although its main point is not the discussion of an ethical question but 
the justification of Socrates’ life and activity, offers this justification on the basis of 
ethical concerns. Socrates here argues that his life is devoted to assisting people to 
examine their lives making clear his beliefs that: (a) the unexamined life is not worth 
living; because (b) ‘it is the greatest good for a man to discuss virtue every day’ . 89
 38a89
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Likewise, the remaining five dialogues, despite not being explicitly about ethical 
matters evolve nevertheless around the familiar Socratic concerns over ethical matters 
– what is true and what is good .   90
Overwhelmingly Socrates’ themes are about ethical matters. This fact has often 
inclined Plato’s readers to think of Socrates as a teacher of virtue. Alongside this we 
furthermore have the testimony of Aristotle, which can be casually read as confirming 
the impression that Socrates would have been a teacher of virtue.  Aristotle affirms, in 
Book I of his Metaphysics , that Socrates primarily busied himself – was preoccupied 91
with – ethical issues.   
Together with this evidence we have the testimony of Socrates himself in the 
Apology, which easily lends itself to the interpretation that: if Socrates were a teacher 
of anything he was a teacher of virtue. This comes at 36c where Socrates describes 
himself as having the function in the city of an instigator to ethical reflection. He 
says: ‘…I went to each of you privately and conferred upon him what I say is the 
greatest benefit…’ – to try to persuade you to be as good as possible. Again at 38 he 
says: that it is the greatest good for a man to discuss virtue every day.  
If we take this line of interpretation – that Socrates was a teacher of virtue – then we 
can draw on another example from the Apology: when Socrates refers to himself as a 
gadfly. At this point of the text he describes his own role in the Athenian society 
saying: ‘I was attached to this city by the god… as upon a great and noble horse 
which was somehow sluggish because of its size and needed to be stirred up by a kind 
 I do not claim that the question ‘what is true’ is resolvedly a question of ethics. 90
Claiming this would render all philosophy ethical. However, in the case of Socrates, 
what is true and what is ethical – as will be discussed at a later point of the thesis – 
coincides. Therefore, in studying Platonic texts where Socrates speaking, we assume 
that this question carries some ethical weight.  
 987a29-987b1391
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of gadfly’ . He then goes on to link this activity of his to the cultivation of virtue 92
saying: ‘I was always concerned with you, approaching each one of you like a father 
or an elder brother to persuade you to care for virtue’ .  93
Nevertheless, as natural as it might seem at first, a view of Socrates as a teacher of 
virtue is highly problematic. 
A serious problem faced by this view is that Socrates himself appears to have argued 
that virtue cannot be taught. This is something that we see clearly in the Meno, at 89e, 
where having said that ‘if… there are no teachers or learners of something, we should 
be right to assume that the subject cannot be taught’, Socrates then goes on to explain 
that although he has made every effort to find teachers of virtue, he has never found 
one .  94
Whether we take Socrates’ arguments against the teachability of virtue in the Meno to 
be conclusive or not, we can nevertheless consider that the statements he makes, he 
considers to be true. Where Socrates says that he has never found a teacher of virtue, 
we can take this to have been said frankly, and we have no textual evidence for which 
to think that Socrates considered himself to be an exception to this. We can assume 
therefore that he did not consider himself to be a teacher of virtue either.  
Furthermore, Socrates seems to be making this point again in the Protagoras at 319b. 
He tells Protagoras that he doubts whether one person can teach another how to be 
good, and his argument for this is the same – that he has never known anyone who 
has been a teacher of this. This repetition of the point can be taken as a confirmation 
of its seriousness. 
 30e92
 31b93
 The text used is translated by G.M.A. Grube, in Cooper (1997).94
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Indeed at a further point in the Protagoras it might appear that Socrates changed his 
view as to whether or not virtue could be taught. However – what is to the point – is 
that this does not alter Socrates’ frank proclamation that he has never met a teacher of 
virtue, including himself.  
Devereux and the solution from the Meno 
Devereux attempts to dissolve this problem and preserve the idea of Socrates as a 
teacher of virtue. In his paper ‘Nature and Teaching in Plato’s Meno’ he attempts to 
present the Meno in such a way that Socrates can have made his arguments and still 
be considered a teacher of virtue.  
Devereux’s argument is as follows: that in the Meno Socrates makes the distinction 
between two types of teaching practice. The one, named Sophistical teaching - as it is 
associated with the Sophists – is when there occurs a transmission of knowledge from 
one person (the teacher) to another (the student). The second type, called the Socratic 
conception of teaching - as Devereux considers it to be the manner in which Socrates 
himself teaches – is when a person is assisted to gather knowledge from within 
themselves.  
Devereux argues that the discussion of the theory of recollection, and the example of 
the slave-boy being guided by Socrates to correct knowledge, are intended to 
distinguish between the two sorts of teaching practice. 
Having made a distinction between two conceptions of teaching, Devereux goes on to 
say that Socrates says to Meno that virtue cannot be taught id est in the Sophistical 
sense – it cannot be taught using the ‘wrong’ sort of teaching. He says: 
Since Socrates uses “teaching” in the recollection passage to refer only to sophistical teaching, we must 
understand his claim that teaching is impossible to apply only to this kind of teaching. The basis of the 
claim is made clear by the theory of recollection. If what is learned is in all cases something which 
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comes from within the learner, then the idea that knowledge may be transmitted from one individual to 
another is simply a chimaera. Socrates’ argument, understood in this way, leaves open the possibility of 
a kind of teaching which is based on a correct understanding of what is involved in learning .   95
It can indeed be said that in the Meno Socrates distinguishes between teaching as the 
transmission from a knower to a learner, and teaching as recollection. Furthermore, 
Devereux is correct in saying that Socrates rejects the first sort of teaching, saying 
that it is impossible, and not teaching at all.  
The distinction between two sorts of teaching is made between 81e-85d. At 81e 
Socrates makes the claim that what we call teaching is actually a process of 
recollection. At 82 he confirms that there is no ‘teaching’ – in the Sophistical sense as 
Meno means it – but only a process of recollection is possible. It is incorrect, he 
suggests, to think of teaching and learning in the Sophistical sense.  
Again at 84c Socrates distinguishes between ‘teaching’ and asking questions saying: 
‘Look then how he will come out of his perplexity while searching along with me. I 
shall do nothing more than ask questions and not teach him. Watch whether you find 
me teaching and explaining things to him instead of asking for his opinion’. Then at 
85d, summing up the process of education that he is employing on the slave-boy 
Socrates says: ‘And he will know it without having been taught but only questioned, 
and find the knowledge within himself’.  
However, the point that Devereux wants to make – that Socrates’ claims leave open 
the possibility that virtue can be taught using the Socratic mode of teaching – cannot 
be supported. This is because in the Meno Socrates makes it clear that when he says 
that virtue cannot be taught, he is using the notion of teaching in both the Socratic and 
the Sophistical sense. Thus Devereux is not justified in claiming that only the 
teaching of virtue via the Sophistical mode is rejected as a possibility by Socrates. 
 1978: 12095
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We can see this at 87b9-87c1. Before returning to the question of whether virtue can 
be taught – where he goes on to say that it is not – Socrates prefaces what follows 
with: ‘…is it teachable or not, or, as we were just saying, recollectable? Let it make 
no difference to us which term we use’. It is clear from this that Socrates does not 
intend, in the Meno, to claim that teaching of virtue in a Socratic manner is possible 
whereas not in the Sophistical manner.  
Therefore, I conclude that Devereux’s attempt to save the idea of Socrates as a teacher 
of virtue from the devastating effect of Socrates’ own words is not textually valid. We 
are thus left with the difficulty that if we are to conceive of Socrates as a teacher of 
virtue we do so contrary to his own direct proclamation.   
 
II.I 
We have arrived at what seems like a stalemate. We have said (A) that what Socrates 
did constitutes some form of education; (B) that he was not a teacher of virtue; and 
(C) that what he taught pertained to helping people lead a virtuous life. Our problem 
then that arises is how one can go about and teach virtue when they don’t teach 
virtue? 
We want to say that Socrates had some form of educational project that was an act of 
care for the souls of his fellows. In chapter III we will go on to argue that the health of 
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II.I But doesn’t all this 
mean that Socrates was a 
teacher 
of virtue after all?
the soul is the state of virtue , and that to care for one’s soul involves fleeing injustice 96
and partaking of justice.  
Socrates might not have posed himself as a teacher of virtue, giving knowledge of 
virtue to pupils, as perhaps some sophists may have claimed to do. Nevertheless, if 
with his approach he hoped to contribute to the wellbeing of his fellows, urging them 
and assisting them dialogically to seek virtue, then, can we not say that he was a 
teacher of at least an (primary) aspect of virtue? Have we not come back around on 
ourselves? 
II.I.I 
One might object to this problem by saying that Socrates did not teach people how to 
behave virtuously (where to ‘be virtuous’ means to behave in such a manner), but 
rather, that he concerned himself with the epistemic aspects of virtue. Perhaps we can 
say that Socrates taught something about virtue in an abstracted sense, but that he did 
not teach one how to be virtuous (the act of ‘doing virtue’).  
This distinction could be imagined as when a person learns something about music 
theory and musical appreciation but does not learn how to play an instrument, for 
making music is a skill of its own. 
However, such an objection cannot dissolve the problem we have come to, because 
such a view does not correspond to what we know about Socrates from Plato’s texts. 
There exist two difficulties for this view: the first is the link that Socrates saw 
between philosophy and action; and the second is the link he saw between virtue and 
enquiry. 
 Some scholars have noticed that Socrates speaks about virtue in the soul as the 96
health of the soul and vice as its illness and have concluded that Socrates was a sort of 
physician. See Moes (2007:41)
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The premise that philosophy and action are linked is basic to Socrates and underlines 
his belief that no one errs willingly and that virtue is knowledge. It is the backbone of 
Socratic intellectualism .  97
Knowing the truth and being virtuous are linked for Socrates because, as is well 
known, knowing the truth is linked for him with avoiding vice and seeking virtue. As 
he says in the Protagoras: ‘…knowledge is a fine thing capable of ruling a person, 
and if someone were to know what is good and bad, then he would not be forced by 
anything to act otherwise than knowledge dictates, and intelligence would be 
sufficient to save a person’ .  98
We have no reason to think that Socrates held that contemplation -abstracted from its 
impacts on the whole person and upon action - is a virtuous aim in itself. In what 
Socrates says above, philosophizing and acting virtuously are coupled: they are part 
of the same movement towards good virtuous actions. 
A brief reminder of Socratic intellectualism then shows us all the more that our 
problem of Socrates being a sort of teacher of virtue is a real one. 
Secondly, Socrates is explicit that there exists a link between virtue and enquiry. 
Enquiry, Socrates tells us, equips the person to be virtuous.  
This is seen in the Euthyphro. Here Socrates says to Euthyphro that having the 
definition of piety lets you make decisions about what constitutes a pious or an 
impious act. The thesis made here by Socrates is that studying universals allows one 
to understand the particular . It is here suggested by Socrates that enquiry into the 99
matter of piety – coming to understand what piety is – has a direct result of enabling 
 This is a standard view assumed for example by Evans (2010)97
 352c-352c798
 see Euthyphro 6e99
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people to act piously. Through enquiry they acquire a criterion for knowing which act 
is pious and is to be preferred.  
Further on in the Euthyphro, at 15d Socrates exclaims: 
‘so we must investigate again from the beginning what piety is….if you had no clear 
knowledge of piety and impiety you would never have ventured to prosecute your old father 
for murder…’ 
Here Socrates is making the point again, by saying that Euthyphro’s actions need to 
be informed by his knowledge of piety, the object of their enquiry. One’s actions 
ought not be done in ignorance. The matter of enquiring into ‘what is piety’ is 
therefore of practical importance. It ought to inform ones choices. 
Socrates himself does not claim to know what piety is, and this lack of knowledge is 
reflected in his actions. Socrates, we are told, who does not know what piety is, does 
not conduct himself with the confidence of one who does consider that they know. 
He, we are led to believe, would never persecute another .  100
Another dialogue where a link can be seen between enquiry and virtue is the Crito. In 
the Crito we learn something about Socrates. He is a man – as his friend points out – 
who ‘claims through out [his] life to care for virtue’ . He attends to virtue in all his 101
acts: that is, he has sought to be virtuous in every aspect of his life.  
Socrates accepts this characterization of himself and manifests it immediately. He 
demonstrates to us the manner in which he has strived to care for virtue in his 
response to Crito: ‘We must… examine whether we should act in this way or not, as 
 2b100
 Crito 45d. The Greek reads: ‘ταῦτα αἱρεῖσθαι, φάσκοντά γε δὴ ἀρετῆς διὰ παντὸς 101
τοῦ βίου ἐπιµελεῖσθαι’ 
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not only now but at all times I am the kind of man who listens to nothing within me 
but the argument that on reflection seems best to me’ . 102
Crito is trying to convince Socrates to act in a particular way: to escape from prison 
and to thus escape the death penalty. Socrates responds that they ought to enquire into 
what is just and what is appropriate, and then to act accordingly. Even at the threat of 
death, Socrates chooses to act in accordance with the principles which he holds, 
which he has secured through a life of enquiry.  
Indeed it is so significant for Socrates that his acts are the result of principles 
developed in enquiry (philosophy) that he is willing to face any consequence, even 
death. He says: ‘I cannot, now that this fate has come upon me, discard the arguments 
I used…. I value and respect the same principles as before, and if we have no better 
arguments to bring up at this moment, be sure that I shall not agree with you, not even 
if the power of the majority were to frighten us with more bogeys, as if we were 
children, with threats of incarcerations and executions and confiscation of property. 
How should we examine this matter most reasonably?’  103
Let us also take another point of evidence from the Crito. Beginning a train of thought 
at 46e Socrates says that ‘one should value some people’s opinions, but not others.’ 
This point was also made at 44d where Socrates tells Crito that they need not be 
concerned with the opinions of the majority, but only with the opinions of ‘reasonable 
people’. It is the opinions of reasonable people that are worth taking into account – 
and these reasonable people are ones who ‘will believe things were done as they were 
done.’ The claim is that the majority – not having reasonable opinions – will not form 
a correct opinion but a false one; and that this need not be given any consideration . 104
 Crito 46b102
 46b6-c6103
 see also 47a and 47b8104
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Socrates builds his argument concluding that: if you ignore the advise of the wise one 
who has a good opinion, and if you take bad advice from one who is ignorant, then 
you will be harmed. In the same way, Socrates says, that a man would be harmed if he 
took dietary advice from someone ignorant of the matter, one would be spiritually 
harmed if they act in accordance with foolish opinions about moral matters .  105
The wise men of whom Socrates is speaking here are those who have enquired into 
the matter in question; and those who are foolish and give harmful advice referred to 
here are those who are ignorant of the matter.  
Socrates is making the point that: the opinion of one who is ignorant is rendered 
useless. Being attentive to reality – seeing what things really are like – makes your 
opinion worthwhile. One single man who has an informed opinion – who knows what 
he is talking about – has an opinion that is worth more than that of all the others. The 
opinion of the ignorant is worth nothing, and is in fact harmful and should be avoided.  
If you obey the opinion of the many who have no understanding, you will suffer evil. 
This reminds us of the introductory scenes of the Protagoras when Socrates chastises 
the young Hippocrates for being eager to subject himself to the influence of a sophist 
of whom he has not examined the moral worth . Our actions, Socrates in effect says, 106
should be guided by those who have developed an understanding of a matter – those 
who have enquired seriously into it. Then our actions can be correct and virtuous.  
We can say then that philosophical enquiry and learning are for Socrates an important 
part of ‘being virtuous’. The two cannot be separated, and therefore our problem 
remains: that by urging people to philosophize, and by assisting them in the process, 






For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face-to-face: now I know in part; but then shall I 
know even as also I am known. 
- Paul’s letter to the Corinthians, 13:12 - 
In what follows it will be claimed that although Socrates was in a sense a teacher of 
virtue, the sense in which he was one can be qualified making him ‘less than a teacher 
of virtue’, and therefore justifying him in believing that there are no teachers of 
virtue, whilst all the while doing his best to benefit the souls of his fellows.  
I will present my claim in eight parts. Firstly (i) I will draw attention to the fact that 
virtue for Socrates was a great thing: it was the nature of the divine. Then I will show 
(ii) that becoming akin to virtue (goodness) is the purpose of the examined life; since 
(iii) attaining to it was for Socrates the proper aim of human life. Naturally then (iv) 
Socrates aimed for this for himself and for others. Philosophy has this aim.  
Sections (ii) – (iv) function to reaffirm that what Socrates did was bring people closer 
to virtue; but they also bring the matter of philosophy into the equation firmly.  
Then, in an attempt to show that Socrates was humble-minded regarding this project I 
will present (v) Protagoras’ definition of philosophy. I will say that (vi) Plato seems to 
have agreed with Protagoras’ definition; and (vii) therefore philosophy, and the 
teaching of philosophy, can be seen as a humbler version of teaching virtue. Socrates’ 
discussion of the sophists in the Apology will be given as evidence that Socrates held 
some such humble view of himself. Finally, it will be concluded that (viii) Socrates 
was a ‘humbler version’ of a teacher of virtue. 
Since philosophy was Socrates’ way of relating to virtue and divinity, and philosophy 
(I argue) is a humbler relationship than being wise; Socrates’ approach to virtue (and 
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his way of teaching people to approach it) was something ‘lesser and more humble’ 
than what might be meant by being a teacher of virtue.  
(i) Virtue was for Socrates the greatest possible human achievement. It was the source 
of success in life; and it was the nature of the divine.  
There are many examples of occasions where Socrates expresses the view that 
success in life is linked to virtue. Let us consider the Crito as an example .  107
Here Socrates speaks plainly about virtue and its necessity for one’s life. He tells the 
reader that a life is only successful in achieving any goodness if it is virtuous. At 47d 
he says that one needs to be careful to learn from, and subject himself to, the 
teachings of the virtuous – for, he says, following the lead of the ignorant man who 
cannot guide one in what is virtue can be very harmful. 
Again, at 47e Socrates makes the strong claim that life is not worth living if one’s 
virtue is corrupted. He continues with this at 48b where he says that only a good life 
is worth living, where a good life means the virtuous life of justice. Again, along these 
same lines, at 48d Socrates says that it is better to die than to do wrong. At 49b, he 
concludes saying: that wrongdoing and injustice are in every way harmful and 
shameful to the wrongdoer.  
Socrates leaves no space for doubt. There is no way, he says, in which a person can 
have a life without virtue that is anything more than dire wretchedness to which death 
is preferable.  
Furthermore, as Socrates tells Theodorus in the digression of the Theaetetus, virtue is 
‘divinely important’. It is the nature of the divine. He says this at 176e: 
 The Crito serves well as an example, because here Socrates speaks candidly and 107
forthrightly about his own views – without any discernible irony. See 46c-d
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‘My fiend, there are two patterns set up in reality. One is divine and supremely happy; the 
other has nothing of God in it, and is the pattern of the deepest unhappiness. This truth the 
evildoer does not see; blinded by folly and utter lack of understanding, he fails to perceive 
that the effect of his unjust practices is to make him grow more and more like the one, and 
less and less like the other.’ 
And at 176c: 
‘In God there is no sort of wrong whatsoever; he is supremely just, and the thing most like 
him is the man who has become as just as it lies in human nature to be.’ 
(ii) Indeed, Socrates did seek virtue, through philosophy, both for himself and for 
others.  
Notice that Socrates famously says that: ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’ . 108
He does not say ‘the un-virtuous life is not worth living’  - as would have been an 
obvious thing for him to say and in direct accordance with his views expressed 
elsewhere – but the unexamined life.  
Socrates can say this because for him the purpose of the examined life is to become 
akin to virtue, as also the divine is virtuous. He tells Theodorus this in the digression 
of the Theaetetus.  
Socrates compares the philosopher, calling him a free man, to the un-philosophical 
man whom he likens to a slave; and concludes that the philosopher seeks with his way 
of being to become virtuous. He tells Theodorus that: the actions and state of being of 
the free man result in virtue, and contribute to peace and goodness in the world. 
Likewise, the actions and state of being of the slave are vices and lead to evil on earth. 
By being un-philosophical, the enslaved man partakes in vice and evil. This ‘low’ 
condition of being is metaphorically described as being on earth, and its alternative - 
 Apology 38a6108
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being philosophical and mindful of essence and the divine - is described as being high 
up in heaven . Socrates enjoins us, saying that each person needs, with urgency, to 109
become free: to move from being aligned with vice to being partakers of the good: ‘to 
make all haste to escape from earth to heaven’ .   110
‘…and escape means becoming as like God as possible; and a man becomes like God 
when he becomes just and pious, with understanding’ . Restating this then Socrates 111
says: ‘one should try to escape from wickedness and pursue virtue’ . 112
This view is similar to what we find in the Apology. From 29d8 to 30a5 Socrates 
explains to the jury that he urges his fellows to stop caring about wealth, honor and 
reputation as they are found in society, but to turn their attention to the proper care of 
their souls. In other words: to care rather for that which will actually benefit them. 
Caring for the soul, is seen to mean making it akin to virtue, and at 30b2 Socrates says 
that what he does is tell people about the value of virtue. 
(iii) For Socrates, the unexamined life was not worth living; and the proper aim of 
human life was to attain to virtue. This would be its success. 
(iv) With such a belief as is expounded by Socrates in the Apology, and the Theaetetus 
among other occasions, it was natural then, and most prudent, that Socrates aimed for 
this for himself and for others: to follow the odos  of philosophy, and to cultivate 113
virtue. This was Socrates’ project of philosophy.  




 Greek word meaning ‘road’, ‘path’ or ‘way’. Methodos is composed of ‘meta’ and 113
‘odos’, meaning: to be on that particular path. See Μπαµπινιώτη (1998)
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(v) In what sense then was Socrates the philosopher, who encouraged and assisted 
others in the ways of philosophy, not a teacher of virtue? Our answer comes in the 
way that we define philosophy, where to be a lover of sophia is a different condition 
than being a sophos (a possessor of wisdom). 
According to Diogenes Laertius : the first person to name himself a philo-sopher 114
(that is: a lover of wisdom) was Pythagoras; and his reason for naming himself so was 
that: µηδένα γὰρ εἶναι σοφὸν [ἄνθρωπον] ἀλλ᾽ ἢ θεόν. None is wise but god. The 
purpose of this compound word then was to achieve two concepts at once:  
1. That the philosopher loves and longs for wisdom. This is compatible with 
pursuing sophia much like any lover pursues the object of their love, and 
2. That being wise is a superior state, more exalted than what a human person 
can be – being a condition of the divine. 
Being a philosopher then is an appropriate condition for a human person, but it is 
something more humble that being a sophos. A philosopher, does not need to posses 
wisdom the way a sophos  does, but they can love it and seek it nevertheless.  115
(vi) This definition of the term philosopher is found exactly the same in Plato’s work. 
In the Phaedrus at 278d Plato has Socrates say: ‘I think, Phaedrus, that the epithet 
wise is too great and befits God alone; but the name philosopher, that is, “lover of 
wisdom,” or something of the sort would be more fitting and modest for such a 
man.’  116
 Lives of Eminent Philosophers: 12, see Hicks (1972)114
 Lesher (1987: 284) makes the point that Socrates in the Apology is denying being a 115
sophos.
 Translation by Fowler (1925)116
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In the Greek this is: τὸ µὲν σοφόν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, καλεῖν ἔµοιγε µέγα εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ θεῷ 
µόνῳ πρέπειν: τὸ δὲ ἢ φιλόσοφον ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι µᾶλλόν τε ἂν αὐτῷ καὶ ἁρµόττοι καὶ 
ἐµµελεστέρως ἔχοι. 
The sort of man of whom they are speaking as deserving of the epithet philosopher, is 
one who has achieved more genuine value in his words precisely because, unlike his 
fellows, he: ‘has composed his writings with knowledge of the truth, and is able to 
support them by discussion of that which he has written, and has the power to show 
by his own speech that the written words are of little worth…’   117
Socrates never says: ‘I am wise regarding virtue, let me teach you what I know’; but 
he does say something of the sort: ‘I am a lover of wisdom, I pursue it always, and so 
should you. Be like me in that I seek the truth about these matters.’  
According to Lesher (1987: 286) the idea of human knowledge being limited in its 
capacity was common in Plato’s time: shared by Heraclitus, Xenophanes, and 
Democritus. Xenophon seems also to have attributed a distinction between human and 
divine knowledge to Socrates on these grounds. 
(vii) Furthermore, Socrates often suggests that he can help someone in the path of 
philosophy. As he tells Theaetetus when he compares his own activity to that of a 
midwife of men’s souls: he has the skills to bring people into a better conceptual 
relationship with virtue.   
To begin with, Socrates calls himself the son of Phaenarete  (Φαιναρέτης), a name 118
which carries the literal meaning of ‘she who brings virtue to light’ . This notion, of 119
bringing forth that which is good from amongst the intellectual activity of his 
interlocutors, is one that continues throughout this allegorical description of the 
 278c, translation by Fowler (1925)117
 Theaetetus 149a2118
 see note by M. J. Levett, in Cooper (1997)119
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Socratic pedagogical art. This name Socrates gives to his mother prepares us for what 
is to follow: Socrates’ claim that he has the skill of discerning that intellectual content 
of others which is ‘good and worthwhile’ - and worth bearing - and that he has the 
method that assists them to bring this good intellectual content forth .  120
Socrates can teach philosophy , and in this way bring people closer to virtue; but 121
this is something humbler that claiming to be wise regarding virtue, and of being able 
to teach others what virtue is.  
Let us consider what Socrates says in the Apology regarding the sophists before he 
eventually tells the jury that he lives the life of philosophy and urges his fellows to 
imitate him in this.  
At 19d8-20c3 Socrates shows that the accusation brought against him by Meletus 
involves the assumption that Socrates is like the fee-earning sophist teachers of 
virtue ; the sort of men who claim to be ‘expert in this kind of excellence, the 122
human and social kind.’  123
In response to this accusation, as Reeve (1989: 10) says, Socrates tries to explain how 
the sort of wisdom he possesses and utilizes differs from that of the sophists who 
claim to teach virtue. He says: that he has a sort of wisdom that can be rightly termed 
‘human wisdom’; whereas the sophists pretend to have a wisdom that is more than 
human .  124
 For example, see also Theaetetus 150e120
 The claim that Socrates can teach philosophy is discussed further in chapter five.121




Henry Teloh (1986:110) notices this distinction made by Socrates between his own 
human wisdom and the supra-human wisdom that he suggests the sophists might need 
to have for what they claim to teach. Teloh holds that Socrates distinguished between 
two sorts of wisdom: divine and human wisdom; and that in order to do what the 
sophists claim to do, one would need to have a divine sort of wisdom – a sort of 
wisdom that is beyond that which Socrates can claim to possess.  
On this reading, Socrates is making the point that he is not a teacher – as his accusers 
had presented him at the trial – in the manner of sophists, since he does not possess 
the knowledge that would justify such a confident act.  
By saying: that to be that which a sophist claims to be, one would need divine wisdom 
– wisdom that is greater than that which Socrates possesses – Socrates showed that he 
himself – having only human wisdom – was more humble regarding his knowledge. 
According to Reeve (1989: 31) it was precisely for this knowledge that his wisdom 
was human that the oracle praised Socrates. He was wise in that he made no ‘hubristic 
claims to wisdom’ and the oracle made an example of him so as to ‘make a general 
deflationary point about human wisdom’.  
(viii) What we are left with then is this: that Socrates was indeed some sort of a 
teacher who urged people, and assisted people in the process of philosophy, ultimately 
for the purpose of caring for his own soul and for theirs. Nevertheless, he viewed 
himself as somehow lesser than a teacher of virtue: he had a more humble 
understanding of what he did. He saw himself as a philosopher, not as a sophist, 
because being a philosopher was the best a person can do.  
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With these in mind then, let us continue having said: that in fact Socrates was a sort of 
teacher of virtue, though of a humbler sort than the sophists, and by his own 
estimation, a more authentic and realistic sort. He was then: a ‘humbler version’ . 125
 Kuperus (2007: 196) has argued that in the Protagoras Socrates is making a 125
distinction: that virtue cannot be taught by telling something to another, as the 
sophists speak to their pupils, but, that it can be learnt through praxis: through active 
involvement in Socratic question-and-answer (philosophical enquiry). This, according 
to Kuperus is because one needs to develop one’s knowledge of virtue by actively 




We have said so far that Socrates was an educator who cared for the souls of his 
fellows. The act with which Socrates actively cared was the philosophical dialogue.  
Our aim in this thesis is to understand better this Socratic act. For the purpose then of 
developing a sense of how Socrates hoped to benefit the souls of his fellows through 
dialogue, we will now turn our attention to the root question of: what sort of thing is 
the soul, and consequently, what sort of care does it benefit from.  
We will examine what view can be found in the dialogues termed as ‘early’ or 
‘Socratic’ . Then, from an examination of the textual references to the soul we will 126
be able to say what sort of care Socrates bestowed upon the soul of his fellows. 
  
Let us now look at the text to describe what Socrates proposed regarding the soul: 
 A view that Gregory Vlastos (1991:55) saw as ‘symptomatic of the metaphysically 126
reticent temper’ that Plato’s Socrates had regarding the soul; but that John Burnet 
(1916) saw as being an essentially new and controversial proposal made by Socrates. 
Berghash and Jillson (1998: 314) agree with Burnet that Socrates changed the concept 
of soul that existed before him. 
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III. What sort of thing is the soul  
And, what sort of care does it 
need? 
 References to the soul in the ‘early’ dialogues 
(1) In the Charmides, Socrates says that the soul is well when ‘it acquires and 
possesses temperance’ . 127
(2) In the Laches Socrates seems to be saying that the education of the young is an 
important matter and needs to be chosen with care . His reason for this suggests that 128
one’s soul can be benefited or harmed by the learning that a person acquires through 
education . The dialogue concludes by stating that it is beneficial for the soul to seek 129
to know the Good . Without altering the content of this proposition made by 130
Socrates, we can otherwise restate is as: ‘the soul of a person – and the reality that 
concerns people - is such that people benefit from seeking to know the good.’ 
(3) In the Hippias Minor Socrates gives the impression that the soul is such that it can 
have knowledge (or wisdom). At 364 he uses the phrase: ‘your soul’s wisdom’ . 131
Likewise, at 372e he suggests that the soul is such that it is harmed by ignorance, 
stating: ‘you’d do me a much greater good if you give my soul relief from ignorance, 
than if you gave my body relief from disease’ . This phrase also gives us to 132
understand that the soul is therefore more important in the bigger scheme of things 
than the body is. 
 Charmides 157, translation by Rosamond Kent Sprague, in Cooper (1997)127
 See for example Laches 187d128
 Laches 185e129
 Laches 200-201c130
 ‘τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς σοφίαν’. The translation used here is by Nicholas D. Smith in 131
Cooper (1997)
 Translation by Nicholas D. Smith, in Cooper (1997)132
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(4) In the Gorgias at 453d Socrates talks about both persuasion and learning as being 
in the soul. Again, at 453a4, Socrates says: ‘ἢ πειθὼ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ 
ποιεῖν’ .   133
(5) At 456c9-456d8 Socrates tells Gorgias that it is his belief that the soul is more 
capable of distinguishing that which is good for a person, and that it ought to govern 
over the body. The soul is the seat of a person’s ability to know things for what they 
are, and to not be governed merely by pleasure, but to be able to evaluate matters 
appropriately. Socrates claims that ‘if the soul didn’t govern the body but the body 
governed itself’ then there would be chaos – ‘the world according to Anaxagoras 
would prevail’.  
(6) At 477a9 Socrates suggests that a person’s soul can be in a better or in a worse 
state in this lifetime. When the soul partakes in just acts then it is benefited, by 
somehow thus being more just itself. Likewise, we are to understand, that a soul that 
partakes of what is unjust is harmed. Therefore, Socrates tells us, since it is always 
beneficial for the soul to partake of justice and that which is good, it is beneficial for 
the soul that has partaken of injustice to be corrected. A person’s soul, Socrates tells 
us, undergoes improvement when it is justly disciplined .  134
(7) The corrupt condition of the soul, Socrates tells us, is the condition of being 
unjust, ignorant, cowardly, lacking in discipline , ‘and the like’ . At this point 135 136
Socrates repeats what he had said in the Hippias Minor , that it worse for one’s soul 137
 Translated as ‘instilling persuasion in the souls of an audience’ by Smith, in 133
Cooper (1997).
 Socrates is clear about this: Brickhouse and Smith (1992: 65), even though the role 134
that Socrates saw for punishment is not clearly understood: Brickhouse and Smith 
(2007)
 See Gorgias 477e135
 See Gorgias 477b136
 Hippias Minor 373137
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to be in a bad way, than it is for one to be physically unwell, or even financially 
deprived. ‘Badness in the soul’ (injustice) is called the ‘most serious kind of badness’, 
and it is concluded that ‘the happiest man, then, is the one who doesn’t have any 
badness in his soul’ .  138
(8) At 493 Socrates tells of a description of the soul which is reminiscent of the 
description in the Republic. Socrates does not commit himself to this view, but retells 
it as he had ‘heard one of the wise men say’. He distances himself even further from 
this position when he says that: ‘this account is on the whole a bit strange’ .  139
However, he does let us know that the reason he has mentioned this description of the 
soul is because it carries the same conclusions regarding wellbeing that he himself is 
putting forth. At 493c5 he tells Callicles that this account of the soul ‘does make clear 
what I want to persuade you to change your mind about if I can’. The account of the 
soul discussed is this: that the soul has parts; that there is a part of the soul where 
appetites reside; and it is this part of the soul which is open to persuasion and which 
‘shifts back and forth’. 
(9) At 501b8 Socrates shows that the soul is such that is can get pleasure.  
(10) Again, reminiscent somewhat of that discussion of the soul in the Republic, at 
504b4 ff. Socrates claims that the soul can be in a healthy or an unhealthy state; and 
that to be healthy means that the soul is ordered and well-organized. He goes on to 
say that a soul is well ordered and organized when it has justice and self-control. 
(11) Still speaking with Callicles, Socrates asks if it is not so that the soul is such that 
it can be organized and ordered, or disorganized, just like a household can be. We can 
assume that Socrates believed this assertion to be true, for when Callicles urged him 
to give his own opinion on this matter Socrates assented and went on to say that: just 
 Gorgias 478d11138
 493c4, translation by Donald J. Zeyl, in Cooper 1997139
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as ‘the name for the states of organization of the body is “healthy”, as a result of 
which health and the rest of bodily excellence comes into being in it’, the same can be 
said of the soul.  
The state in the soul which is equivalent to health in the body is the state of being 
‘lawful’, and it is this that ‘leads people to become law-abiding and orderly’. To be 
law-abiding and orderly, Socrates tells us, is to be just and having self-control .   140
(12) Therefore, Socrates goes on to say, an orator who cared about the well-being of 
his listeners would ‘always give his attention to how justice may come to exist in the 
souls of his fellow citizens and injustice be gotten rid of, how self control may come 
to exist there and lack of discipline be gotten rid of’ .  141
(13) At 505b Socrates says regarding the soul: ‘as long as it’s corrupt, in that it’s 
foolish, undisciplined, unjust and impious, it should be kept away from its appetites 
and not be permitted to do anything other than what will make it better….for this is no 
doubt better for the soul itself.’ 
From 506c5 onwards the Gorgias takes an extraordinary turn. Socrates begins to 
speak himself about the matter that was being discussed with the group. Socrates 
begins the task of having a dialogue with himself, asking himself questions, and 
answering them as he himself thought to be correct. Socrates puts himself in the place 
of his interlocutor. We can assume therefore, that what Socrates says during this 
exercise is his honest opinion, since it is a criterion he sets to the people who answer 
his questions – that they answer truthfully stating what they believe to be the case. 
This is what he goes on to say: 
 Gorgias 504c7-504d2, translation by Donald J. Zeyl, in Cooper 1997140
 504e141
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(14) At 506d he says: that it is ‘organization, correctness and craftsmanship’ that 
brings about excellence in the soul.   
(15) At 506e: that ‘a soul which has its own order is better than a disordered one.’ 
(16) At 507: that ‘an orderly soul is a self-controlled one’. Therefore, ‘a self-
controlled soul is a good one’.  
(17) At 507a5: ‘I say that if the self-controlled soul is a good one, then a soul that’s 
been affected the opposite way of the self-controlled one is a bad one. And this, it’s 
turned out, is the foolish and undisciplined one’. 
(18) At 511: that the soul of the unjust man is corrupt and mutilated. 
(19) At 512: ‘if a man has many incurable diseases in what is more valuable than his 
body, his soul, life for that man is not worth living…. for a corrupt person it’s better 
not to be alive, for he necessarily lives badly.’ 
(20) At 522e Socrates speaks in a manner that shows that he believes that the soul 
continues to exist after physical death. He also shows that he believes that the soul of 
a dead person will be held accountable for all the just or unjust actions of that person 
during her lifetime. He says: ‘for no one who isn’t totally bereft of reason and courage 
is afraid to die; doing what’s unjust is what he’s afraid of. For to arrive in Hades with 
one’s soul stuffed full of unjust actions is the ultimate of all bad things.’ 
Socrates then goes on to give an account that he claims will show that this is true. He 
warns his interlocutor Callicles that this will not be a mere tale, but that what he is 
about to tell him is true . His account contains the following:  142
- (21) ‘that when a man who has lived a just and pious life comes to his end, he 
goes to the Isle of the Blessed, to make his abode in complete happiness, 
 Gorgias 523142
!  77
beyond the reach of evils, but when one who has lived in an unjust and 
godless way dies, he goes to the prison of payment and retribution, the one 
they call Tartarus.’   143
- (22) That ‘death… is actually nothing but the separation of two things from 
each other, the soul and the body.’  144
- (23) That after death a man’s soul will remain in the same condition that he 
had it during his lifetime . 145
- (24) After death each person’s soul will be judge as to whether the man was 
just and good or not – with no regard to any of the things such as wealth and 
fame that we esteem in human societies . 146
- (25) ‘Bad’ acts, such as perjury and injustice will leave their stamp on our 
souls and we will be judged for these after this life is over . 147
- (26) When a soul is not nurtured on truth during this life, everything ‘warped 
as a result of deception and pretense, and nothing is strait’. Furthermore, souls 
will be ‘full of distortion and ugliness due to license and luxury, arrogance and 
incontinence in its actions.’  148
Socrates concludes his account of the judgment of souls after death by saying: 
‘For my part, Callicles, I’m convinced by these accounts, and I think about how 
I’ll reveal to the judge a soul that’s as healthy as it can be’ . Therefore, he 149
insists, one should live a life which will ‘clearly turn out to be advantageous in 










That concludes the references to the soul made in the Gorgias, thus, let us now 
turn to see what references to the soul are made in the first book of the Republic. 
(27) The philosophical content of the Republic begins the same way that the 
Gorgias ends: Cephalus makes reference to the ‘stories that we are told about 
Hades’ – about how a soul will be judged after death and that its fate will be 
determined by whether a man was just or unjust during his lifetime. Cephalus 
claims that if a man has lived a just and pious life then in old age he is calm and 
happy, having ‘sweet good hope’; otherwise, he becomes afraid for the fate of his 
soul .  151
Socrates then, in apparent agreement with this claim , turns the conversation to 152
examining what it means to be just. He challenges the notion implicit in what 
Cephalus had been saying – that justice unconditionally is ‘speaking the truth and 
paying whatever debts one has incurred’ . This is in response to a claim that 153
Cephalus had made, that the rich are better able to be just in this life since they are 
able to fund religious sacrifices and pay their debts to others.  
The conversation then becomes an exploration of ‘what is justice’; and if we are 
to observe the continuity of theme between this dialogue and the Gorgias, then we 
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Socrates. However, it is the opinion of the author that Socrates is not seen to disagree 
with the sentiment expressed by Cephalus, which he calls ‘admirable’ at 331b. 
Socrates does not seem to challenge anything about this view, but rather to question 
what constitutes the justice that the soul should aim at. This agreement of Socrates 
might be confirmed by the fact that Plato chooses to end the Republic similarly to 
how the dialogue is began here by Cephalus. At 614a Socrates speaks about the 
blessings that the just soul can hope to receive in the afterlife. This is followed by the 




can assume that the dialogue will concern itself with which inclinations, being 
just, will benefit one’s soul, both in this life and in the next. 
The same point that Socrates made in the Gorgias is to be defended again in the 
Republic – namely, that the life of a just person in better than the life of an unjust 
person . In the Gorgias we were told that this is because the unjust man harms 154
his soul through being unjust, and thus procures upon himself the worst possible 
harm .   155
(28) The conclusion of the first book of the Republic is much the same as that of 
the Gorgias. At 353d, Socrates leads Thrasymachus to agree, that just as it is the 
function of the eyes to see, it is the function of the soul to take care of things, rule, 
deliberate, ‘and the like’. It is also the function of the soul to impart life on the 
person. Furthermore, we are told that a ‘bad soul rules and takes care of things 
badly and that a good soul does all these things well’ . This allows Socrates to 156
draw the following conclusion:  
(29) ‘We agreed’, Socrates says, ‘that justice is a soul’s virtue, and injustice its 
vice…. Then it follows that a just soul and a just man will live well, and an unjust 
one badly…. Therefore, a just person is happy, and an unjust one wretched. ’    157
That completes the references made to the soul in the first book of the Republic so 
let us now turn to look at the Apology. 
(30) At Apology 29e2 Socrates speaks of the soul as that which it is most 
worthwhile for a person to care for during their lifetime. Two sentiments are clear 
from what he says: (a) that the soul is something that we need to care for and pay 
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attention to keeping in a ‘good state’; and (b) that one’s soul is more important 
than other concerns, and that people ought not to neglect the care of their soul but 
prioritize it.  
Socrates says: ‘are you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth, 
reputation and honors as possible, while you do not care for nor give thought to 
wisdom or truth, or the best possible state of your soul?’  158
(31) Similarly, at 30b Socrates says: ‘For I go around doing nothing but 
persuading both young and old among you not to care for your body or your 
wealth in preference to or as strongly as for the best possible state of your soul, as 
I say to you “Wealth does not bring about excellence, but excellence makes wealth 
and everything else good for men, both individually and collectively”’.  
From this statement we can furthermore see the following: (a) that Socrates 
believes that excellence is achieved when one’s soul is in a ‘good state’; and (b) 
that when a person’s soul is in a ‘good state’ he is then able to know and seek his 
own benefit. For a person whose soul is not in a good state cannot discriminate 
between what is beneficial and what is not, and therefore, even if they have health, 
status or wealth, they would not know how to use them properly nor how to derive 
benefit from them. 
(32) Finally, at 40c Socrates refers to the belief that the soul does not die with the 
body but continues into another realm, saying that ‘there is good hope’ that death 
is ‘a blessing, because it is either nothing or a change and a relocating of the soul 
from here to another place’.    
Let us now look at how Socrates refers to the soul in the Protagoras. 
 translation by G.M.A. Grube, in Cooper (1997)158
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(33) At 313c Socrates talks about the soul as something which is nourished by 
teaching. At 314b Socrates tells Hippocrates that when a person learns something, 
or takes something to be true, they integrate that notion acquired into their soul. If 
then these notions that one puts into their soul, Socrates goes on to say, as true, 
then the soul is benefited. However, if the notions that one takes into their soul are 
not true, then a person is harmed by them. 
(34) It is with this in mind that at 312c Socrates takes Hippocrates to task, for 
being willing to ‘hand over his soul for treatment’ to man of whom it has not be 
ascertained whether what he teaches is good and true. For as he says at 313e, 
some teaching is beneficial for the soul but some is detrimental, and one ought to 
be careful to acquire what is beneficial to their soul, as the soul is the most 
important element of a person.  
(35) This same idea is expressed again at 329c2 when Socrates is speaking with 
Protagoras. Socrates challenges Protagoras, asking him if he can tell him the truth 
about a matter that Socrates wants to question. If Protagoras can answer him, 
Socrates says, then having learnt something true from him, Socrates’ soul will be 
‘satisfied’. 
 (36) At 313b2 Socrates speaks of the soul again in a way that is in agreement with 
what we saw in the Apology. At 30b of the Apology Socrates had said that 
excellence in a person depends on whether or not their soul is in a good state.  
This excellence in its turn is what determines how much a person is capable of 
benefiting from what they acquire in this life. In the same way now, Socrates tells 
Hippocrates that: ‘when it is something you value more than your body, namely 
your soul, and when everything concerning whether you do well or ill in your life 
depends on whether it becomes worthy or worthless, I don’t see you getting 
together with your father or brother or a single one of your friends to consider 
whether or not to entrust your soul to this recently arrived foreigner’.   
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Finally, let us end the enumeration of occasions in the ‘early dialogues’ where 
Socrates refers to the soul by pointing out a final point from the Crito. 
(37) The Crito begins with some evidence that Socrates believes that the soul 
continues after death and goes on to another realm. At 44, Socrates tells Crito that 
he does not expect to die for two more days – despite the fact that news of the ship 
indicate otherwise – because of a dream he has had. In the dream, Socrates was 
told that he will arrive on ‘fertile Phthia’ on the third day. Socrates takes this 
dream-vision to mean that he will not die until the third day, for it is only then that 
his soul will make its way to Phthia. 
(38) Notice that the reference to Phthia is taken from the Iliad where Achilles uses 
the term ‘fertile Phthia’ to refer to his home. The use of the quotation then by 
Socrates, on such an occasion as he finds himself in the Crito – where he is 
awaiting his death – can be read as suggesting that Socrates’ soul will be going to 
its home when it leaves his body.  
This reference can be taken as suggestive of the idea that the soul leaves the body 
at death and continues to exist, but also, that the soul is more of a foreigner to this 
world than to the next. The status of the other world in that case is higher than is 
that of the living. 
The findings 
The list we have made of the references to the soul in the ‘early’ ‘Socratic’ 
dialogues included thirty distinct statements regarding the soul. For the ease of the 
reader, these are enumerated here, and a table is made of them. For each I indicate 
in which dialogues these statements can be found. The numbers in the brackets 
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direct the reader to the parts of the above section where these statements are 
referenced . 159
(i) The soul can acquire temperance. In Charmides (see 1)
(ii) The soul can have knowledge and wisdom. In Hippias Minor; Laches; 
Protagoras (see 2, 3, 33)
(iii) One’s soul can be benefited or harmed through education. In Laches; 
Gorgias; Apology; Protagoras (see 2, 12, 33)  
(iv) It is good for the soul to seek to know the good. In Laches; (see 2)
(v) The soul is harmed by ignorance. In Hippias Minor; Apology (see 3, 31)
(vi) The wellbeing of one’s soul is more important that their physical health, 
financial prosperity or social standing. In Hippias Minor; Gorgias; 
Apology (see 3, 7, 19, 30)  
(vii) The soul is something we need to care for. In Laches; Apology; Protagoras 
(see 2, 30, 34)
(viii) Persuasion and learning are in the soul. In Gorgias; Protagoras (see 4, 8, 
33) 
(ix) The soul is the part of the person which is most capable of distinguishing 
what is good for us, and thus ought to govern over the body. In Gorgias; 
Republic I  (see 5, 28)
(x) The soul is the seat of our ability to know things for what they are. In 
Gorgias; Apology; Protagoras (see 3, 5, 36)
(xi) The soul has discernment. In Apology (see 31)
(xii) The soul is such that is can get pleasure. In Gorgias (see 9)
 These lists are not intended to be exhaustive but indicative.159
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(xiii) The soul can be in a better or worse state. What is good for the soul and 
what betters it is to partake of justice, and to be unjust is what makes 
the soul worse. The soul benefits from just acts and it is harmed by 
unjust acts. In Gorgias; Republic I (see 6, 7, 12, 13, 18, 20, 21, 24, 25, 29)  
(xiv) The soul benefits from being justly disciplined. In Gorgias; (see 6, 7)
(xv) The soul has parts. In Gorgias (see 8)
(xvi) The soul is healthy when it is well-organized and disciplined. A person 
who is self controlled has a healthy well-organized soul; self-discipline 
and order in the soul should be promoted, and lack of discipline gotten 
rid of. In Gorgias (see 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17) 
(xvii)  Discipline cures the soul of its vices. A soul that is corrupt and thus 
foolish should be controlled and not permitted to follow its appetites. 
In Gorgias (see 13)
(xviii) The soul has various appetites. In Gorgias (see 13)
(xix) Organization, correctness and craftsmanship brings about excellence 
in the soul. In Gorgias (see 14)
(xx) It is better to have a healthy ordered soul than to not have one. In 
Gorgias (see 15, 16, 17)
(xxi) The soul of the unjust man is corrupt and mutilated, therefore, its 
appetites do not pertain to what is actually good. In Gorgias (see 18)
(xxii) The soul continues to exist after physical death. In Gorgias; Republic I; 
Crito (see 20, 21, 22, 27, 32, 37)
(xxiii) After death the soul will be judged and held accountable for extend to 
which a person was good and just during their lifetime. The fate of the 
soul will be determined by the just and unjust acts of the person whilst 
they lived. In Gorgias; Republic I (see 20, 21, 24, 25, 27)
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Table 1: references to soul in ‘early’ dialogues, thematically categorized 
The act of caring for the soul 
With such a view of the soul and what constitutes its benefit, we would expect that the 
care of the soul would entail: helping the soul to know the good; cleansing it of 
ignorance; turning one’s attention towards the more important: the health of their soul 
(xxiv) After death a good soul will go on to a blessed heavenly place – the Isle 
of the Blessed, but the bad soul will move into a prison-like state. In 
Gorgias; Republic I (see 20, 21, 27)
(xxv) Death separates the soul from the body. In Gorgias (see 22)
(xxvi) From the time of death onwards, the soul remains in the condition (of 
health) in which it was at the time of death. All cleansing and care of 
the soul, all repentance and correction of the soul’s ills, are only 
possible in this lifetime. In Gorgias (23), but this is also implied in 
Republic I (27).
(xxvii) Truth nurtures the soul. Furthermore, it prevents the soul from being 
ugly, having license and luxury, arrogance and incontinence. These 
vices are the result of the soul living at a distance from the truth. 
Implied in this is the idea that the truth is good and it is the source of 
that which is good and health for the soul. Therefore, the soul benefits 
from seeking to know the truth and to emulate it. In Gorgias; 
Protagoras (see 26, 33,35)
(xxviii)   The soul is that which imparts life to a person. In Republic I (see 28)
(xxix) Excellence is achieved when a person’s soul is in a ‘good state’. In 
Apology; Protagoras (see 31, 36)
(xxx) The soul is more at home in the life after death than it is in this life. In 
Crito (see 38)
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and away from the distraction of the lesser goods of society; governing one’s body by 
applying one’s souls to determining what is good and what is not; partaking of justice 
and fleeing from injustice; becoming self-disciplined; curtailing one’s appetites; 
preparing the soul for the judgment of the afterlife (through making it akin to what is 
just); helping it to acquire truth.   
To put it in the words of Werner Jaeger: ‘Socrates defines the care of the soul more 
closely as the care of the knowledge of values and of truth, phronésis and alétheia.’  160
If we accept that Socrates strived to bring his fellows to care for their souls, then we 
can expect that Socrates attempted, through dialogue, to assist his fellows in bringing 
about some or all of these effects.  
  
One possibility could be that Socrates simply tried to urge and motivate his fellows to 
turn their attention to caring for their own souls. He might have acted merely as a sort 
of stimulant: like a gadfly might bother a sleepy horse and quicken it. If this is the 
case, then Socrates might rightly have claimed that he was not a teacher of anyone: if 
he did not teach them the methods and processes of ‘caring for the soul’ but simply 
reminded them that they ought to be concerned with the care of it. 
This he certainly did. As Burnet (1916: 25) summarized it: ‘What he did preach as the 
one thing needful for the soul was that it should strive after wisdom and goodness.’ 
However, as has been said in section I.I that Plato’s Socrates had taken a more 
involved approach. In dialogue, he assisted his interlocutor practically in the 
processes, among other things, of cleansing their soul from ignorance; removing false 
beliefs that act as barriers in the pursuit of truth; and in helping them to acquire truth. 
We can say then that Socrates was involved both in motivating his fellows and in 
technically assisting the epistemic aspects of the care of the soul. 
 1943: 39160
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This was Socrates’ project of education: to help his fellows to achieve the care of their 
souls.  
In section I.I we said that through a process of dialogue Socrates guided people to a 
more ‘appropriate’ or ‘correct’ epistemic state. We can now begin to see why this was, 
as Socrates understood it, a way to help others to care for their souls: a project he 
deemed as the most important task of life.  
III.I 
The health of the soul according to Socrates was virtue, and the act of caring actively 
for the souls of others, as well as for his own, meant assisting them to attain to virtue. 
Socrates did this, as we have said, in the capacity of what can be called (by our terms 
today) a teacher: he engaged proactively with people’s intellect. For Socrates, caring 
for one’s soul was fundamentally an intellectual activity. 
Some scholars however have seen Socrates’ intellectualism as problematic for his act 
as a teacher of others. 
George Grote, in 1867 complained that: ‘[Socrates made] the error…of dwelling 
exclusively on the intellectual conditions of human conduct, and omitting to give 
proper attention to the emotional and volitional.’ 
Nussbaum, in her analysis of the Clouds, finds that Aristophanes made this same 
criticism of Socrates, and she agrees, that this neglect on the part of Socrates lead to 
his educational influence on his fellows being a negative one . 161
 Elsewhere, Nussbaum (1991: 34) say that Socrates’ lack of [desired] effect on his 161
fellows was ‘uncanny’. However, in her book Cultivating Humanity: a classical 
defense of reform in liberal education Nussbaum presents Socrates’ rationalism as an 
ideal. See (1997: 17-18) 
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Nussbaum finds, both in Aristophanes’ and Plato’s portrait, a Socrates who thought of 
theoretical knowledge of virtue as sufficient for an agent acting virtuously, and who 
gave no relevance to any habituation whatsoever. She considers that Socrates thought 
nothing of emotive and habitual aspects of virtuous behavior .  162
In the Socratic paradox, that ‘knowledge is sufficient for virtuous action’ Nussbaum 
sees Socrates trying to establish ‘the necessity and the sufficiency of a certain type of 
moral expertise – a skill in measuring pleasure and pain, both present and future – for 
the good of human life.’  Socrates ‘assimilates morality to an expert craft or 163
skill’ .  164
Socrates, Nussbaum argues, neglected ‘the crucial importance of early habituation and 
the training of the desires’ . He taught anyone and everyone how to use negative 165
dialogue, without concerning himself to find out first if his pupils were emotionally 
mature enough to use this skill appropriately ; and through this neglect he allowed 166
for many of his followers to misuse the skill to the detriment of themselves and 
society .  167
Socrates’ mistake was to train the intellectual aspects of a person, whilst neglecting 
the role of non-rational desires; and Nussbaum concludes, this was both ‘unjustified 
and dangerous’ . 168
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Nehamas (1992) agreed with Nussbaum’s analysis and argued that Socrates’ 
intellectualism, and the manner in which he affected his fellows because of it, opens 
him up to severe criticism .  169
The problematic element Nehamas, following Nussbaum, found in Socrates was: ‘his 
unshakeable faith in reason, in the power of understanding to secure goodness, and in 
the power of goodness to provide us with happiness’ . Due to these faults, Nehamas 170
agued, ‘Socrates’ direct, immediate effect on his contemporaries’ morality was 
minimal’ . 171
Nehamas felt that these shortcomings in Socrates were so detrimental to his role as a 
teacher that he concluded that Socrates could not have been a teacher of virtue at all. 
He says that in order to diffuse these charges against Socrates he: ‘tried on a number 
of earlier occasions to construct an interpretation of his character…according to 
which Socrates…is totally unconcerned with the moral improvement of others….if 
Socrates was not a teacher; if he did not have, even in its most rudimentary form, he 
sort of program for moral education that Plato and Aristotle developed after him…
then…the charge of intellectualism…would loose much of its point.’ 
‘I still believe that this hypothesis is true….I still believe that he was not…a teacher 
of aretē.’   172






1. That Socrates identifies virtue with knowledge. From this, Nehamas claims, it 
appears that Socrates considered ‘the affective side of our nature irrelevant to 
our virtue, to what counts as a good human life.’   173
2. That virtue is considered necessary and sufficient ‘for the good life’ and for 
happiness’.  
3. That ‘only knowledge and argument, not the whole nature of one’s personality, 
can lead us to virtue’ .    174
Nehamas argued that intellectual dialogue is limited in its capacity to make people 
virtuous; other ‘non-cognitive’ elements to one’s personality, aside from their 
intellect, play a role in developing virtue.  
Regarding aspect (1) of Socratic intellectualism Nehamas addressed the criticism that 
no heed is paid to the ‘necessity of socialization and habituation’, nor to the 
‘importance of the careful, long-term attention to our non-cognitive side’. These, 
Nehamas claimed, are at least as necessary for becoming good ‘as is the knowledge of 
the nature of goodness’ . The accusation here is that Socrates believed that the only 175
thing a person needs in order to become good is a cognitive grasp – a knowledge of – 
the nature of goodness. On this reading Socrates was failing to notice that the 
cultivation of the affective side of our nature is just as vital in the achievement of 
virtue. 
Regarding the second aspect of Socratic intellectualism, (2), Nehamas raised the 
following point: if we take Socrates’ point that ‘being good, in some way, is the 
essence of being happy’, then ‘nothing else matters’. The criticism of this point is that 
perhaps it is not appropriate to ignore – as Socrates’ is deemed to ignore – the other, 





As for the third element, (3), Nehamas made the point that: since Socrates believed 
that (a) knowledge and argument alone can make a person virtuous; and (b) Socrates 
did not think that the ‘whole nature of one’s personality’ is important in making one 
virtuous; then (c) ‘he made it his business to address his questions to everyone 
indiscriminately .’  176 177
Nehamas claimed that Socrates may have harmed some of his interlocutors by 
encouraging them to engage in philosophy. The accusation being made is that 
Socrates did not take into account – as would have been appropriate for a teacher of 
virtue to have done – the overall nature of his interlocutor’s personality. Therefore, he 
gave dialogical tools to persons who were not capable of using them well. The 
example of Critias, Charmides and Alcibiades are given of such persons.  
This ‘lack of discrimination’ on the part of Socrates – which is attributed to his 
overestimation of intellect and to his ignoring other non-cognitive elements of a 
person’s character – Nehamas says, was harmful. ‘Not caring whether those he 
engaged in discussion, particularly the young among them, had the character 
appropriate for philosophy’, Nehamas accuses, ‘he encouraged the wrong people… to 
engage in philosophy to the detriment both of the youths and of philosophy.’   178
Nehamas summarises the accusations that can be levied on Socrates due to his 
intellectualism as such:  
 ibid: 281176
 Notice here that Nehamas does not himself assert that Socrates went about Athens 177
addressing his questions to everyone indiscriminately. Indeed Nehamas is of the view 
that Socrates addressed his questions to an elite group of society. However, Nehamas 
is here describing Socrates as other scholars have read him, in order to show that 
these three elements together result in a catastrophic personality.  
 1992: 281178
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Socrates then, wrongly equates knowledge with virtue, inhumanly identifies virtue with 
happiness, and imprudently encourages everyone, whatever their moral fiber, to become well 
versed in the sort of argument that can easily destroy as establish moral value.  179
III.I.I 
Let us deal first with the concern raised by Nehamas: that Socrates’ intellectualism 
was not well suited to a person who cared about helping others to grow towards 
virtue; and that an intellectualist of the sort that Socrates was, was not likely to have 
posed as a teacher of others. 
In order to defuse the seriousness of the charge against Socrates – the charge that his 
intellectualism rendered him a dire specimen of a teacher if in fact he was one – 
Nehamas concluded that we must see Socrates as someone who was entirely 
unconcerned about the souls of others, and who had no intent of helping his fellows 
through any form of education . 180
A look at how Socrates understood the soul of man informs us that this concern is 
inappropriate, since, the soul was such that it requires ‘intellectual care’. Given 
Socrates’ belief that the soul needs wisdom to prosper, and virtue to flourish (where 
virtue is knowledge), then we can expect that Socrates would have deemed the sort of 
intellectual ‘care’ that he provided to be most appropriate.   
Since he thought that the soul was healthy when it was rid of falsehood, and when it 
matured in knowledge of the good , then reasonably he would have considered his 181
work of bringing this about in the person to be beneficial, and he had no reason to be 
concerned with the problem raised by Nehamas.  
 ibid: 281179
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Socrates cared for others intellectually, since this is the type of care he thought that 
they needed. The fact that Socrates himself was thoroughly intellectualist was not, in 
his mind a barrier for caring for others, but more likely, it constituted his special 
ability to do so. 
Concerning Nehamas’ first point: that Socrates considered the ‘affective side of our 
nature’ as irrelevant to our wellbeing and concentrated merely on the intellectual 
aspect, this was not a problem for Socrates himself. Since for Socrates, the affective 
and intellectual aspects of our nature were not differentiated in this manner. Socrates 
considered rather that the affective side of our personality was shaped by our virtue 
and our knowledge.  
What made a person happy, according to Socrates, was the actual real state of their 
being (their condition). A person who was virtuous was blessed, well off and happy, 
and one who was unjust was wretched and miserable. Everyone sought this blessed 
life of happiness, but not everyone could find it.  
Having knowledge of virtue meant that a person understood how to acquire the good 
for themselves, and how to make their life better. They could recognize what was 
good and discriminate what was bad, they could desire the good, and they understood 
how to acquire it. 
According to Socrates, those who did not know virtue could not get at happiness. In 
the same way that a person who knows where the jar of honey is will be able to eat 
something sweet, whereas one who does not know, and who has false opinions about 
what jar has honey, will not be able to acquire its sweetness.  
Therefore we can say that, as far Socrates was concerned, in his system of thought, he 
did not overlook the affective side of people’s personalities. Rather, through his 
intellectualist approach, he catered to it. The cognitive side of virtue was, for 
Socrates, the knowledge of how to accomplish the joy of being aligned with the good.  
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For this reason, Socrates considered that he could help a person to satisfy the real 
needs of their affective side and to become truly happy. As Socrates told Callicles at 
the end of the Gorgias: ‘So, listen to me and follow me to where I am, and when 
you’ve come here you’ll be happy both during life and at its end.’   182
Regarding Nehamas’ second point we can say the following: that Socrates considered 
virtue to be a necessary element without which no one can be well off. What Socrates 
says is that one is better off being virtuous in every case – and they are never, under 
any circumstances better off not being virtuous.  
This is what it means for something to be a necessary element: you cannot achieve 
your purpose without it under any circumstances. Thus, Socrates emphasizes that a 
virtuous man in prison is better off than an unjust king .  183
This does not mean to say that a person will always feel pleasure if they are virtuous 
and feel discomfort if they are unjust. Indeed Socrates acknowledges that a virtuous 
person can suffer pain and ill fate. In the Gorgias for example, Socrates argues that a 
person benefits from undergoing reprimanding and discipline, even though this 
disciplining can be painful both physically and emotionally .  184
This is so much in the same way that an ill person might undergo painful treatment or 
take medication that has a bad taste. The process is unpleasant but they are better off 
for it.  
We can make sense of this if we understand it in context. Socrates says that being 
virtuous is the necessary and sufficient characteristic of living well, because, this is in 
accord with his definition of the good life. Socrates believed that the good life was 
 Gorgias 527c182
 Gorgias 470e183
 See conversation with Polus 476-479184
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one where the person came closer to the divine and became akin to it through coming 
to resemble it by being virtuous . If the goal of life is, as Socrates believed that it 185
was, to imitate the divine by being virtuous, then of course, it is only logical to 
consider that being virtuous is the necessary and sufficient element of living well.  
Regarding Nehamas’ third point, I find that Plato’s presentation of Socrates does not 
support Nehamas’ claim. Nehamas finds that: ‘only knowledge and argument, not the 
whole nature of one’s personality, can lead us to virtue’ .  186
However, a different reading of the texts shows that Socrates believed that one’s 
personality plays a role in their ability to engage with knowledge and argument. As I 
argue in III.I.II for example, in the Gorgias we can see the following: that indeed 
argument and reason can bring us to know the truth and give us the information we 
need in order to identify and distinguish virtue. We can come to know what things are 
by argument. However, in order to engage in proper genuine enquiry, the sort that 
does make us more familiar with virtue, the ‘nature of our personality’ needs to be 
that way inclined also.  
Our will, our interest and our desires need to be focused on seeking out truth. It is a 
process that we need to be dedicated to, and being dedicated means that one loves 
truth more than they do other things. Certainly they need to love truth more than they 
love their reputation and their wealth.  
People need to be willing to be proven wrong, which means that their emotive intents 
need to be turned towards seeking the truth, and away from preserving the ego or 
from acquiring other social benefits. In order to enquire genuinely and become 
involved with argument and knowledge, the whole nature of one’s personality needs 
to be involved . 187
 Please refer to section II.I.II for a discussion of this claim.185
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It cannot be properly said that Socrates concentrated on the cognitive element and 
ignored the other aspects of our personality. For Socrates, ‘turning’ the cognitive 
aspect is key to assisting people to seek virtue. Socrates tried to show people the value 
of truth and virtue so that they might turn to it with their entire being, and embrace it 
with the whole nature of their personalities.     
We have been arguing that, even though Nehamas was disinclined to, Socrates can 
easily be imagined both as an intellectualist and as one who actively cared for the 
souls of others, making an effort to assist them in some cognitive process to that end. 
Nehamas is welcome to disagree with Socrates as to the purpose of life. However, it 
needs to be acknowledged that within Socrates’ own system of thought, Socrates 
would not have seen his intellectualist practices as harmful for his fellows. 
Having such an ‘intellectualist’ belief – that being virtuous is the sum of living well 
and being happy – would not have prevented Socrates from being one who actively 
cared for the souls of others.  
Nehamas, if he wishes to disagree with Socrates about the purpose of life may well 
accuse him of failing to understand what people need, and conclude that he was a bad 
teacher. But it cannot be argued, as Nehamas has tried to argue, that Socrates himself 
could not have pretended to care for the souls and behaved as he did. It is very 
compatible with Socrates’ belief system that he care about the souls of others through 
this ‘intellectualist’ route of pointing out that virtue is needed in order to live well. 
Socrates, because he cared for the souls of his fellows, assisted their cognitive states 
(their relationship to truth). He did so because he believed that this education – 
learning the process of how to enquire philosophically – made their life worth living. 
The examined life, for Socrates, was one worth living.  
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To care means to try to do good for others. For Socrates the worthwhile life is the 
examined life. Doing good to someone would have meant prompting them and 
otherwise assisting them to examine. 
One might disagree with Socrates’ premises, and say that he was not a pedagogue of 
the sort we would like but one cannot say that Socrates did not make every effort to 
assist people in the processes that he valued above all else.   
As Socrates said himself in the Apology, he gave his life to ‘persuading [us] to care 
for’ virtue and to examine our life, making them thus more worthwhile with every 
step . 188
III.I.II 
Having said that, let us say further that the manner in which Nehamas and Nussbaum 
have understood Socratic intellectualism is controversial. Many of the elements of 
Socratic intellectualism that they find incompatible with teaching are not accepted by 
other scholars.  
Socratic intellectualism has been interpreted in a variety of ways and there is no 
agreement regarding it. The sort of ‘intellectualism’ that is assumed by Nehamas in 
his criticism of it is one where rational thought is responsible for all of our choices, 
and there is no role in decision-making for non-rational motives. 
Gould (1987: 265) describes this reading of intellectualism as the most common 
reading and defines it as the view attributed to Socrates that: all decisions are made 
rationally and that there is no place for… ‘any faculty other than the intellect’ . 189
As Segvic (2005: 171) points out, this line of criticism sees Socrates as either 
overlooking entirely or vastly underestimating the importance of the emotional; the 
 Apology 31b188
 Dreyfus (1988) for example assumes this view.189
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desiderative; and volitional sides of human nature . However, Segvic argues that this 190
is an incorrect reading of Socratic intellectualism and makes the case that emotions, 
volitions and desires do indeed play a greater role than Nehamas’ criticism permits. 
She argues that Socrates, far from ignoring these ‘other’ aspects of our being, rather 
attempts to ‘to build them into his account of virtue as knowledge’ . ‘Socratic 191
wanting’, according to Segvic, is both a volitional and cognitive state. She finds this 
demonstrated in the Gorgias . 192
As she points out, Socrates supports that people desire that which they deem to be 
good . For him then, wanting is both volitional and cognitive. The emotive and 193
desiderative aspects of our decisions therefore are not ignored by Socrates. He does 
not claim that these do not play a role in decision-making. Socrates, on this reading of 
intellectualism can acknowledge the force of desire and its importance in decision-
making, since his intellectualism lies not in the denial of the existence of desires but 
rather in how he analyses these desires. If we understand desires as something defined 
by our rational views, then these can be accommodated within an intellectualist 
account. 
Indeed, this is the way in which some stoics understood Socratic intellectualism. 
Chrysippus, influenced by Socrates, thought of emotions as a type of judgment, and in 
light of this accepted intellectualism. ‘Emotions can be regulated by knowledge and 
argument because they are types of judgments themselves.’   194




 Coplan (2010: 134)194
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Coplan (2010: 133) describes the way scholars understand Socratic intellectualism in 
a manner that resembles a battle: ‘reason is all powerful’ and ‘either emotion is no 
match for reason, which will always overrule it, or it is a species of reason and can be 
regulated by reasoned argument’.  
Scholars often separate the emotions from the intellect and therefore set them in 
opposition to one another, understanding Socrates’ intellectualism as the claim that: 
‘knowledge cannot be overcome by desire, pleasure, pain, fear, or love and is 
therefore sufficient to motivate action and sufficient for virtue.’ 
On Segvic’s reading, where the emotions are not independent of reason or opposed to 
it, but rather are formed by it, this dichotomy between the two does not exist.  
The view that it is too simplistic a reading to think of Socratic intellectualism as 
ignoring or undervaluing non-rational aspects of the person has been developed by 
several scholars. Even though these scholars disagree about the specifics, they share 
the opinion that Socrates took non-rational elements into consideration in his 
intellectualist analysis of decision-making. 
Bowery (2007: 92) argues against seeing Socrates as having a narrow ‘rationalistic’ 
view because she finds him focusing as much on the emotional states of his 
interlocutors as he does on the logical argumentation used. She notes that on 
occasions when a dialogue is narrated by Socrates to another, as is the Lysis; 
Republic; Charmides; Protagoras; and the Euthydemus, Socrates gives a report with 
great detail about the eroticism between the characters, instances of blushing and 
occurrences of laughter . 195
Socrates, according to Bower, does so because he wants his audience to hear about the 
philosophical exchange as it took place within the context of these emotive 
 Bowery (2007: 92)195
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environments . Emotional expressions, such as blushing, are a part of the exchange 196
that takes place during the philosophical discussion. Blushing for example, says 
Bower, among other things might be indicated in order to show the experience of 
having ones ‘secret personal allegiance brought to light’ . 197
Bower argues that these signals written into the narrative offer insight into why 
Socrates treats his interlocutors the way that he does. He responds to them, not purely 
based on the flow of the argument, but according to their experience of the 
philosophical exchange. Socrates uses his ‘emotional acuity to guide the philosophical 
conversation’…. Socrates’ motivation for philosophical conversation arises from his 
attunement with the emotions and motivations of his interlocutors and not simply 
from his commitment to finding truth through philosophical refutation.’  198
Bower finds that Plato makes such emphases in his writings because he wants to give 
us an insight into the process of acquiring self-knowledge through the practice of 
philosophy, both by representing to us the experience of Socrates the paradigmatic 
philosopher and his various interlocutors. We see from this that ‘Socratic self-
knowledge is not simply a rational process of examination turned inward but one 
infused with a remarkable degree of passion, sensitivity to feeling, and reflection on 
the emotional dimension of human experience . We are often in dialogues given the 199
opportunity to see how Socrates responds to a situation and how his emotional 
responses differ from those of others . 200
I agree with Bower that Socrates’ ‘intellectual’ approach to self-knowledge and virtue, 







deeply responsive to emotive aspects of human personality. Emotions and non-
rational motivations are treated as a critical part of practicing philosophy. I find this 
clearly demonstrated in the Gorgias.  
The Gorgias is a dialogue abounding with information regarding how Socrates 
thought about the education of learners. Socrates here describes to his interlocutors 
what is involved in doing philosophy, and in what manner a person ought to proceed 
in their thought processes if they are to achieve any worthwhile benefit. 
Here Socrates speaks plainly about the attitudinal approach of successful 
philosophers. He makes thirteen points. 
From the start of the dialogue we can see that Socrates wants the following 
characteristics from a learner who is to be effective: 
1. That they be attentive; that they concentrate on the issue at hand; that they 
focus on what is being said . 201
2. A part of this is that Socrates cared about clear precise thinking and precise 
speaking. To a large extent, for Socrates, thinking and speaking correctly was 
a matter of doing so with exactitude and a care for detail.   
3. That they be persistent in their enquiry and follow trains of thought to their 
end, 
4. and that they be serious about seeking the truth. One ought not to merely 
pretend that they care about the matter or that they are speaking about it, but 
Socrates requires them to actually care and make a genuine effort when 
speaking about it.  
 A view shared by Giblin (1953: 204)201
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These elements might seem self-evident to us, however, it is not always the case that 
people’s thought processes or their speech acts are characterized by these. Socrates 
seems to have found the lack of these a problem and he made the point of requiring 
these from his interlocutors. Socrates often asks his interlocutor to concentrate on the 
matter at hand, to focus on their argument, and to stop trying to use the act of speech 
for the purpose of making some impression. 
Element one is exemplified in section 448d-e. Here Socrates criticizes Polus for 
giving an accomplished answer which as nevertheless irrelevant to the question being 
discussed. Polus made a point, but his point was not focused on the issue. It did not 
answer the question. Socrates tells Polus that if the enquiry is to proceed he must 
answer the question and not merely give the semblance of having answered. 
The second and third elements are seen in section 450a-453a. Gorgias had claimed 
that the skill of oratory is the knowledge of making speeches. Socrates then shows 
Gorgias that this is a characterization that can be applied to several arts, and that 
therefore it does not sufficiently serve to identify what oratory is. Gorgias is prompted 
to give a more precise, and a more exact description. Such as answer at the one he had 
given is too general and it does not help them to think critically about oratory. 
Socrates wants a definition of oratory that is exact enough so that it will enable one to 
understand the true nature of oratory. It is only after Gorgias had made his definition 
more precise that Socrates is willing to proceed with the enquiry and evaluate oratory. 
He says: 
‘Now I think you’ve come closest to making clear what craft you take oratory to be, Gorgias. 
If I follow you at all, you’re saying that oratory is a producer of persuasion. Its whole 
business comes to that, and that’s the long and short of it.’ 
The fourth element is exemplified at 453b where Socrates says: ‘You should know 
that… I’m one of those people who in a discussion with someone else really wants to 
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have knowledge of the subject the discussion’s about. And I consider you one of them 
too.’ 
   
Here a further point is also found: 
5. That one ought to have a good will towards their interlocutor.  
Socrates begins his conversation with Gorgias by telling him that he regards him as 
being a genuine philosopher – one who demonstrates a love for truth in their thought 
processes and speech acts. The philosophical attitude is the one that Socrates respects, 
it is the one he has himself, and it is what he now expects from Gorgias. The 
implication is that their dialogue ought not to deteriorate into some sort of 
competition where each is trying to get the better of the other, but that both will work 
instead together towards the truth. 
Socrates is known for leading a dialogue through asking questions. At points it might 
seem as though he is leading the discussion by asking questions to which he already 
knows the answer. At 453b he acknowledges this and explains his motives. Here again 
he reaffirms what we have said regarding one’s attitude in a discussion. Socrates 
explains that this is something he does in order to assist the discussion by keeping it 
focused.  
Socrates might perhaps be able to anticipate what his interlocutor thinks about a topic 
and proceed to deconstruct this. However, such behavior is likely to cause confusion. 
Socrates asks the other to state what they think as explicitly as possible so that they 
may also become aware of the content of their thought. Socrates wants concepts to be 
made explicit and clarified, so that they may then be critically examined. He requires 
the belief which is to be critically examined to be ‘put on the table’ so to speak. 
Socrates wants unambiguous and precise thinking. He wants everyone to be clear as 
to the concept that is being discussed. He says: 
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‘You can know for sure that I don’t know what this persuasion derived from oratory that 
you’re talking about is, or what subjects it’s persuasion about. Even though I do have my 
suspicions about which persuasion I think you mean and what it’s about, I’ll still ask you just 
the same what you say this persuasion produced by oratory is, and what it’s about. And why, 
when I have my suspicions, do I ask you and refrain from expressing them myself? It’s not 
you I am after, it’s our discussion, to have it proceed in such a way as to make the thing we’re 
talking about most clear to us.’  202
When a person is asked to give a lucid statement of a belief that they hold it ensures 
that they will be able to conduct a more clear and exact examination of it afterwards. 
The less vague our belief is, the more accurately we can evaluate it. Socrates repeats 
this point at 454b saying: 
‘Yes Gorgias, I suspected that this was the persuasion you meant, and that these are the 
matters it’s persuasion about. But so you won’t be surprised if in a moment I ask you again 
another question like this, about what seems to be clear, and yet I go on with my questioning 
– as I say, I am asking questions so that we can conduct an orderly discussion. It’s not you I 
am after; it’s to prevent our getting in the habit of second-guessing and snatching each other’s 
statements away ahead of time. It’s to allow you to work out your assumption in any way you 
want to.’ 
For Socrates, reaching a clear and precise understanding of a matter is what it means 
to learn about it. Learning for Socrates is seeing the truth about matters. This is why 
focusing, concentrating and persevering in the study of a matter is what is desirable in 
the learner – it is the way to ‘see’ the truth about a matter. In the same way that I will 
come to see what something is if I focus my sight on it, observe it and identify its 
characteristics, a person can come to learn about the truth by looking persistently at a 
concept and seeking to understand its nature . 203
 Jowett translates 453c5 as: ‘Not for your sake, but in order that the argument may 202
proceed in such a manner as is most likely to set forth the truth’
 This claim is discussed again in chapter VI.203
!  105
At 457c4 Socrates says: ‘Gorgias, I take it that you, like me, have experienced many 
discussions and that you’ve observed this sort of thing about them: it’s not easy for 
the participants to define jointly what they’re undertaking to discuss, and so, having 
learnt from and taught each other, to conclude their session’. 
Socrates is here making a complaint to Gorgias, but notice what he says: that when 
the participants of a discussion come to agree and define jointly that concept which 
they are undertaking to discuss, they will have learnt from and taught each other. 
There are barriers to this however. Unfortunately, Socrates notes, people do not show 
such dedication to truth in their enquiries. They are not committed to and concentrated 
on examining how things are. They are not focused on seeing what things are.  
People are inhibited from having substantial thought processes or truthful speech acts 
by certain attitudes. Socrates identifies these as attitudinal barriers to philo-sophising, 
and he makes it clear that a learner and lover of truth ought not to have these attitudes.  
Any reaction which distracts the person from focusing purely on the task at hand – 
from concentrating on the investigation being conducted – is destructive for 
philosophy. A learner who wishes to pursue truth needs to be focused on the aim of 
examining how things are. When they are distracted from this, they forfeit the ability 
to enquire genuinely. 
He says : ‘Instead, if they’re disputing some point and one maintains that the other 204
isn’t right or isn’t clear, they get irritated, each thinking the other is speaking out of 
spite. They become eager to win instead of investigating the subject under discussion. 
In fact, in the end some have a most shameful parting of the ways, abuse heaped upon 
them, having given and gotten to hear such things that make even bystanders upset 
with themselves for having thought it worthwhile to come to listen to such people.’ 
 Gorgias 457d 204
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A person who reacts and feels the need to protect their ego can never, according to 
Socrates participate in genuine enquiry. A discussion requires that both people have 
good will towards the other. A discussion ought not to be a battle between them nor an 
opportunity to compete, but together the interlocutors ought to help one another to 
think more clearly. 
Their common aim is to think clearly and to understand precisely. Their task is to 
search together, to enquire together into the truth of how things are. The interlocutors, 
having this common aim uniting them, are to help one another by critically examining 
together the views and opinions that are being expressed. 
Each person ought not to hold on to their own opinion as if it is something that they 
need to protect and defend. The opinions that each person has ought only to be the 
material which the discussants will examine together. Both should seek to attain truth, 
and not to maintain the views they have already presented. Each then needs to be 
willing to undergo a critical analysis of their views, and each should contribute by 
criticizing the opinions that are being discussed, if they can. 
Socrates considered that he was doing someone a favor by criticizing their views, if 
he was able to identify any false idea entertained by the other. He acted as a kind of 
intellectual editor, helping people to sort through their beliefs. Likewise, he says, he 
would appreciate any person that can show me his own misconception, because by 
making them clear, he would help Socrates to become freed of these.  
This brings us to the sixth attitudinal element that Socrates says is characteristic of 
one who can be a philosopher: 
6. That they need to be willing to have their views criticized, deconstructed and 
even disproved. 
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He says to Gorgias : 205
‘What’s my point in saying this? It’s that I think you are now saying things that aren’t very 
consistent or compatible with what you were first saying about oratory. So, I’m afraid to 
pursue my examination of you, for fear that you should take me to be speaking with eagerness 
to win against you, rather than to have our subject become clear. For my part, I’d be pleased 
to continue questioning you if you’re the same kind of man I am, otherwise I would drop it. 
And what kind of man am I? One of those who would be pleased to be refuted if I say 
anything untrue, and who would be pleased to refute anyone who says anything untrue; one 
who, however, wouldn’t be any less pleased to be refuted than to refute. For I count being 
refuted a greater good, insofar as is it a greater good to oneself to be delivered from the worst 
thing there is than to deliver someone else from it. I don’t suppose there’s anything quite so 
bad for a person as having false belief about the things we’re discussing right now. So if you 
say you’re this kind of man, too, let’s continue the discussion, but if you think we should drop 
it, let’s be done with it and break it off.’ 
Dialogical enquiry for Socrates is not a competition, it is a shared search. It offers the 
benefit of two minds working together on the same question instead of one. For it to 
be genuine successful enquiry however, the interlocutors need to have the attitude 
described above. They need to be dedicated to their aim of seeking to see the truth 
about a matter. They need to be focused on this and not allow themselves to be 
distracted from this task. 
According to Socrates, one needs to follow the arguments that are being made. 
Focusing and keeping to the point of discussion is necessary for one to reach any real 
conclusion, much in the same way that staying on the road will get you to your 
destination. If you are driving to Glasgow, but you keep turning off into the fields, 
you will never get there.  
The sequence of the thought process is important. This is why Socrates tells Polus off 
at 466a for forgetting what he had said earlier and for misquoting what had been said. 
 457e-458b2 205
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Socrates expects his interlocutor to follow the entire thought process through, from its 
start to its conclusion. 
One form of distraction in the search of truth that Socrates often noted and criticized 
is what we might call ‘emotionalism’. That is, when a person is motivated by their 
emotions to hold a belief, rather than by a reasonable assessment of that belief. 
Socrates felt that many of his fellows were affected by emotionalism. Socrates, we 
might say, considered that many people were vulnerable to their reason being made 
hostage through emotional manipulation. Instead of using reason to examine the truth 
about a matter, people use speech acts to suggest to others, through emotional 
manipulation, what they ought to believe.    
Socrates tells as much to Callicles at the end of their discussion in the Gorgias. At 
513c Callicles admits to Socrates that he sees that what has been said is good, but that 
nevertheless, he cannot agree with him for some reason. Socrates explains to him that 
this is because he has a love for the demos. Callicles’ concern with the opinions of the 
demos interferes with his better judgment. He can see the reason in what Socrates is 
saying but is emotionally unwilling to accept it. Socrates here makes the point that a 
person must: 
7. Love truth above all else in order to appreciate it 
Furthermore we can see this for example in the Apology. Socrates points out to his 
jurors that he is speaking the truth to them and telling them how things actually are. 
But he complains that they will not respond well to this. He tells them that they would 
have given him a more favorable verdict had he used emotionalist tactics on them, the 
way other accused persons do. Socrates lets his distaste for such methods be felt.  
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He says that a man who: ‘begged and implored the jurymen with many tears, [who] 
brought his children and many of his friends and family into court to arouse as much 
pity as he could’ brings shame upon the city, and behaves ‘no better than women’ . 206
Socrates tells the jury that despite the shamefulness of such behavior he often sees his 
fellow Athenians behaving in this manner at court. He tells the jury that this ought not 
to be allowed, and that in fact, if a man does plead in such a shameful manner, they 
ought to be more willing to persecute him. 
He says: 
‘I do not think it is right to supplicate the jury and to be acquitted because of this, but to teach 
and persuade them. It is not the purpose of a juryman’s office to give justice as a favor to 
whoever seems good to him, but to judge according to law.’  207
   
In the same way, in the Gorgias, Socrates tells us that a person ought not to be 
persuaded by any form of peer pressure or other emotional blackmail, but that they 
ought instead to form their opinions through a reasonable process of enquiry (of 
seeking the truth about something). 
At 471e Socrates tells Polus that appealing to authority does not offer proof. Socrates 
is not interested in the reputation of the witness, but in the truth of their statements. 
Refutation by appeal to authority, and to the awe that one might feel for the reputable 
witness, ‘is worthless as far as truth is concerned’, Socrates says. 
Again at 473d Socrates tells Polus that trying to scare him into accepting an opinion is 
also unacceptable and cannot lead one to truth. You are spooking me, he tells Polus, 




The only thing that Socrates cares about in the process of enquiry is the correctness of 
what is being said. He explains to Polus that he will only be persuaded by their 
reasonable discussion and not by any emotional bullying. This is why he quickly tries 
to refocus Polus on what they have been arguing and return his attention to their 
argument saying: ‘refresh my memory on just a small point: if the man plots to set 
himself up as a tyrant unjustly, you said?’ 
Socrates then proceeds to draw some logical conclusions from what they have been 
saying, at which point Polus laughs at him. Socrates immediately identifies this as 
another attempt to convince him emotionally that Polus is in the right. Socrates points 
this out, and tells Polus that laughing at him is not a form of refutation. He chastises 
Polus and wants to bring him back to the reasonable argument that they had been 
conducting. Socrates lets Polus know that he will not be persuaded by any emotional 
pressure to accept a view that is not concluded through reasonable enquiry .  208
Again at 473e7 Polus tells Socrates that he must admit that he has been refuted on the 
basis that most people would disagree with what had said. Polus says: ‘Don’t you 
think you’ve been refuted already, Socrates, when you’re saying things the likes of 
which no human being would maintain?’ 
Socrates makes it clear that he does not consider this a form of refutation at all. 
Socrates states clearly that he does not think that the number of people that believe an 
opinion does anything to support that opinion. He does not care, neither for the view 
of the many on the question addressed, nor of what the many think of him.  
Socrates tells Polus that he is not a politician, he does not aim to please the people. He 
does not care what the crowd feels. This reminds us of the Crito 44c where Socrates 
tells Crito that he does not care about the opinions of the majority. 
 See Gorgias 473e208
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This brings us to the eighth element that according to Socrates characterizes the 
attitude of philosophical enquirers: 
8. To not be influenced by opinions and emotional pressure, but to remain 
reasonable and focused on the arguments. Discipline is needed . 209
Socrates believes that the reasonable logical examination of reality is what will bring 
one to truth. With an interlocutor he can follow a line of reasoning considering the 
parts of reality and how they relate to one another, and much like a mathematical 
equation, this will bring them to conclusions that can be taken seriously; for as he 
says, it is impossible to refute the truth . 210
All the other emotive ways in which people form opinions, usually in order to become 
acceptable to the majority of people, can only ever distract the philosopher from his 
actual aim: the truth.  
At 474a Socrates says: ‘…try the kind of refutation I think is called for. For I do know 
how to produce one witness to whatever I’m saying, and that’s the man I am having a 
discussion with. The majority I disregard. And I do know how to call for a vote from 
one man, but I don’t even discuss things with the majority. See if you’ll be willing to 
give me a refutation, then, by answering the questions you’re asked.’ 
In other words, Socrates is saying that an enquiry need to not be influenced by 
opinion, but by reasons. 
Notice here that Socrates is not against persons, he is against the mob. The person 
whom he is speaking with who can be brought to agreement can be anyone: he need 
not be anyone special. This was seen in the Meno especially, where Socrates had a 
 Very much related to point three.209
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discussion with an entirely uneducated slave-boy. According to Socrates, it is the mob 
that cannot think, not the people.  
A mob is a crowd of people who influence one another and decide together – a 
decision making force in Athenian democracy. Socrates seems here to be saying that 
he is not able to engage a crowd in substantial dialogue. However, Socrates seems to 
accept to discuss seriously with any person who is willing to apply himself to the 
discussion.  
We come not to the ninth attitudinal element that is characteristic of one who enquires 
philosophically: 
9. That they be courageous and pursue truth without fear . 211
We can see this in the exchange between Polus and Socrates at 475d. Socrates had 
been trying to examine a question with Polus. Polus had tried to win the argument 
with the emotive tactics discussed above. Socrates addressed these by pointing them 
out, calling them by their name and forcing Polus to keep to the argument. Despite his 
best efforts then, Polus is compelled by Socrates to keep focused on an argument that 
is most likely going to prove him wrong.  
He is on a dialogical path, together with Socrates, which will probably lead to the 
conclusion that everything he had been stating with such confidence in public is 
incorrect. He is hesitant to proceed. He feels perhaps threatened by the process. 
Socrates assures him that one who seeks to learn about the truth ought not to be afraid 
of such things, but ought to proceed courageously. He assures him that no actual harm 
will come to him, despite the discomfort he might be feeling.  
 Very related to point seven.211
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He says: ‘Answer Polus, and fear not. For you will come to no harm if you nobly 
resign yourself into the healing hand of the argument as to a physician without 
shrinking and either say yes or no to me.’  212
As we have said already in fact, not only does Socrates believe that his interlocutor 
will not be harmed by the process, but he is certain that he will be helped by it, as he 
will be released from the prison of false belief. This he comforts Polus with 
confidence. 
By 480d Polus has followed the argument with Socrates and has come to see that 
what Socrates says appears to be correct. However, he admits to Socrates that what 
they have just now agreed on feels very strange to him. Socrates then makes a tenth 
point: 
10. That being consistent in one’s thoughts is necessary in enquiry and is needed 
when seeking truth. 
Polus says: ‘to me Socrates what you are saying appears very strange. Though, 
probably in agreement with your premises’. To which Socrates answers: ‘is this not 
the conclusion, if the premises are not disproven?’, ‘yes it certainly is’. On these 
grounds then, Socrates convinces Polus, they must agree that their conclusion is 
correct. 
This process of consistently following a precise and clear examination of how things 
are Socrates names philosophy. Carrying out an enquiry of a matter where a person is 
concentrated on what is being said and persists with each strand of thought, and 
follows each line of argument to its logical conclusion, without being distracted in 
any way from this process, Socrates says, is what brings one to truth.   
 translation by Benjamin Jowett212
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It is a reliable and consistent process and it leads to something more than fickle 
opinions. The beliefs produced by philosophy are stable and serious. A person who 
wants to reject the conclusions of philosophical enquiry, as Socrates conducts it, 
needs to address them on the terms of philosophy and show why they cannot be 
supported by logical reasoning. 
At 481e he says that if someone bases their beliefs on the opinions of other people, 
then their beliefs will be fickle, as it is in the nature of opinions to be. If the basis of 
some belief is prone to flimsy change, then so it that belief flimsy. However, if ones 
opinions are based on reason and examination, as Socrates proposes that they ought to 
be, then, since their base is stable and secure, they also are well supported. 
He says: ‘…instead of being surprised at my saying them, you must stop my beloved, 
philosophy, from saying them. For she always says what you now hear me say, my 
dear friend, and she’s by far less fickle than my other beloved. As for the son of 
Clinias what he says differs from the one time to the next, but what philosophy says 
always stays the same, and she’s saying things that now astound you, although you 
were present when they were said.  
So, either refute her and show that doing what’s unjust without paying what is due for 
it is not the ultimate of all bad…or else, if you leave this unrefuted, then by the Dog…
Callicles will not agree with you, Callicles, but will be dissonant with you all your life 
long. And yet for my part, my good man, I think it’s better to have my lyre or a chorus 
that I might lead out of tune and dissonant, and have the vast majority of men disagree 
with me and contradict me, than to be out of harmony with myself, to contradict 
myself, though I am only one person.’  213
Socrates is here speaking with Callicles and he is making a statement which it at the 
very heart of his dialogical method. In simple words what Socrates is saying here is: 
‘you don’t really think that. You cannot honestly hold such a view if you think about 
 Gorgias 482a-482c 213
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it. If you examine it, the truth will become known to you, and your false beliefs will 
be destroyed. That is because only truth can stand the test of refutation. Only truth 
cannot be refuted. You do not really think what you are saying, but you believe this 
false belief because you are influenced by the opinions of others. You are wrong to let 
opinion shape what you believe. Think about it and you will see.’ 
This is the heart of Socrates’ dialogical method: he compels people to think about 
what they believe, and by examining their beliefs their falsehood is made obvious. 
They are then invited to enquire into reality even further so that they may replace their 
opinions with correct ideas.   
That which is required for this process is frankness. Socrates is saying: ‘if you really 
actually think about it you will see that you do not believe what you are saying’. This 
is why Socrates is always requiring his interlocutor to speak frankly. We see this also 
in what follows in the Gorgias. 
This brings us to the eleventh element characteristic of one doing philosophical 
enquiry: 
11. They need to carry out their investigation frankly 
Socrates main point method is to bring the interlocutor to realize that they do not 
actually think that which they believe. If they look honestly at their beliefs they will 
see their fault. But this needs to be done frankly. Socrates proposes this criterion to 
Callicles at 487e saying: 
‘If there’s any point in our discussions on which you agree with me, then that point will have 
been adequately put to the test by you and me, and it will not be necessary to put it to any 
further test, for you’d never have conceded the point through lack of wisdom or excess of 
shame, and you wouldn’t do so by lying to me either…So, our mutual agreement will really 
lay hold of the truth in the end’. 
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If the criterion of truthfulness is met, the outcome is ascertained.  
Socrates then tells Callicles that: 
12. the philosopher needs to live in accordance with their philosophy 
The results of enquiry, Socrates says, should be applied to life and taken seriously. 
This places enquiry in the greater context of being the process that helps the lover of 
truth to live well.  
As Socrates tells Callicles, the reason he seeks and desires to be genuinely criticized 
by his interlocutor is because by correcting his opinions Socrates will be in a better 
position to know the truth. His purpose it to live in accordance with the truth, and 
thus, being refuted is a great benefit for him. He says: 
‘…if I engage in anything that’s improper in my own life, please know well that I do not 
make this mistake intentionally but out of my ignorance. So don’t leave off lecturing me the 
way you began, but show me clearly what it is I’m to devote myself to, and in what way I 
might come by it; if you catch me agreeing with you now but at a later time not doing the 
very things I’ve agreed upon, then take me for a very stupid fellow and don’t bother ever 
afterwards with lecturing me, on the ground that I am a worthless fellow.’  214
  
The dialogue with Callicles then begins to take off and Socrates again points out to 
Callicles all the mistakes that he is making in his reasoning, and in this manner shows 
that Callicles’ stated opinion is not in accordance with philosophy. It cannot withstand 
philo-sophical examination. When one looks closely at its premises one finds that 
these are not well supported. They are not true. 
One criticism is that Callicles’ opinion is not consistent, as it can be shown under 
questioning. He tells Callicles that he is not committed to what he is saying, and his 
statement is not stable. He says: ‘I…claim that you never say the same things about 
the same subjects. At one time you were defining the better and the superior as the 
 488a214
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stronger, then again as the more intelligent, and now you’ve come up with something 
else again…. But tell me… once and for all, whom you mean…’   215
Socrates then tells Callicles that he needs to be both consistent and frank if he is to 
enquire genuinely into truth. One should not just say things to make their point or 
support their argument. You do not just construct a consistent argument for your point, 
but you need also to do so honestly. In dialogue with Socrates they must answer 
truthfully in the pursuit of truth.  
This is because Socrates’ dialogical method of enquiry is not a purely logical proof for 
something. Logic and argument are used indeed, but what Socrates is proving as such 
is that: ‘if you are honest, you will not believe what you are saying. If you enquire 
truthfully, you will find that you agree with me’. 
Socrates is not as such proving that this or that view are the only logically possible 
truths. What he is arguing for is that: as far as he can see, these are the most truthful 
views to hold. These truths that Socrates directs others towards are the opinions which 
are concluded when one is truthful. 
Socrates does not claim to have a full-proof method mathematically deducing the only 
possibility. He claims rather that when one thinks truthfully they will reach the same 
conclusions as he. The lover of truth thinks truthfully. 
He tells this to Callicles at 495a. Callicles is in the process of being refuted by 
Socrates. He tries to support his point by sustaining an argument for it. He says: ‘…to 
keep my argument from being inconsistent if I say that they are different, I say they’re 
the same’. Socrates does not allow this saying: ‘You’re wrecking your earlier 
statements, Callicles, and you’d no longer be adequately enquiring into the truth of 
the matter with me if you speak contrary to what you think.’ 
 491b215
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Callicles however is obstinate and continues to maintain ‘funny things’ he does not 
frankly believe, in order to argue for his case. Socrates points out that if Callicles 
were truthful, he would agree with him.  
At 495e Socrates tells the audience that he does not agree with a point and adds: ‘and 
I believe that Callicles doesn’t either when he comes to see himself rightly’.  
At 500b Socrates tells Callicles that frankness must also be combined with 
seriousness. Philosophy for Socrates is something to be taken seriously. He says: ‘…
Callicles, please don’t think that you should jest with me either, or answering 
anything that comes to mind, contrary to what you really think, and please don’t 
accept what you get from me as though I’m jesting! For you see, don’t you, that our 
discussion’s about…. The way we’re supposed to live.’ 
Then at 505e Socrates tells Callicles that the philosophical enquirer needs to be: 
13. Dedicated to truth  216
This is a general description and involves all of the elements discussed already. 
Socrates says: ‘…all of us ought to be contentiously eager to know what’s true and 
what’s false about the things we are talking about. That is should become clear is a 
good common to all.’ 
At 506a Socrates clarifies that one needs to be dedicated to truth, not to the 
preservation of their own opinions. They need to be willing to have their views 
refuted for the sake of learning about the truth. They need to be willing to let go of 
false beliefs. Dialogue is not a competition where each tries to make their case, but a 
co-enquiry into the truth which can occur only when the participants are dedicated 
 Notice that many of these points are related, and perhaps all can be included in the 216
final point (13). We felt however the need to go into each point separately since these 
are fundamental to how we see Socrates’ educative act in the agora and we want to 
emphasize them. 
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and concerned with the truth. Socrates says: ‘I’m searching together with you so that 
if my opponent clearly has a point, I’ll be the first to concede it.’  
Again at 506c, Socrates tells Callicles that if he is refuted, he will be much indebted 
for it. Being refuted, for Socrates, is a blessing. It is so because it would mean that he 
held a false belief from which he is now set free. It will be an improvement to 
Socrates’ life. This is the attitude to refutation that Socrates expects from all 
philosophical enquirers.  
At 506b he repeats that philosophical enquirers need to be persistent, thorough, and 
dedicated to following the lead of philosophy. They should follow the trails of a true 
argument to the end with courage and not abandon it midway. 
All of these thirteen attitudinal characteristics of a philosopher can also be called the 
appropriate emotional reactions that make one apt in the process of acquiring self-
knowledge and pursuing virtue through the process of philosophical analysis. Socrates 
regularly claims to be characterized by these emotional responses and urges other 
people to be also. It is a part of his teaching others how to conduct philosophical 
enquiry. 
We have been making the point, in agreement with Bower (2007) that the rational and 
‘intellectualist’ aspects of Socratic enquiry are intertwined with the attitudinal and 
emotional aspects of a person. The two are not separate.  
We are discussing the question of whether Socratic intellectualism overlooks the non-
rational aspects of an interlocutor’s personality. Other scholars have taken a different 
approach towards the same aim: of criticizing an analysis of Socratic intellectualism 
as ‘dry intellectualism’ that neglects non-rational aspects. 
Brickhouse and Smith (2007: 342) take issue with what they refer to as the ‘standard 
view’ of intellectualism where all decisions are purely cognitive in the sense of 
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computational as opposed to conative. They find that Socrates requires the 
philosopher to discipline the appetites and passions within their soul . 217
Brickhouse and Smith see Socratic intellectualism as holding that the rational aspect 
of a person makes the final decision about what a person does, but that the rational 
element is in contact with, and influenced by, the non-rational conative aspects of 
personality.  
It is the responsibility of the rational element to assess information and make a 
decision. The conative aspect of a person tries to ‘provide information’ and persuade 
the person to act in a certain way. Conative aspects of our nature do this by presenting 
the object of desire as something good. The philosophical person is one who develops 
the ability to not be overrun by their sentiments in decision-making . 218
The purpose of their account is to explain that Socratic intellectualism does not 
overlook non-rational aspects of personality but rather takes them into account. 
Christopher Rowe makes the same point, even though his account of how Socratic 
intellectualism is best described differs from that of Brickhouse and Smith. 
Brickhouse and Smith try to explain that we desire that which we think is good, and 
that the process of deciding takes into consideration a variety of elements including 
conative ones. In this case conative elements are not overlooked by Socrates, but 
rather he is of the opinion that these need to be disciplined and made appropriate for 
philosophy. Rowe (2012: 306) on the other hand interprets Socratic intellectualism as 
a process where we desire the good fundamentally, and we intellectualise about how 
to achieve it.  
A person always desires the good. However a desire that is relevant for action is a 




complex state. A desire to act is a blend that involves beliefs. As Penner writes: 
‘desires only become desires ‘to do something’ when they are combined with beliefs, 
i.e., about what is best for the agent; and that is also the moment at which they 
become ‘rational’ desires.’     
As people we invariably desire goodness. We then have beliefs and thoughts about 
what this desire amounts to, what is good, and how we can achieve it for ourselves. 
For example, I might feel the need to be benefited, and believing that being wealthy 
will make me happy (because perhaps my society has given me this belief) I seek to 
acquire wealth. Depending on how correct my views are regarding goodness, my 
actions and my desires to act will be to my benefit or to my detriment.  
On this account again, desires and rational assessment cannot be contrasted and it 
cannot be said that Socrates prioritizes the one over the other, because, Socrates sees 
desires as rational. They are the result of what we believe. Socratic intellectualism 
then does not ignore the desiderative element of personality and ‘over-intellectualize’ 
character development (becoming virtuous) as Nehamas suggests. Rather, Socratic 
intellectualism is a position that offers an analysis of desire whereby it is linked to 
rationality. 
The assumptions that Nehamas makes of Socratic intellectualism in his criticism of it 
are not necessary, and in my view, in light of all the emphasis given to conative 
elements of philosophical enquiry in Platonic writings, the assumptions oversimplify 




‘what result do we get from our statements? Is it not precisely that… wisdom is good and ignorance is 
bad?’  219
There is a common view among scholars that the total of what Socrates did through 
dialogue was to reveal to people that they were in fact ignorant of matters in which 
they had thought themselves wise: that he showed to them that their opinions were in 
fact false. 
Leigh (2007: 318) for example considers the Socratic method to be entirely negative, 
offering no positive learning but merely causing the negation of beliefs: ‘designed to 
leave the hapless interlocutor refuted by a contradiction and acutely aware of her 
 Euthydemus 281e4, translation by W.R.M. Lamb (1967).219
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IV. Can a man who 
embraces 
ignorance be the 
prototype 
lover of wisdom? 
confusion and ignorance’. Several scholars have held views of the Socratic method as 
essentially destructive, including Hugh Benson ; Roland Hall (1967); Richard 220
Robinson (1971)  and George Grote (1867, 1906).  221
Gregory Vlastos supported this negative view in 1956 and 1958 arguing that: the 
object of elenctic arguments was ‘simply to reveal to his interlocutor confusions and 
muddles within themselves, jarring their adherence to some confident dogma by 
bringing to their awareness its collision with other, no less confident, presumptions of 
theirs’. With this in mind he had concluded that Socrates’ service to his interlocutors 
was simply therapeutic (purgative) .    222
Benson (1990) labels Socrates as a sort of skeptic whose aim in dialogue is to show to 
the interlocutor that they are wrong in thinking that they know that premise which 
Socrates elenctically disputes. Benson aligns himself with White (1976) who 
described Socrates ‘skeptical act’ as a ‘first step towards ridding oneself of a false 
conceit of knowledge so that genuine knowledge might, somehow, be put in its 
place’ . As to how that knowledge might be acquired, both scholars agree was 223
developed by Plato and not Socrates . 224
The views of these scholars differ, however, for our purposes, what they have in 
common is that for them the aim of the Socratic method is to reveal that Socrates’ 
interlocutor is inappropriately holding a belief . Talisse (2002: 51) for example, who 225
 See Woodruff (2010: URL) 220
 See pages 84-86221
 Vlastos (1994: 17). Vlastos has since completely rejected this view and had 222
developed a more positive view of the elenchus as a search for truth and able to 
establish truths. Nevertheless, several scholars still maintain some such position.
 White (1976: 3)223
 Benson also traces this view in Lutoslawski (1897), Robinson (1953), Guthrie 224
(1975), Thomas (1980) and Sharples (1985).
 For a popular summary of this view see Morrison (2006: 108)225
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does not hold that Socrates proves false the premises believed by the other to be true, 
nevertheless sees the purpose of the method as proving that the interlocutor does not 
know what they are claiming to know. In either case, the belief of the interlocutor is 
taken from them by Socrates .  226
Indeed for many Socrates himself has come to be known as the reticent Questioner 
who steers well away from dogmas, and who primarily acts as a disputant. Nehamas 
(1992) for example admits to having held some such view. Matthews (2009: 439) 
speaks about Socrates as: ‘a gadfly questioner…. a relentless questioner’ who does 
not advocate for his own position but who provokes others; ‘a philosophical 
provocateur’ who knew nothing worthwhile and thus contributed no positive doctrine 
to discussions. Similarly, Arcesilaus in c.a 260BC tried to present Socrates as an 
‘uncommitted enquirer rather than as a dogmatic moralist’ .   227
This ‘negative’ view of Socrates method of engagement seems natural if we 
understand Socrates in the Apology to be saying that the role given to him by the god 
was to investigate whether or not people truly had the wisdom which they thought 
they had. Such a view can be formed from the passage at 22a3, where Socrates says 
that he investigated the wisdom of his fellows at the behest of the god; and at 23b4 
where Socrates tells the jury that he is still carrying out the investigation of his 
fellows (which he began in order to understand the oracle saying that he was wiser 
than others), and that this is ‘his service to the god’. 
Indeed Benson (1990: 152) expresses this view. In arguing that Socrates was a skeptic 
whose method was purely negative he says:  
‘…in the early dialogues Socrates puts forth no substantive view about how such knowledge 
is to be acquired. His contribution is limited to seeking out those who profess to care about 
these things, questioning them, examining them, and testing them, learning from them if they 
 Matson and Leite (1991: 146) even argue that Socrates was trying to show his 226
fellows that explicit verbal definitions of moral terms were impossible.
 Annas (1992: 310)227
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know (unfortunately no one he meets does), and persuading them of their ignorance if and 
when they do not. Socrates had the support of the Delphic oracle (and perhaps even of his 
deimon) to sustain his faith that this was enough.’ 
Burnet (1916: 9) assigns such a view generally to the English scholarship of his time 
saying: ‘The god must really mean that all men alike were ignorant, but that Socrates 
was wiser in this one respect, that he knew he was ignorant, while other men thought 
they were wise. Having discovered the meaning of the oracle, he now felt it his duty 
to champion the veracity of the god by devoting the rest of his life to the exposure of 
other men’s ignorance.’ 
Scholars like Leigh (2007) have described Socrates’ aporetic conclusions as 
‘negative’, and as having the aim of revealing one’s ignorance. Other scholars, among 
them Scott (2007:xvii) and Doyle (2012: 43), have tried to explain Socrates’ act in 
more positive terms, and have described it as propaedeutic.  
They have made the case that this state of coming to terms with one’s ignorance 
(occasionally named aporia) is positive in its negativity because, it makes one 
teachable. It removes the barrier of false knowledge and the learner then becomes free 
to desire or seek true knowledge. Nevertheless, even with these more ‘positive’ 
accounts of the Socratic act, we see a Socrates who in fact does nothing further than 
bring his interlocutors to acknowledge their ignorance: whether one ascribes ‘positive’ 
motives to this achievement or not.  
However, Burnet (1916: 11) suggests that this reading of what we learn regarding 
Socrates’ task from the Apology is too limited, and that something more constitutes 
Socrates’ role: the task of urging people to care for their souls. 
Indeed, if we look at the texts of the Apology we see that the view of Socrates as 
merely disputative is a very impoverished one. The way that Socrates describes his 
‘god given role in the city’ is far broader and richer than that.  
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It is interesting to notice that in the Apology whist Socrates is speaking about his 
‘god-given’ role amongst his fellows he uses a rich selection of verbs and nouns to 
describe what he does. As scholarship has rightly noticed, he says : ‘I proceeded to 228
investigate’ (ἐπὶ ζήτησιν) ; ‘examining myself and others’ (ἐξετάζοντα) ; ‘in this 229 230
investigation or in philosophy’ (ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσει διατρίβειν µηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν) . 231
Together with these however Socrates also said: ‘…stop exhorting you, pointing 
out’ (οὐ µὴ παύσωµαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑµῖν παρακελευόµενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύµενος 
ὅτῳ ἂν) ; ‘saying in my accustomed way’ (λέγων οἷάπερ εἴωθα, ὅτι) ; ‘I shall 232 233
rebuke him’ (ὀνειδιῶ) ; ‘I urge you’ (πείθων ὑµῶν) ; and again, ‘I tell you’ (λέγων 234 235
ὅτι) .  236
In his own description of what he does, Socrates clearly states that, alongside 
investigating and examining himself and others, he also:  exhorts his fellows to do 
something; points something out to them; says some things to them; urges them or 
persuades them, and tells them something.  
Regarding what this something is, the text is clear. He speaks to them openly about 
the importance of caring for their souls, urging them to live the examined life. He 
urges them to not waste their time caring for the insignificant ‘goods’ of society, but 
 all of the following translation is taken from Fowler (1966)228






 30ab, could otherwise be translated as ‘persuade’ 235
 30b2236
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to seek rather the wellbeing of their souls ; and he tells them: about the value of 237
virtue, both for the state and for the individual . 238
These things, Socrates says at 30a4, are what the God commands him to do. Much the 
same way as he had said at 23b4 and 28e5 that the god has ordained him to examine 
himself and others. Socrates himself draws no distinction between his two tasks in the 
Apology, and likewise, we do not need to separate the two in what Socrates does. 
Roughly speaking then, we can say that Socrates did not just act against 
misconception, but also actively for the seeking of virtue.  
Both of these tasks are compatible with caring for the souls of others, when one has 
an understanding of soul as can be traced in the ‘early’ dialogues. Cleansing the souls 
of his fellows of ignorance; turning their attention towards the more important task of 
caring for the health of their soul and away from the distraction of lesser goods; 
rebuking them so that they might be corrected; and urging them to flee injustice and 
to partake of justice; would all constitute acts of care, and therefore, it is not 
surprising that in the Apology Socrates tells the jury that he does these. 
The fact that Socrates tells us earnestly in the Apology that he does something more 
complex than just reveal ignorance in others is a good enough reason interpret the 
aporetic dialogues in light of this insight. An analysis of Socratic dialogue that 
concludes merely that Socrates is bringing others to the acknowledgement of their 
ignorance takes no account of what Plato has Socrates say of himself. 
There is a further reason that makes the view of Socrates as one who merely reveals 
ignorance unconvincing. As we have said already, Socrates was a person who was 
dedicated to the care of his own soul and of the souls of his fellows. Indeed he went as 
far as to give his life to this act of care, spending his years in poverty and disrepute 




much, and who was devoted to caring. We expect then that he did as much as he could 
for others.  
It is clear that Socrates brought other people to the awareness of their ignorance; that 
he deemed this as a necessary step; and that he believed that it was good for the 
interlocutor to break from his conceit as one who knows. However, we can expect that 
Socrates, who cared so much, did more than just leave people in their ignorance. I 
contend that he must have made an effort also to bring them forward from the state of 
ignorance towards knowledge and virtue. 
If we remember the simile of the midwife, we are told there that Socrates did more 
than just take away the phantom child (the lie from one’s mind). He is presented to us 
as someone who could see others through a successful intellectual pregnancy and help 
them to bear the fruit of philosophy . 239
Let us remember that in the Hippias Minor at 372e Socrates suggests that the soul is 
such that it is harmed by ignorance, stating: ‘you’d do me a much greater good if you 
give my soul relief from ignorance, than if you gave my body relief from disease’ . 240
We also see in this same dialogue  that Socrates saw the soul as something that can 241
attain to wisdom .  242
We might otherwise have said that Socrates saw ignorance as a state less than ideal, 
but as a necessary evil. We might have concluded that Socrates brought people to 
ignorance and left them there because he believed that that was the best a person can 
hope to achieve (the self-awareness of their ignorance). However, Socrates’ belief that 
the soul can attain to wisdom makes this an unreasonable assumption. 
 Theaetetus 150d239
 Translation by Nicholas D. Smith, in Cooper (1997)240
 See point (3) of section II 241
 ‘τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς σοφίαν’. The translation used here is by Nicholas D. Smith in 242
Cooper (1997)
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As for being any sort of a skeptic, this would require that Socrates saw being in a state 
of acknowledged ignorance as something profitable in itself. Many skeptics today, as 
the Hellenistic skeptics, see the acknowledgement of their ignorance as providing 
intellectual integrity. Knowledge, or belief , is not certain and at least they are aware 243
of this.  
Indeed Socrates did not value the state of being ignorant, even when the person was 
self-aware regarding this. Socrates does say that it is better to have true self-
knowledge and to acknowledge that you are lacking in wisdom rather than to have the 
false belief that you are more knowledgeable than you are; nevertheless he considered 
the state of being ignorant to be evil and we can expect that he made every effort to 
bring people further forward than this.  
Socrates considered ignorance to be a harmful state and refers to it as an evil. It is 
problematic to think that, being one who cared for the souls of others, he would leave 
them in a state of ignorance and do nothing more to bring them out of it . 244
Consider the disapprobation with which Socrates speaks about ignorance: 
In the Crito Socrates claimed that ignorance leads people to behave inappropriately.  
When the ignorance is concerning moral matters it then leads one to behave un-
virtuously and thus: ‘harm and corrupt that part of ourselves that is improved by just 
actions and destroyed by unjust actions’  .  245 246
 Vogt (2014: URL)243
 This is the view of Socrates that Martha Nussbaum finds in Aristophanes’ Clouds. 244
See Nussbaum (1981: 74)
 Crito 47d245
 We disagree with Lesher (1987:286) on his point that virtue had very little to do 246
with the performance of actions in the Socratic model.
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Again in the digression of the Theaetetus Socrates tells Theodorus that ignorance in 
the realm of moral matters has the most detrimental effects imaginable: it becomes a 
source of vice and evil . He says : 247 248
‘…This truth the evildoer does not see; blinded by folly and utter lack of understanding, he 
fails to perceive that the effect of his unjust practices is to make him grow more and more like 
the one, and less and less like the other.’ 
Again at 176c Socrates connects any success in life with proper awareness regarding 
moral matters. Ignorance regarding them is perceived at detrimental. He says: 
‘And it is here that we see whether a man is truly able, or truly a weakling and a nonentity; 
for it is the realization of this that is genuine wisdom and goodness. While the failure to 
realize it is manifest folly and wickedness. Everything else that passes for ability and wisdom 
has a sort of commonness…’ 
As we discussed earlier, the richness of how Socrates describes his work in the 
Apology makes it difficult for us to think that he would have done only so little for his 
fellows: as to bring them to a sense of ignorance, which itself is not an end point, and 
do nothing more to assist them in the act of care for the soul when this care requires 
them to have some understanding of virtue. 
We have been saying that Socrates was a humble sort of teacher of virtue. Being 
virtuous, as we have also said, involves behaving virtuously. It involves having 
discernment and making appropriate choices. It thus involves some kind of 
understanding of what is the right and wrong thing to do in the circumstances of our 
lives. We often hear Socrates telling people that there are better ways to behave: for 
example that it is best to be just; to suffer wrong rather than to inflict it on others; to 
be temperate; and self controlled. 




To put it otherwise, if Socrates was an exemplar lover of wisdom (a philosopher) it 
does not seem appropriate that he was satisfied to stop at an acknowledgement of 
ignorance (or a disavowal of knowledge); and indeed we see that the good life 
requires examination and virtue; and that there is evidence to support the view that 
Socrates regarded ignorance regarding moral matters to be very damaging for the 
person. 
IV.I 
Regarding his own person, it is sometimes said that Socrates was wise in that he 
disavowed knowledge: that is, he was a sort of agnostic (or skeptic) regarding moral 
matters, and that this agnosticism accorded him intellectual dignity. 
 
To borrow Nehamas’ words: ‘precisely in disavowing ethical knowledge and the 
ability to supply it to others, [Socrates] succeeded in living as moral (if not 
necessarily as perfectly human) a life as anyone ever did who belonged in a tradition 
he himself initiated’ . 249
There exists a popular view that Socrates was a sort of agnostic, or skeptic. This view 
has been based on Socrates’ statement in the Apology at 21d where he tells the jury 
that he is wise in that he knows that he does not know . He says: 250
‘I am wiser than this man; it is likely that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, but he 
thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think 
I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he is to this small extent, that I do not think I know 
what I do not know.’  251
 1992: 296249
 See for example Sakezles (2008)250
 Apology 21d251
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Here we see Socrates placing value on the acknowledgement of one’s ignorance: of 
being aware that one does not know. The fact that Socrates does ‘not know’ does not 
appear to be a problem. In fact, the oracle of Delphi – a divine authority – outright 
says that there is no one wiser than Socrates , although, by his own admittance, he 252
does not know anything . It would seem that by embracing his ignorance – by 253
having self-knowledge regarding it – Socrates achieves something admirable. 
The ‘skeptical’ reading of this text places value on the acceptance by Socrates of his 
own unknowing. It presents him as embracing (knowingly accepting) that he lacks 
knowledge of moral matters. Some scholars have thought of Socrates as a proto-
skeptic  who did not think that knowledge was possible and who therefore, whether 254
proudly or regrettably, accepted his self-aware lack of knowing as the best possible 
condition for man .  255
Both ancient and modern readers have understood Socrates’ statement in the Apology 
to be that he is one who knows nothing , and have assumed the Delphic attribution 256
of wisdom to this awareness to mean that Socrates somehow knows that: knowledge is 
not possible, or, is necessarily limited.  
Wertheimer (1993: 346-7) for example argues that Socrates was a skeptic who in the 
Apology was making the point that humans lack knowledge about the content of our 
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However, if we accept an interpretation of this text where value is placed on the fact 
that Socrates disavows knowledge we come up against the problem of how it is then 
sensible to understand Socrates’ character and his behavior.   
It would be reasonable to ask the following: if Socrates embraces ignorance and is 
satisfied with it, then why is he an intellectual? Why does he make the efforts that he 
is famous for making enquiring into matters? Why does he urge others to examine 
themselves and to enquire into matters as eagerly as he does? Why is the unexamined 
life not worth living? Is all this because Socrates wants others to also come to a 
realization of their own ignorance?   
Perhaps we might say that it is the case that Socrates merely wants others to come 
face to face with their own ignorance. Perhaps he urges people to examine the nature 
of virtue – to ‘give thought to wisdom or truth’  – so that they can realize that they 257
do not know anything about it, since what they think they know does not actually 
correspond to the reality they are examining.  
However, this cannot be a satisfactory explanation of what Socrates aims to do, if 
only for the reason that we see him engage in enquiry himself. If it were the case that 
the purpose of enquiry is to become convinced of your own ignorance, then, enquiry 
would have been redundant for Socrates himself. Since as he tells us in the Apology 
Socrates is already aware of his own ignorance, he would not need the process of 
dialogue to constantly remind him. 
Nevertheless we see Socrates engaging in enquiry also for his own sake, and not 
merely for the sake of his interlocutors. Consider for example the opening scenes of 
the Symposium . Socrates is on his way to a party. Furthermore, he is taking with 258
 Apology 29e257
 Please notice that I am here using the frame of the Symposium as evidence. 258
Although many scholars would hold that the content of the Symposium is not 
characteristic of Socrates, the frame is generally accepted as Socratic. See for 
example Nails (2014: URL) 
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him a man (Aristodemus) who had not been invited to the party, but who was to be 
justified to appear at the party as Socrates’ guest . Despite these social obligations, 259
Socrates becomes so involved in his thought, that he neglects what is expected of him 
and lags behind: 
‘But as they were walking, Socrates began to think about something, lost himself in thought, 
and kept lagging behind. Whenever Aristodemus stopped to wait for him, Socrates would 
urge him to go ahead. When he arrived at Agathon’s he found the gate wide open, and that. 
Aristodemus said, caused him to find himself in a very embarrassing situation’  260
The embarrassing situation in which Aristodemus found himself was arriving at the 
party without Socrates on whom he depended on to justify his presence, uninvited, to 
a house . Socrates however, was so enwrapped in his intellectual activity that he 261
overlooked this. 
‘So I turned around (Aristodemus said), and Socrates was nowhere to be seen’  262
A slave was then sent out to find Socrates, as the party was ready to eat, and the host 
was eager to have his guest Socrates join them. The report from the slaves however 
came back as such: 
‘Socrates is here, but he’s gone off to the neighbor’s porch. He’s standing there and won’t 
come in even though I called him several times.’  263
Such behavior struck the host as strange, and he instructed the slave to go and bring 







something characteristic of Socrates. ‘It’s one of his habits: every now and then he 
just goes off like that and stands motionless, wherever he happens to be’ .  264
If Socrates were a skeptic then we would expect to see him shunning attempts to seek 
knowledge. However, during such times as the scenes of the Symposium described, 
we are given reason to believe that Socrates is involved in deep thought and is seeking 
wisdom.  
Socrates is not a person who is nonchalant about thought. He does not embrace 
ignorance in the sense that he does not carry out dedicated thought. Indeed as we can 
see from this example, Socrates is so dedicated to his thought processes, and 
prioritizes them to such a degree, that he can become socially awkward.  
On this occasion in the Symposium we see that Socrates is committed to being 
systematic in his thought processes, and in completing them. As we can see, he 
ignored social etiquette and does not join the party, until his thought was complete. It 
is said: 
‘So they went ahead and started eating, but there was still no sign of Socrates. Agathon 
wanted to send for him many times, but Aristodemus wouldn’t let him. And in fact Socrates 
came in shortly afterwards…. Agathon… called: “Socrates, come lie down next to me. Who 
knows, if I touch you, I may catch a bit of the wisdom that came to you under my neighbor’s 
porch. It’s clear you’ve seen the light. If you hadn’t you’d still be standing there.”’   265
Again the same thing can be seen in the speech that Alcibiades makes about Socrates. 
He says: 
‘Immersed in some problem at dawn, he stood in the same spot considering it; and when he 
found it a tough one, he would not give it up but stood there trying. The time drew on to 




been standing there in a study ever since dawn!’…. thus they waited to see if he would go on 
standing all night too. He stood till dawn came and the sun rose; then walked away…’  266
Such dedication to thought on the part of Socrates does not sit well with the 
impression that he took ignorance lightly. Enquiry was something that he valued 
deeply, both for himself and for others. A further declaration of this his estimation of 
enquiry is found also in the Meno.  
Indeed, the statement made in the Meno clearly denounces any attitude that embraces 
ignorance. Socrates says: ‘…I would contend at all costs both in word and deed as far 
as I could that we will be better men, braver and less idle, if we believe that one must 
search for things one does not know, rather than if we believe that it is not possible to 
find out what we do not know and that we must not look for it.’  267
Finally, the clearest example that reveals Socrates’ personal dedication to enquiry 
comes in the Charmides as Socrates speaks with Critias. At a point after Critias has 
put forth the definition of piety that he holds, and Socrates is in a process of 
deconstructing and examining this view, Critias accuses Socrates: that he is intent on 
disproving his point and showing him up to be wrong. He says: ‘you are trying to 
refute me and ignoring the real question at issue’ .  268
Socrates answers this accusation earnestly. He emphasizes that his interest is not in 
merely disputing the other or showing up his ignorance. He has a sincere interest in 
the conversation and the topic. He examines the issue at hand genuinely because he 
considers the recognition of truth to be significant. His attitude is that of a philo-





Furthermore, Socrates explains, that the process to which he is subjecting Critias is 
homologous to the ‘thorough investigation’ he applies to his own statements. From 
this we can see clearly Socrates own personal relationship to enquiry, namely, that he 
subjected himself to thorough enquiry, seeking for himself the same benefit that he 
hoped for others. He says:  
‘Oh come…how could you possibly think that even if I were to refute everything you say, I 
would be doing it for any other reason than the one I would give for a thorough investigation 
of my own statements – the fear of unconsciously thinking I know something when I do not. 
And this is what I claim to be doing now, examining the argument for my own sake primarily, 
but perhaps also for the sake of my friends. Or don’t you believe it to be for the common 
good, or for that of most men, that the state of each existing thing should become clear?’  269
The above example texts show that Socrates would not have been a person who 
would have been content to be ignorant. This being the case, we might then wonder 
why he seems to urge others to embrace ignorance, and why at instances, as we have 
seen earlier, he speaks of the realization and the acknowledgement of the state of 
being ignorant as if it is a perfectly good state to be in. 
Furthermore, interpreters face another problem if they understand Socrates in the 
Apology to be claiming that he is the wisest in that he is aware of his ignorance. 
Namely, there are several occasions in Plato’s dialogues where Socrates claims that he 
does know something of significant relevance to the topic being therein discussed.  
If we are to understand Socrates in the Apology as setting up the attitude of non-
commitment on the grounds a self-awareness of ignorance as an ideal, then, occasions 
where Socrates commits himself to a position with any certainty would be 
problematic. This is because on such occasions, Socrates would be expressing an 
epistemic commitment that is less than his proclaimed ideal. 
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However, there exist occasions in Plato’s dialogues when Socrates undeniably claims 
to know certain things . On these occasions he does not seem to be proud of any 270
intellectually reticent attitude, but confirms that he has significant beliefs – ones, we 
might add, which contribute significantly to the debate of the dialogue where they 
occur.  
The point that is being made is that Socrates’ statement in the Apology - that seems to 
place the embracement of ignorance as the condition that makes you the wisest - 
cannot be taken to mean that Socrates actually believed that being in a state of 
ignorance (and being self-aware regarding this) is ideal.  
There appears to be a discord in what Socrates supports. At times, as he told 
Theaetetus, Socrates says that having the clarity to be mindful of your own ignorance 
makes you a better person . You are epistemically in a better state than if you had 271
harbored false knowledge. In fact, in the Apology Socrates even says that one is better 
off having no knowledge - and being aware of this - than having some knowledge 
mixed with the conceited appraisal that one has more knowledge than they do .  272
At other times however, as we have seen in the Symposium and in the Meno Socrates 
behaves in ways uncharacteristic of the ignorant: pursuing enquiry and seeking 
wisdom. 
Rather than taking a skeptical attitude to knowledge, we see in Plato’s works a 
Socrates who does all of the following: 
 For example: Apology 29b6; Gorgias 486e5. This of course is problematic because 270
there are occasions when Socrates seems to say that he knows nothing (as mentioned 
in the Apology). If one reads such passages as meant universally, then a contradiction 
is found in what Socrates says. Vlastos (1985) has a good discussion and solution for 
this problem. We do not have the capacity here to take an exact stance to Vlastos’ 





(a) actually claims knowledge 
(b) pursues knowledge (enquires into it) 
(c) makes positive claims and has positive commitments 
If then Socrates in his famous statement in the Apology is not presenting the state of 
being aware of one’s ignorance as the most ideal condition achievable by man, then 
we need to interpret the relevant passage differently. 
Intellectual humility 
‘Furthermore it is noteworthy that Socrates’ statement of his ignorance occurs almost always only 
when ethical problems are under consideration.’ 
- Homer H. Dubs  -   273
Vogt (2012: 3) understood Socratic skepticism to be ‘about the stepping back from 
belief-formation and counteracting one’s tendencies to be quick to judge’. This 
understanding of what has been labeled Socratic skepticism is closer to what I will 
call Socratic intellectual humility .  274
Homer H. Dubs spoke of Socrates saying: ‘It is the greatest scientists who are most 
humble. It is the man who has achieved most in the advancement of human 
knowledge who recognizes most keenly what is lacking and is most conscious of his 
ignorance. It is a mark of Socrates' greatness that he too recognized his own 
limitations, and that much as he had accomplished, he saw that he had not attained the 
goal which he had set up for himself. He too confessed his failure’ .275
 1927: 300273
 Schmid (1983: 345) also characterized what he saw as the aim of the Socratic 274
process as ‘philosophic humility’.
 Dubs 1927: 300275
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We will not consider here the full meaning of Dubs’ analysis of Socratic ignorance, 
but we can agree with him that Socrates was characteristically humble, even though 
he was such an accomplished intellectual. 
I propose the idea that Socrates was advocating instead – not the embracing of 
ignorance – but intellectual humility. In the Apology Socrates says the following: 
‘…they knew things I did not know, and to that extent they were wiser than I. But, men of 
Athens, the good craftsmen seemed to me to have the same fault as the poets: each of them 
because of his success at his craft, thought himself very wise in other most important pursuits, 
and this error of theirs overshadowed the wisdom they had, so that I asked myself…whether I 
should prefer to be as I am, with neither their wisdom or their ignorance, or to have both. The 
answer I gave myself and the oracle was that it was my advantage to be as I am.’  276
The emphasis does not lie in Socrates being ignorant. In fact, he does admit that, as 
far as the craftsmen knew something about their art, they were wiser than he. What 
Socrates is emphasizing, and objecting to, is the craftsmen’s epistemic conceit: which 
led them to feel confident that they had knowledge which they in fact did not have. 
Socrates is claiming here in the Apology that one ought to know their limits. They 
need to be humble and realistic, and have the self-awareness to know when they are 
lacking some knowledge. They should be humble, and not think that they know about 
matters which they do not know. It is not any general acceptance of the inevitability 
of our ignorance that is being encouraged by Socrates but intellectual humility. You 
are better off, he is saying, being aware of your humble position – that you do not 
have knowledge regarding important matters – than if you have the false impression 
that you do know when indeed you do not. 
When Socrates disavows knowledge and says that he does not know, perhaps we can 
understand him like this: he is not saying that he has no opinions of beliefs, or even 
 Apology 22d-e276
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knowledge about some things – indeed on occasions he clearly does – but that he is 
humble about his epistemic state, and he is aware that he does not know ‘enough’. He 
is aware that he has more to learn, that he should search and enquire; that his 
understanding is not complete, but incomplete, and that studying matters is needful . 277
This fact, that Socrates wanted to express the significance of intellectual humility, has 
been noticed by several scholars; though, they each constructed a different 
explanation of this. I will now mention two such scholars.  
Gregory Vlastos tried to capture this sentiment somewhat in his paper ‘Socrates’ 
Disavowal of Knowledge’ . Vlastos expressed this intellectual humility on the part 278
of Socrates by contrasting two sorts of knowledge: knowledge in the strong sense and 
knowledge in the weaker sense of the word. He claimed that Socrates attributed to 
himself the weaker sense of knowledge, but that admitted to not having knowledge in 
the stronger, absolute sense. He argued: 
‘…he [Socrates] is making a dual use of his words for knowing. When declaring that he 
knows absolutely nothing he is referring to that very strong sense in which philosophers had 
used them before and would go on using them long after – where one says one knows only 
when one is claiming certainty. This would leave him free to admit that he does have a moral 
knowledge in a radically weaker sense…’    
Henry Teloh expressed a similar sentiment in his book Socratic Education in Plato’s 
Early Dialogues. His analysis differs however from Vlastos’. Teloh instead makes his 
point by contrasting two sorts of wisdom: human wisdom and divine wisdom.  
Teloh points out that Socrates challenges other people’s attitude to knowledge. In the 
Apology, contrasting himself to sophists and as a manner of criticism of them, 
 See Vogt (2012) chapter one277
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Socrates says: that he has ‘human wisdom perhaps. It may be that I really posses this, 
while those whom I mention just now are wise with a wisdom more than human.’  279
    
As we have discussed earlier, the distinction that is being made at this section of the 
Apology by Socrates is between himself and sophistic teachers. The suggestion being 
made is that in order to do what the sophists claim to do, one would need to have a 
divine sort of wisdom – a sort of wisdom that is beyond that which Socrates can claim 
to possess. Socrates is here making the point that he is not a teacher – as his accusers 
had presented him at the trial – in the manner of sophists, since he does not possess 
the knowledge that would justify such a confident act.  
By saying: that to be that which a sophist claims to be, one would need divine wisdom 
– wisdom that is greater than that which Socrates possesses – Socrates shows that he 
himself – having only human wisdom – is more humble regarding his knowledge. He 
is intellectually humble. He knows that he does not have the knowledge that would 
have been required to justify him setting himself up as a sophist – a knowledge so 
complete that it can be called divine. 
According to Teloh, Socrates is not here claiming that he has no knowledge. He is 
claiming that his knowledge is human. He is expressing some humility regarding it.  
Consider what ‘human wisdom’ is. Teloh explains it by contrasting it to divine 
wisdom: ‘divine wisdom is absolute, closed, and unquestionable. One does not 
question… a dream from a god. Divine knowledge is dogmatic. Human knowledge, 
by contrast, is revisable; no matter how strong the arguments in favor of some belief, 
that belief can never be closed to further inquiry. It is always open to further evidence, 
and more dialectical investigation. Socrates knows in the sense “revisable knowledge” 
that he does not possess absolute knowledge.’  280
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Without committing myself to the particular interpretation of Vlastos or Teloh on this 
matter, I want simply to bring out that both of their understandings of Socrates’ 
disavowal of knowledge capture a sentiment of intellectual humility on the part of 
Socrates.  
Let us turn now back to the Apology. When one reads the text looking out for 
occasions where Socrates expresses his intellectual humility, they find that it is on 
such grounds that Socrates contrasts himself to his fellow Athenians.  
Beginning with a comparison between himself and a politician Socrates says: ‘I am 
wiser than this man; it is likely that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, but he 
thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither 
do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that I do not 
think I know what I do not know.’  281
Socrates does not say here anything to show that he is proud of his own lack of 
knowledge – of his ignorance. He is not pointing out that he takes a reticent epistemic 
stance. Rather, his emphasis lies in this: the politician is criticized for being arrogant 
and lacking self-awareness. He thinks he knows what he does not know. He is 
presumptuous and conceited in that. Socrates in contrast is humble. He knows his own 
limits. He has a realistic self-awareness regarding his knowledge. He knows what he 
knows and what he does not know. He is aware that he is lacking. Socrates is not 
epistemically presumptuous. 
After the politicians, Socrates presents his experience of the poets and says that he 
came across the same adverse attitude in them. He says: ‘…because of their poetry, 
they thought themselves very wise men in other respects, which they were not. So 
there again I withdrew, thinking that I had the same advantage over them as I had over 




Following this contrast between himself and the poets Socrates continuous to make 
his point by contrasting himself to craftsmen. What he says next is very interesting, 
because it makes clear the point regarding the value of intellectual humility. Notice 
the way in which Socrates first attributes wisdom to the craftsmen and then to 
himself. He says:  
‘…they knew things I did not know, and to that extent they were wiser than I. But, men of 
Athens, the good craftsmen seemed to have the same fault as the poets: each of them, because 
of his success in his craft, thought himself very wise in other most important pursuits, and this 
error of theirs overshadowed the wisdom they had, so that I asked myself… whether I should 
prefer to be as I am, with neither their wisdom nor their ignorance…. The answer I gave 
myself… was that it was to my advantage to be as I am.’  283
We agree with Giblin (1953: 205) that Socrates statement that he is wise in knowing 
that he does not know is not what a skeptic may want it to be . It is not being 284
claimed by Socrates that it is his sustaining a state of awareness of his own ignorance 
that makes him wise. It is not his acceptance that he does not know – his skepticism – 
that makes him wise .  285
It is the having of correct knowledge; the self-awareness; the truthful perception of 
the fact that Socrates has actual reason to be intellectually humble that makes him 
wise. Socrates is wise, we see in the above passage, because he knows that the most 
appropriate condition for him – the most truthful – is to be intellectually humble.   
One might ask: what is the difference between being intellectually humble and 
acknowledging your ignorance? I want to highlight two difference. The first is that the 
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 Furthermore, as Lesher (1987: 281) points out: Socrates never claims complete 285
skepticism; and his comment in the Apology that he does not think he knows that 
which he does not in fact know refers very specifically to knowledge of particular 
matters.
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skeptic is more likely to be content with an awareness of their ignorance. They see it 
as the best epistemic state that can be maintained; whereas the intellectually humble 
can believe in the possibility of knowledge and seek it wholeheartedly. There is 
possibly a difference in attitude between the humble and the skeptical.  
In addition to this the intellectually humble person can (like Socrates) hold some 
knowledge as certain whilst being aware that they do not know everything. 
Intellectual humility is an attitude appropriate for learning. It is a willingness to 
acquire knowledge. Where as, a skeptic who thinks that nothing can be decidedly 
known (and who thus views the realization of this fact as the most ‘correct 
awareness’) faces a logical problem in accepting anything as known. Skepticism thus 
is an attitude that makes learning problematic.   
A positive result for aporia 
We have been saying that Socrates was a type of teacher of virtue. Virtue and 
philosophy were found to be connected to behaving virtuously and thus involving 
some kind of understanding of what is right and wrong in the circumstances of our 
lives. We have also said that Socrates often told people that there are better ways to 
behave. These better ways of behaving can be summarized under the heading of ‘it is 
always better to be just even if you need to suffer for it’. 
 His act of teaching then on the part of Socrates involves some form of moralism as 
well as of confidence of knowledge. We have agreed with those scholars who have 
acknowledged that these are present in Socrates . 286
We have also been arguing that the view that confines what Socrates does with his 
interlocutors to bringing them to an awareness of their ignorance is incorrect, even if 
this ignorance has the potential of helping the production of knowledge at a later 
 See for example Vlastos (1985) and Vlastos (1990)286
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date . We have in other words rejected the view that what Socrates does equates to 287
seeking to divest himself and others of false beliefs. 
Instead we agree with Kidd (1967: 483) that the ‘continual self-criticism’ to which 
Socrates subjected himself and others in dialogue was productive of knowledge rather 
than ignorance; and therefore we can agree with Vlastos (1985) and Giblin (1953: 
205)  that Socrates could reasonably continue to seek knowledge through dialogue, 288
even though his exchanges with others often come to an end in aporia. 
A question arises. How can we say that Socrates sought knowledge through dialogue 
when: his dialogue was regarding ethical matters and therefore any knowledge 
accomplished would have been knowledge of virtue; and, we have said that he 
considered knowledge of virtue to be attributable properly only to the gods. 
We can say that Socrates sought knowledge, as much of it as he could approach 
through dialogue, if we understand knowledge of virtue to be as Reeve (1989: 53) 
characterized it: as being elenchus-resistant. He has defined knowledge as elenchus-
proof when: ‘nothing in the universal set of [one’s] beliefs, to which [one’s] 
commitment is greater than it is to P itself, entails a proposition inconsistent with 
P. ’  289
In other words, knowledge becomes elenchus-proof when one’s set of beliefs is 
consistent. To the extend therefore that we can say that Socrates attempted to achieve 
consistency in his beliefs and to eradicate contradictory beliefs, then we can say that 
he was seeking clear elenchus-resistant knowledge about the matters discussed.  
 Another example of a scholar who held this view is Myles Burnyeat who has 287
claimed that ‘earlier dialogues had valued perplexity merely as a necessary step 
towards disencumbering someone of the conceit of knowledge’. Burnyeat (1977: 58)
 Brown (2006: 279) also expresses this view.288
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We need to say though that Socrates was seeking human knowledge through the 
elenchus and not divine knowledge. The reason is that, if Socrates was confident 
enough that he can achieve expert knowledge so as to seek it, then the distinction 
between expert knowledge (the property of the gods) and human knowledge would 
blur. The distinction between the two sorts of knowledge would not be properly called 
human and expert (of the gods) but would merely be a distinction between higher and 
lower knowledge, and Socrates would have no basis for denying that he has higher 
knowledge. 
It must be then that Socrates was seeking human knowledge. This fact draws our 
attention to another point. Namely: that human knowledge can be completely correct. 
Human knowledge is not lesser than expert knowledge because it is somehow less 
precise or correct. Rather, the difference between the two sorts lies in the way that the 
knower knows: in the epistemic relationship of the knower to the knowledge.  
Reeve (1989: 53) captures this when he characterizes human knowledge saying: that 
one has human wisdom ‘only if he recognizes that he has no explanatory, teachable, 
luck-independent, elenchus-proof, certain knowledge of virtue but that he does have 
some knowledge, of the sort (implicitly) possessed by all human beings, which, 
though elenchus-resistant, is non-explanatory, unteachable, luck-dependent, and 
uncertain.’ 
All of these above characteristics, which Reeve has found to be attributable to human 
knowledge, refer to the manner in which the knower has a grasp on the knowledge. 
We accept that this must be the meaning of the distinction which Socrates makes 
between the two sorts of knowledge for the simple reason: that Socrates is so very 
motivated to seek the (human) knowledge of which he is able. If this knowledge had 
been somehow imprecise and thus to a degree untrue belief about virtue, then 
Socrates would not have been as interested in it.     
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Having said then that Socrates sought knowledge, let us return to the matter of why he 
is seen as bringing his interlocutors to a state of aporia. Many of Socrates’ platonic 
dialogue end in aporia, which is defined as ‘a mental state of perplexity and being at a 
loss about some ethical subject’ . However, we find that this aporia was a positive 290
result. Several other scholars, including Scott (2007) and Politis (2006) have given 
their own reasons for considering aporia to be a positive conclusion to dialogue. We 
want to add our new reason. Namely, we consider that the achievement of aporia by 
Socrates’ interlocutor was a success (also ) in the sense that it was a form of 291
knowledge. 
Realizing that you do not have knowledge of matters in which you incorrectly thought 
that you did have knowledge, brings one to the awareness of the limits of their 
knowledge. It is therefore a part of self-knowledge. By helping people to realize the 
limit of their knowledge, Socrates brings them closer to the desired aim of ‘knowing 
thyself’. He has produced in them some self-knowledge.  
This is no small achievement. Knowing one’s self is an important form of knowledge 
and in later dialogues Plato’s Socrates can be seen at points to give priority to it over 
other forms of knowledge .  292
In the Phaedrus 229e Socrates tells Phaedrus that he hasn’t the leisure to be 
concerned with other topics since he must first and foremost devote himself to the 
primary task of knowing himself. Again in the Philebus at 48c Socrates tells 
Protarchus that not knowing one’s self is a kind of vice.  
In other dialogues we find that the task of the philosopher is to know things as they 
really are; to know the truth about matter and to avoid entertaining false impressions. 
 Politis (2006: 88) 290
 We say ‘also’ because as will be discussed in chapter V, we agree with the positive 291
result of aporia found by Politis (2006)
 Nussbaum (1981: 72) assumes that this is what Socrates is doing in the Apology. 292
!  149
Knowing the truth about yourself and your epistemic state falls into this same 
category. To know the reality about your epistemic limits is more truthful and more 
appropriate for the philosopher than having a false impression about oneself, thinking 
they know things that they in fact do not know. 
The Theaetetus gives us an outline of this view. In its Digression, when Socrates 
describes the philosopher and compares him to the un-philosophical man, he tells 
Theodorus: that the philosopher wants to know what things are. He is deeply curious 
about the world, and applies his mind to seeing things in their essence . 293
The philosopher lives in a different realm from others. His is on a higher level. He is 
not concerned with appearances – with the hypocritical nature of things – but with 
their real essences . Socrates suggests that the love of truth and a curiosity for the 294
essential gives the philosopher a nobility that is not to be had otherwise .   295
For Socrates intellectual humility and self-knowledge are accompaniments. 
Intellectual humility includes the realization of our ignorance where appropriate, but 
does not commit us to this ignorance. It is the self-awareness of our limits and can 
include several beliefs as well as some degree of knowing. 
Again one might ask what the difference is between a skeptic and one who has self-
knowledge regarding their imperfect epistemic state. The difference I would draw is 
this: a skeptic is one who does not see how it is possible for them to transcend the 
noetic realm of uncertainty. Where as a person who has self-knowledge is someone 
who can assess correctly their epistemic state. They can be aware of that which they 
know together with that which they lack. They can know some things and still have a 





The intellectually humble learner can identify the gaps in their knowledge and thus 
can formulate the questions needed to guide an enquiry .  296
 
 See our discussion of Politis (2006) for more on this point. 296
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V. But if he doesn’t know 




We have been saying that: Socrates’ awareness that he does not know ‘anything fine 
and good’ and that what he did not know he did not think he knew either , was 297
Socrates self-knowledge. It was his achievement that rendered him wise: he knew 
himself in that he knew his own lack. This reflection of his furthermore expressed his 
perception of reality and the divine as being something related to, but grander than, 
what he can know about it. 
Some scholars then have asked: how can Socrates teach virtue to anyone when he, at 
his own admission does not know what it is? Nehamas (1992: 284) says that he is 
‘quite sure that Socrates was not a teacher’  of aretē. A main reason he has given for 298
this is that Socrates, by his own admittance did not have enough knowledge about the 
matter of virtue to act as a teacher to others . ‘Having some moral views about the 299
world’ says Nehamas, ‘is not sufficient to qualify one as a teacher of aretē…’ .  300
 Apology 21d297
 Please notice that even though in the paper discussed here Nehamas declares that 298
he has been wrong about some of his previous view and he withdraws them here, he 
still confirms the view that Socrates was not a teacher. He says: ‘the question whether 
Socrates was or was not a teacher. I still believe that he was not – that he was not, that 
it, a teacher of aretē; I will argue for the claim in what follows.  
 Nehamas’ text is not entirely clear. Another possible reading of the relevant essay 299
is that: Socrates was not a teacher (because he explicitly disclaims it), and that 
Nehamas offers the lack of expert knowledge as an explanation of this. We do not 
have sufficient evidence to commit to either of these two readings of Nehamas’ text. 
Nevertheless, for our purposes, it is sufficient to say that Nehamas considered that 




Nehamas claims that Socrates had himself set a high standard for the sort of 
knowledge that is required by a person in order to act as a teacher to others, and that 
Socrates did not meet his own criteria with regards to moral knowledge. He says:  
‘What Socrates considers necessary for being able to claim that role is a very specific 
kind of knowledge, not simply the conviction that some moral positions, which may 
in fact be very important to him, have so far survived all dialectical attack. To be a 
teacher you need not only this conviction, which is compatible with the possibility of 
your ideas turning out to be false upon their next examination, but also a certainty that 
the views you are claiming to teach are true…. In addition you must be in a position 
to explain the truth of these ideas: if not to all and sundry, at least to those who, like 
apprentices to a master craftsman, gradually become habituated into a craft. This is 
just the sort of knowledge which, all scholars agree, Socrates lacks, and, moreover, 
believes he lacks.’       301
My response to Nehamas is two-pronged. I argue first that Socrates does not claim to 
be a teacher of virtue, in the sense of one who actually imparts knowledge of it, so 
does not need expert knowledge of virtue but rather of philosophical method; and 
secondly that he is not in any case committed to the view that teaching requires expert 
knowledge.  
We agree with Nehamas that Socrates genuinely denies having the absolute sort of 
knowledge of virtue which in the Apology he labeled as divine, and which he 
contrasted with his own human wisdom. However, if we think of Socrates as we have 
been describing him: as a humbler sort of teacher of virtue who was a philosopher 
rather than a sophos then the fact that he did not have super-human knowledge of 
virtue is not a problem for us.  
 1992: 286-287301
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Socrates was a philosopher – a lover of wisdom – and he taught others how to live the 
life of philosophy: to enquire, and to seek to know virtue. If we think of Socrates as a 
teacher of philosophy, then we can notice that although he does not claim to have 
expert knowledge of virtue, he does seem confident that he has expertise in the skills 
of philosophy.  
We do see Socrates denying that he has any dogmas about virtue to pass on to others, 
but we never see him claiming that he cannot train a person in the ways of philosophy. 
He neither denies that he is an able philosopher himself, nor that he can help others to 
follow the path of philosophy. 
I will now make the case that Socrates speaks of himself as an expert teacher of 
philosophy; and if we think that philosophy was, in Socrates’ mind, the best a human 
person can do to approach virtue, then we are showing in what way he claimed to 
have the expertise needed to be a humble sort of teacher of virtue. We will have gone 
some way to respond to Nehamas’ claim that Socrates by his own admittance did not 
have the necessary expertise to be a teacher of virtue. 
The case that Socrates was an expert teacher of philosophy 
Socrates’ pedagogy  was an apprenticeship in philosophy. That is, it was the 302
practical processes of the love of truth. Let us consider what is postulated about his 
pedagogical art using the simile of the midwife in the Theaetetus. Here Socrates 
speaks of himself as a midwife attending to the souls of men . 303
 The term pedagogy is used in the modern sense meaning: the science and art of 302




In the section 148e7-151d of the Theaetetus Socrates likens himself to a midwife, and 
his pedagogical methods to the art of midwifery. It begins when Socrates uses a simile 
to describe Theaetetus’ intellectual worries, likening them to the pains of labor. He 
tells him that it is because he is pregnant and not barren that he is preoccupied with 
the question they are considering. Socrates then presents himself to Theaetetus as a 
midwife – telling him that if he were to submit himself to his (Socrates’) art, then 
Socrates could carry out the process of appropriately handling Theaetetus’ intellectual 
pregnancy .  304
Let us look closely at the elements of the art of midwifery to see what expertise is 
ascribed to the intellectual midwife . 305
Socrates tells Theaetetus that he (Socrates) is the appropriate person to help him with 
the philosophical concerns that he has been having. From this very introduction to the 
section we can see several propositions being made by Socrates regarding his own 
pedagogic art. Firstly, we learn that he is one who expertly deals with the intellectual 
condition of others. He has the art of dealing with the content of people’s intellect: 
that is, their thoughts and concepts. 
To start with, he is able to diagnose whether Theaetetus is barren or pregnant, where 
Theaetetus himself admits that he ‘does not know about that’ regarding his own 
state . We can see from this that Socrates claims to have the expert ability to 306
diagnose the intellectual state of a person better than that person can diagnose 
themselves. 
 See 149a304
 The main points I find as characteristic of the intellectual midwife agree with the 305
ones found by MacDowell (1973: 116) and Chappell (2004: 42).
 148e8306
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Furthermore, as has been said already, Socrates tells Theaetetus that he is the son of 
Phaenarete  (Φαιναρέτης). His mother’s name literally means: ‘she who brings 307
virtue to light’ .  308
The name introduces the notion of bringing forth that which is good from amongst the 
intellectual activity of others, and this notion continues throughout the allegorical 
description of the intellectual midwife. Describing himself as a midwife (like his 
mother was) Socrates’ claim that he has the skill of discerning that intellectual content 
in others which is ‘good and worthwhile’ - and worth bearing - and that he has the 
method that assists them to bring this good intellectual content forth.   
 A sort of Socratic unknowing 
Next Socrates tells Theaetetus that although he has this practical ability of dealing 
with the intellectual children of others, he himself does not bear children of his own. 
His activity – or his pedagogical art – does not involve him developing his own 
theories. His art is not characterized by his developing his own ideas, but it is instead 
a purely facilitative activity: where he, using skill and expert knowledge in the art of 
bringing forth the children of the intellect, directs others in the process of bringing 
forth their own thoughts .   309
Of his barrenness Socrates says: 
‘The common reproach against me is that I am always asking questions of other people but 
never express my own views about anything, because there is no wisdom in me; and that is 
true enough…. God compels me to attend the travails of others, but has forbidden me to 
procreate. So that I am not in any sense a wise man; I cannot claim as the child of my own 
 149a2307
 See note by M. J. Levett, in Cooper (1997)308
 149c and 150c5309
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soul any discovery worth the name of wisdom. But with those who associate with me it is 
different.’  310
Besides the point that Socrates’ pedagogical art is facilitative and practical in kind, we 
are also here told that Socrates does not educate his interlocutors by teaching them 
some discovery that he has made. He does not know something that he passes on to 
others through his teaching, but rather, having no content of his own to pass on, he 
directs his interlocutors to bring forth that which is already within them.  
Notice an important distinction. At this point Socrates does not say that he knows 
nothing regarding the various subject matters that he discusses with others . What he 311
does say is that he does not have any discovery of his own regarding them. For 
example, Anaxagoras, Protagoras and Pythagoras would have been unlike Socrates in 
this sense. They, unlike Socrates had developed their own theories about reality. They 
then taught these theories of theirs – their pioneering worldviews – to their disciples. 
They initiated their disciples in a new way of thinking about a matter, which they had 
developed themselves. 
Socrates denies that he has any such ideas of his own to give to anyone. Instead, he 
tells Theaetetus, that his own art is that of enabling others to think properly and to 
complete their thought processes in a correct manner. This is why Socrates says the 
following: that those who undergo the application of his art on them make progress, 
‘not due to anything they have learned from me; it is that they discover within 
themselves a multitude of beautiful things which they bring forth into the light. But it 
is I, with God’s help, who deliver them of this offspring.’  312
 150c5-150d2310
 or like Lesher (1987: 280) argued: we should not think that Socrates denied having 311
any knowledge at all.
 150d312
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However, notice that there is no reason here to take this negative statement that 
Socrates makes about himself as a disavowal of all – or for that matter of any – 
knowledge. Socrates does not give us any reason to think that he is ignorant regarding 
the matters which he discusses with his interlocutors.  
It would be perfectly compatible with the statement that Socrates makes here of 
himself, if he were very well read, and if he had thoroughly and systematically 
thought about the subject matter, and even if he had strong opinions of his own 
regarding these matters.  
He might even be well acquainted with ‘knowledge’ on the matter which is not his 
own brainchild – in the same way that a mathematician might know geometry without 
having made any of his own discoveries. Socrates does not deny this. The only thing 
that he does deny is that he ‘is forbidden to procreate’ and that he does not have any 
intellectual children of his own. Let us notice that this is not the same thing as not 
having informed opinions about the concepts and the theories that already exist 
roundabout you. 
We might for example even think that Socrates has a unique talent of thinking clearly 
and systematically about a matter at hand. Given this, he might be more able than 
others to make sense of matters and to thus have a more correct view of how things 
are. He might have the skill of ‘thinking about matters in a better way’ and so he 
might be in a good position to assess whether an idea or an ideology is true or false.  
He might even be able to point out to others what is correct or incorrect about an idea. 
None of this is incompatible with the negative statement that Socrates makes about 
himself here. He may, as I personally think he did, have these abilities, and still, be 
‘barren’ and not know anything of his own that he can teach to others. 
Consider for example the relationship between a professor of philosophy and a first 
year undergraduate student. The professor might not claim that they know the answers 
to the epistemological problems that they present to their students. They might not be 
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able to say what knowledge is exactly. As we can see, most professional 
epistemologists are aware that they do not have all the answers, even though they 
might have opinions.  
Nevertheless, the professor might appear to an undergraduate student as if they do 
know. This is because the professor has experience in thinking about these matters. 
They can identify easily identify the shortcomings of an answer proposed by the 
undergraduate, who just came up with this idea during the lecture, as they were being 
stimulated by the professor’s presentation. The professor could point out in what ways 
the undergraduate is not thinking about the matter correctly, and they can even give 
direction to the student as to how to proceed. 
These abilities to know the shortcomings of the undergraduate’s thoughts are the 
result of experience. The professor has persisted in thinking about these same matters 
for many years. They might then legitimately say that they do not themselves have the 
answers to today’s epistemological puzzles, however, they are nevertheless more than 
qualified to lead an undergraduate in enquiring about these.  
There is nothing in the text to suggest to us that Socrates is denying having any 
knowledge. Here he is merely denying that he has developed any novel ideas of his 
own to impart to others. Nevertheless, scholars have tended to read into this passage a 
disavowal of knowledge regarding the matters which Socrates discussed with his 
interlocutors. They have read this as a claim of ignorance. 
Dominic Scott, for example, makes this assumption in his book Plato’s Meno. He says 
that ‘when Socrates claims the role of midwife in the Theaetetus…he is clear that he 
has no knowledge himself’. We need to ask, he goes on, whether someone can make 
someone else knowledgeable, without having knowledge themselves. And he 
wonders, how could the maieutic teacher know which are the correct questions to ask 
their interlocutor if they are themselves ignorant .   313
 2006: 144313
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However, there is nothing in the text to justify any such assumption as the one made 
here by Scott. It might even be argued that Scott’s reading is contrary to the text, 
where Socrates has emphasized that he has the expert ability of guiding others in the 
direction of correct and true thought. 
Socratic skill 
Having noticed this point, let us return to see what more Socrates tells Theaetetus 
regarding his pedagogical art of midwifery. He continues telling Theaetetus that a 
midwife can tell better than anyone else whether a woman is pregnant or not . By 314
likening himself to the midwife here, Socrates is claiming for himself the ability of 
diagnosing the intellectual state of others, as we saw him do to Theaetetus at the start 
of this section. 
Socrates then says of midwives: that it is they ‘who have the power to bring on the 
pains, and also, if they think fit, to relieve them…. In difficult cases, too, they can 
bring about a birth; or, if they consider it advisable, they can promote a 
miscarriage.’   315
This text describes various elements of the Socratic pedagogical art. Perhaps it is here 
that it is most clear that Socrates is claiming to have an expert knowledge in 
managing the thought processes of others. At this point we can see clearly that he 
considers himself to have the skills for dealing with the intellectual content and the 
intellectual processes of his interlocutors, by which he can achieve accomplishments 
that they could not have achieved on their own.   




‘But it is I, with God’s help that deliver them of their offspring. And a proof of this may be 
seen in the many cases where people who did not realize this fact took all the credit to 
themselves and thought that I was no good. They have then proceeded to leave me sooner 
than they should, either of their own accord or through the influence of others. And after they 
have gone away from me they have resorted to harmful company, with the result that what 
remained within them has miscarried; while they have neglected the children I helped them to 
bring forth, and lost them, because they set more value upon lies and phantoms than upon the 
truth; finally they have been set down for ignorant fools, both by themselves and by 
everybody else…. Sometimes they come back, wanting my company again…. And then they 
begin again to make progress.’ 
Furthermore, by likening himself to midwives at this point Socrates tells Theaetetus 
that he has a skill – a method – of bringing to the surface important notions that are 
contained within a person’s intellect. Some of these notions, if they are good ones, 
Socrates can bring to the forefront and help the person to acknowledge them for what 
they are. In other words, Socrates here claims that that there might be good content 
buried within a general confusion in a person’s mind, and that he can put order to this 
conceptual mess, and bring out those ideas which are important, and which perhaps 
the thinker himself had overlooked.  
As we can see from the quote at 150e, a person may have the wrong impression about 
the notions which are contained within them. One may have correct notions within 
them but might be unable on their own to recognize this. Socrates here claims that he 
is able to identify these good notions and bring them to the forefront. Thus, according 
to this statement, Socrates believes that a person can know something – have the 
notion contained within themselves – and not know that they know this. They might 
even entertain other, incorrect views, despite having such true correct notions within 
themselves.  
  
Socrates claims to have the following skill: of identifying what is true within a 
persons thought and bringing it to light. He can recognize whether a belief is true or 
false, even when the believer himself does not know how to correctly evaluate their 
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laden or explicit belief . Socrates therefore has the ability, through engaging the 316
other in dialogue, to show them what it is to think truthfully.  
A related claim is made in the Gorgias  where Socrates is discussing with Polus. 317
Here Socrates shows a belief that he can bring out universal ideas from within people, 
even if the person is not aware that they have these ideas in them. 
The case discussed in the Theaetetus differs from what is claimed in the Gorgias in 
that: in the first Socrates is bringing out new ideas from within people, while in the 
second he is bringing out things which everyone believes. Nevertheless, the skilled 
required on the part of Socrates is arguably the same for both cases. In both cases he 
is uncovering and bringing forth truthful ideas from within the interlocutor. 
Polus had made a claim that is in direct opposition to the alternative claim made by 
Socrates. Socrates has claimed that a person who is punished for his injustice is better 
off than a person who remains unpunished for an unjust act. Polus disagreed with 
Plato and has put forth the opposite view, that a person who has managed to procure 
benefits for himself though unjust actions, and who has remained unpunished for his 
injustice, is far happier than a person who is punished.  
After a short exchange, Polus shows that he has no intention of accepting what 
Socrates is saying, and that he does not agree with it at all. In fact, he makes it clear 
that he considers Socrates’ claims to be ridiculous and outrageous. He says: ‘Don’t 
you think you have been refuted already, Socrates, when your saying things the likes 
of which no human being would maintain? Just ask anyone of these people.’  318
 David Sedley (2004: 30) refers to Socrates’ attitude to learning in the Theaetetus 316





To this Socrates responds unshaken by Polus’ confidence and his certainty in his own 
disagreement with Socrates. Socrates is himself confident, that Polus actually agrees 
with him, even though he does not know it yet. Even though Polus is convinced 
otherwise. He answers him saying: ‘For I do believe that you and I and everybody 
else consider doing what’s unjust worse than suffering it, and not paying what is due 
worse than paying it.’      319
Polus again affirms his certainty that he does not agree with Socrates, saying: ‘And I 
do believe that I don’t, and that no other person does either. So you’d take suffering 
what’s unjust over doing it would you?’ 
Socrates then responds, demonstrating once again this deep-rooted belief of his: that 
he knows that within the content of Polus’ beliefs he will be able to extract this idea 
for which he is arguing, despite the fact that Polus is clearly unaware that he believes 
any such thing. In fact, Socrates holds this certainty in the face of Polus rather brutally 
denying that he agrees in the least bit with the idea proposed by Socrates. Socrates’ 
response is this: ‘Yes, and so would you and everyone else.’     320
Polus denies this once again saying: ‘Far from it! I wouldn’t, you wouldn’t, and 
nobody else would either.’ 
At this point we can see that Socrates has full faith in his method of questioning in 
bringing forth the true beliefs from within his interlocutors. This is why he goes on to 
challenge Polus. In disregard of Polus’ confidence that he will never be brought to be 
aligned with Socrates’ expounded beliefs, Socrates invites him to undergo Socratic 
questioning. Socrates’ answer was in effect to say ‘well we shall see about that!’. 
Having made the assertion that Polus will be brought to agree with Socrates’ claims, 




Let us now return to the simile of the midwife in the Theaetetus and make a final 
point. At 149d Socrates tells Theaetetus that he can find, and dig out any correct 
notions that a person might have within them. He then makes the further claim that if 
it is appropriate he can promote a miscarriage. By this Socrates means that if he finds 
it to be the case that a person is entertaining not a true opinion but a piece of 
nonsense, then he has the expert ability of showing up this notion for what it is. He 
can destroy a false notion that the beholder had thought was a true notion.  
Socrates believes that this is a very important part of his art: the act of ridding people 
of false ideas and incorrect conceptions. He calls it the noblest function that a midwife 
could have had ‘to distinguish the true from the false offspring’ . He describes it as 321
a sort of ‘surgical’ act and considers it most beneficial for his interlocutors .  322
Finally, the digression of the Theaetetus has occasion when Socrates expresses his 
belief that he has the expert skill to lead people on the path of philosophy, towards 
truth and virtue. At 177b Socrates makes explicit a further idea. He tells Theodorus 
that through dialogue he has the ability to bring an un-philosophical man, if that man 
cooperates, to the realization that he is lacking in the wisdom that he believes himself 
to have. He can bring him to the self-awareness that he is not wise regarding matters 
of virtue. 
We have been showing that Socrates was an expert in the method of philosophy, that 
he considered himself one, and that he guided others in the processes of philosophy. 
Nehamas’ claim that Socrates could not have been a teacher of virtue because he 
lacked the relevant expert knowledge can be solved, if we think of Socrates instead as 
a teacher of philosophy: since Socrates would have considered himself to have the 
relevant ‘expert knowledge’ to be one who guides others in the pursuit of truth. He 




Discussing the simile of midwifery as found in the Theaetetus, and the Gorgias we 
have shown that: Socrates knew the ‘mechanics of enquiry’ and he was able to make 
‘correct choices’ regarding it. By Reeves’ definition Socrates was an expert of 
enquiry; and by Nehamas’ own criteria, this qualifies Socrates for teaching it. 
In conclusion then, let us say the following: that Socrates was a teacher ‘who knew’. 
He knew how to do philosophy. At Gorgias 487a of the same dialogue Socrates says: 
‘I realize that a person who is going to put a soul to an adequate test to see whether it 
lives rightly or not must have three qualities…: knowledge, good will, and frankness.’ 
These three Socrates must have, for he never denies, nor is it an easy task for anyone 
else to deny, that Socrates is one who puts ‘souls to the test’. He does not deny it in 
the Laches when Nicias describes him as doing just that . Indeed, Socrates tells us 323
that he does this in the Apology.  
At 38a he says: ‘…and the other things about which you hear me talking and 
examining myself and others…’ 
Or as he says at 29e: ‘And if any of you argues the point, and says he does care, I 
shall not let him go at once, nor shall I go away, but I shall question and examine and 
cross-examine him, and if I find that he does not possess virtue, but says he does, I 
shall rebuke him for scorning the things that are of most importance and caring more 
for what is of less worth.’ 
Let us conclude then by saying that Socrates does consider himself to have the ‘expert 
knowledge’ to show people in what manner they ought to do philosophy. He is the 
expert midwife that can bring forth intellectual children. He knows how to enquire. 
He tells us this clearly in the Theaetetus, he tells us it in the Apology. Finally, he tells 
it to Charmnides. He tells him that he knows a charm that will heal his soul.  
 187e323
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He says: ‘the treatment of the soul… my wonderful friend, is by means of certain 
charms, and these charms are words of the right sort: by the use of such words is 
temperance engendered in our souls, and as soon as it is engendered and present we 
may easily secure health to the head and to the rest of the body also.’ 
This is the cure that Socrates knows. He knows how to ‘tune words’ to praise the 
gods, and he knows how to bring the healing of philosophy to others as well, if only 
they be willing to follow him. 
V.I 
Nevertheless, we have also said that being a teacher of philosophy was Socrates’ 
humbler version of being a teacher of virtue. Therefore, if Nehamas (1992: 286)  is 324
correct in claiming that Socrates had set up a high standard of knowledge regarding 
the subject matter of virtue as a criterion for anyone who would act as a teacher of 
virtue, then a problem remains.  
To solve this problem we need to make the important distinction between expertise in 
the sense of mastery of a method and in the sense of mastery of some corpus of 
positive knowledge .  325
A teacher who uses the method of teaching of which Socrates approves in the Meno – 
that of using questions to guide the learner through a process of recollection rather 
than giving them pre-formulated bits of knowledge  – can engage pedagogically with 
a learner without already themselves ‘knowing’ everything in an ‘expert’ way.  
 Nussbaum (1981: 47) can be understood as sharing Nehamas’ view324
 This distinction was suggested by Professor Broadie in a private report of 325
corrections for this thesis, 2013.
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If a teacher is skilled in the ability of asking the right questions that will bring out 
knowledge from the interlocutor; and if the teacher has the ability to navigate with 
discernment through the responses given by the interlocutor; and is thus able to 
identify problematic and false answers and distinguish them from correct true 
answers; then, the teacher can play a role in a pedagogical process without possessing 
expert knowledge of the subject matter. The teacher need only be an experienced and 
an able ‘questioner’(or, enquirer). 
This is indeed what Socrates says of himself in the Theaetetus when he tells us that he 
himself is barren. He claims that he has no new knowledge of his own to pass on to 
others, but that he can nevertheless help them to ‘give birth’ to what is already inside 
them – with what they are pregnant. He says: ‘God compels me to attend the travail of 
others, but has forbidden me to procreate. So I am not in any sense a wise man; I 
cannot claim as the child of my own soul any discovery worth the name of 
wisdom.’  326
Socrates also explains to Theaetetus that people who engage with him in dialogue are 
seen to make progress: ‘…yet it is clear that it is not due to anything they have learnt 
from me; it is that they discover within themselves a multitude of beautiful things, 
which they bring forth into the light.’   327
Furthermore, in line with the point I have made above, Socrates tells Theaetetus that 
one of his most important abilities is to distinguish between a truth and a lie, to bring 
forth the one and to discard the other. When one is not able to properly evaluate and 
distinguish between ‘lies and phantoms’ and the ‘truth’, then, Socrates tells 





I contend that nowhere in Socrates’ description of the teacher, neither in the Meno nor 
in the Theaetetus can we find the idea that the teacher needs to have ‘expert 
knowledge’ which they can then pass on to a learner. Rather what we find is a teacher 
who is able to direct others in the processes of philosophy.  
Nehamas has claimed that ‘Socrates considers necessary for being able to claim that 
role’ of teacher of virtue ‘a very specific kind of knowledge’ : expert knowledge. 329
lacking this knowledge, and being aware that he lacks it, Socrates, Nehamas tells us, 
‘seems to lack just the sort of confidence that would allow him to present himself as a 
teacher…’ . Nehamas goes on to say that: far from having ‘expert knowledge’ 330
Socrates is ‘light and tentative’ in his beliefs; and that he [Socrates] ‘does not believe 
that such tentativeness is compatible with teaching’.  
This knowledge which Socrates considered necessary for teaching but denied having, 
Nehamas tells us, is the ‘expert’ knowledge claimed (according to Socrates) by the 
Sophist with whom he contrasts himself in the Apology. ‘More accurately put, 
[Socrates] says he lacks the knowledge he believes these people must lay claim to if 
they can be teachers of anything’ .  331
Nehamas borrows his notion of ‘expert knowledge from Reeve (1989) and insists that 
‘Socrates is convinced… that if some people can teach virtue… then they must 
possess what he would consider technical knowledge and he interprets their claim in 
this manner’ .  332
Reeve (1989: 53) also presents a thesis that supports the view of Nehamas. He argues 
that Socrates had human knowledge of virtue, and that this virtue is (according to 
what Socrates says of it in Plato’s texts) ‘unteachable’. 





The connection between Nehamas’ claim and Reeve’s description of the notion is thus 
twofold: (a) Nehamas uses the distinction made by Reeve; and (b) by labeling the sort 
of knowledge that Socrates would have had once we distinguish it from the expert 
knowledge he speaks of in relation to the sophists as ‘unteachable’, his distinction 
lends itself to the interpretation that Socrates’ knowledge did not meet the criteria that 
would have allowed him to be a teacher. We believe that this is how Nehamas might 
have felt confirmed in his conclusions by Reeve’s work . 333
I will argue that Socrates makes no such claim. He did not consider that in order to act 
as a teacher of anyone he would require the sort of knowledge he speaks about in 
relation to the sophists. 
What Socrates does say is that sophists presented themselves as teachers of virtue 
who had this expert knowledge, and that doing so was inappropriate on their part. He 
attacked sophists for claiming to teach virtue in the sense of implying that they were 
experts in the science of virtue. However, Socrates could nevertheless have seen 
himself in some sense a teacher of the philosophical approach to virtue without 
claiming expertise in some supposed virtue-science. Socrates does not say, I contend, 
that expert knowledge is necessarily needed by anyone who leads others on the life of 
virtue. 
Expert knowledge 
First, let us give a brief description of the ‘expert knowledge’ which some scholars 
believe, and we deny, Socrates considered necessary. 
 Admittedly this is an assumption on our part and we cannot offer better proof for 333
it.
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Nehamas tells us that what Socrates would have considered necessary for claiming 
the role of teacher of aretē is a ‘very specific kind of knowledge, not simply the 
conviction that some moral positions…have so far survived all dialectical attacks. To 
be a teacher, you need not only this conviction, which is compatible with the 
possibility of your ideas turning out to be false upon their next examination, but also a 
certainty that the views you are claiming to teach are true.’  The high criterion of 334
epistemic certainty is established. 
Nehamas calls the knowledge required of a teacher: ‘technical or expert knowledge’ 
of the subject matter; characterized by the ability to ‘explain that which one 
knows’ . ‘Socrates is convinced’, Nehamas tells us, ‘that if some people can teach 335
virtue (or any other subject), then they must possess what he would consider technical 
knowledge’ .  336
  
Nehamas borrows this concept of technical knowledge from C. D. C. Reeve (1989). 
According to Reeve, Socrates’ notion of expert knowledge is such: 
What Socrates thinks of as expert knowledge is a reapplication of the notion of ‘craft-
knowledge’ as it existed in Athens at his time. It has the following elements: it is 





 Reeve (1989: 45)337
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This knowledge is teachable . Furthermore it is explanatory in the sense that the 338
expert can ‘adequately explain what it is their products…say or mean’ . A poet for 339
example, says Reeve, does not compose with expertise but rather through divine 
inspiration, since Socrates found poets lacking the ability to answer questions 
regarding the content of their poems .  340
Reeve also says that expert knowledge as used by Socrates is ‘elenchus-proof’, since: 
‘Socrates presupposes throughout the Apology that those who cannot successfully 
defend themselves against the elenchus do not have expert knowledge of virtue’. 
These three features are found by Reeve within the Socratic dialogues. The final two 
elements – that expert knowledge is infallible certain knowledge and luck-
independent are deduced by him in the following manner: he first establishes a link 
between the notion of ‘expert knowledge’ as used by Socrates and the notion of ‘craft 
knowledge’ as it existed at the time. In virtue of this link, Reeve then goes on to 
extrapolate these two as elements of craft knowledge, which one can assume to also 
be elements of expert knowledge. 
We can understand that by expert knowledge being ‘luck-independent’ Reeve means 
the following: that one who is an expert on a matter has acquired an understanding of 
the matter and can make informed choices regarding it. Therefore, the moves that an 
expert makes in treating her subject are not successful because of luck. Rather, they 
are successful because the expert, knowing the mechanics of their subject matter, has 
made the correct choice. Reeve expresses this position by quoting the following: 
‘They [the sick] did not want to look on barefaced luck, so they entrusted themselves to craft instead’ 
 1989: 37338
 Dreyfus (1988: 106) claims that according to Socrates an expert can explain what 339





‘Experience made craft, as Polus says, inexperience luck.’  341
As for saying that expert knowledge is ‘infallible’ and ‘absolutely certain knowledge’ 
we can understand Reeve to mean the following: it is the knowledge we have of P 
when ‘the evidence we have for P does entail P, does preclude the possibility that P is 
false.’  342
Socrates as a teacher who does not require expert knowledge 
Even if we accept Reeves analysis that (a) ‘expert’ or ‘technical’ knowledge enables 
its possessor to teach that knowledge to others, we need not think that (b) expert 
knowing is necessary for one to be a teacher.  
(b) does not follow from (a). It might for example be the case that my pen enables me 
to write a letter, but that pen is not necessary for my writing the letter. In lack of a 
pen, I could write using a pencil, or even a laptop. 
We will argue that Plato’s text does not offer sufficient reason for thinking that 
Socrates considered it necessary. This interpretation is controversial because through 
a balanced and fair reading of the text a different reading is more plausible. 
By way of evidence let us consider some of the key texts, as indicated by Reeve 
(1989: 37), where Socrates speaks about expert knowledge in association with the 
sophists. These are texts where Socrates is criticizing sophists for failing to teach 




The texts discussed here are the obvious point where Nehamas might find Socrates 
saying that expert knowledge (of the sort that the sophists would need to have) is 
necessary for being a teacher, since these are the passages where the issue of the 
knowledge of sophists is discussed.  
However, I contend that the particular passages can be interpreted in another way. It is 
my considered opinion that an alternative reading is more consistent with what is 
found in the text. It will be argued that these texts lend them selves to a different 
reading: Socrates had identified that sophists claim to be able to pass on their 
knowledge of virtue to others through teaching. In these texts he challenged them 
regarding this asking something of the sort: ‘but do you even know what virtue is 
actually?’. In this way Socrates deconstructed the sophistic claim showing it to be 
deficient in that: the sophists did not have the relevant knowledge to do that which 
they claimed to do.  
Such a sort of disputation would not be unfamiliar to Socrates. However, there is no 
logical necessity for us to proceed from this and assume that Socrates would have 
been convinced of the sophists’ claim, had he found them to have the ‘expert 
knowledge’ that they claimed to have. There is no necessity to deduce from this that 
Socrates held ‘expert knowledge of virtue’ as an element (necessary or not) of the 
teaching of virtue.       
Gorgias 519c3-d1 
‘For Sophists…do this absurd thing: while they claim to be teachers of excellence , they 343
frequently accuse their students of doing them wrong, depriving them of their fees and 
withholding other forms of thanks from them, even though the students have been well served 
by them. Yet what could be more illogical business than this statement, that people who’ve 
become good and just, whose injustice has been removed by their teacher and who have come 
to possess justice, should wrong him – something they can’t do?’  344
 ‘φάσκοντες γὰρ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι εἶναι’343
 trans. by Zeyl, D., J., in Cooper (1997)344
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The claim that is made here by Socrates is that: a person who is teaching virtue ought 
to be expected to have an effect on his students whereby he makes them more 
virtuous. This is an almost tautological statement that can be restated as such: if one is 
successfully teaching virtue to pupils, then, it ought to be the case that their pupils are 
becoming more virtuous as a result of the teaching. 
Notice that nothing is said of the qualifications and the abilities that such a teacher 
would need in order to accomplish their aim. It does not necessarily follow, by any 
stretch of the imagination: that the teacher can only make the learner virtuous if they 
possess the ‘expert knowledge’ of what virtue is, which they are then able to pass on 
to their students because they themselves possess it.  
Socrates, in this passage, gives us no reason to assume that the having of expert 
knowledge by the teacher is decisive in whether the teaching process is successful. In 
fact, if we call to mind the notion of the ‘Socratic teacher’ who uses the Meno method 
of teaching by assisting recollection, or who uses the maieutic method described in 
the Theaetetus, then, it becomes apparent that it would have been out of character 
were it the case that Socrates was here making any such suggestion. 
This passage does not indicate that the sophists fail in their job precisely because they 
do not have the expert knowledge that they would need to have. It merely says that 
the sophists cannot possibly present themselves as successful teachers of virtue and at 
the same time complain about non-virtuous behavior on the part of their students, 
since, the failure of their students reflects badly upon them and their methods.  
In other words, Socrates is here saying that ‘we can judge a tree by the fruit that it 
bears’. He is pointing out the following point: that the sophists are not successful in 
doing what they claim to be doing.  
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With this argument Socrates wished to show that the sophists are not capable of 
delivering that which they promise. This is why he uses the verb φάσκοντες  in the 345
sentence ‘φάσκοντες γὰρ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι εἶναι’: because his intended meaning 
was that the Sophists are not that which they claim to be. 
My proposed reading of the text is suggested by the context from which it is taken. At 
this point Socrates is speaking with Callicles saying that politicians are harming 
citizens because they attend to the appetites of people, rather than to their actual 
wellbeing: like a baker who feeds you sweet cakes but does not care at all about the 
health of your body .  346
He then turns to say that, since by their actions politicians are creating a city that is 
not good and just, then, those same politicians have no right to complain if this same 
city they have made sick in turn treats them unjustly. Socrates is here saying that 
politicians have caused the problem – the sick state – and that therefore, they have 
only themselves to blame if this state mistreats them. Such a state, as they have 
created, Socrates suggests, can only ever be expected to mistreat people .  347
Socrates calls the complaint of the politicians that they were unfairly treated ‘a foolish 
business’  and ‘completely false’ . He then adds: ‘It looks like those who profess 348 349
to be politicians are just like those who profess to be sophists’ . It is so that our text 350
is introduced. 
 φάσκοντες is translated by Middle Liddell as ‘to say, affirm, assert, often with the 345







My proposed reading of the text is furthermore supported when we consider the way 
in which Socrates himself summarises his argument at 519e saying: ‘…don’t you 
think it’s illogical that someone who says he’s made someone else good should find 
fault with that person, charging that he, whom he himself made to become and to be 
good, is after all wicked?’   
Consider the second text: 
Hippias Major 283c2 
‘Hippias….isn’t the wisdom you have the sort that makes those who study and learn it 
stronger in virtue?’  351
Again, in this passage Socrates is questioning whether the sophist Hippias 
accomplishes that which he claims. Socrates is making the following point: (a) you 
Hippias claim that you have a sort of knowledge that you can pass on to others and 
thereby make them more virtuous; (b) but I have good reason to doubt that it is as you 
say. 
Socrates’ given reason for doubting Hippias’ claim is that if it were so, then any 
reasonable person who wants to be as virtuous as possible would hold Hippias in 
great esteem for this talent of his. They would seek out his services and show their 
appreciation for him by paying him generously. Socrates then points out that this is 
not what we see happening. Is it not the case, he asks Hippias, that you frequent 
Sparta? And is it not also the case, he further asks, that Spartans do not pay you for 
your services?   352
In this passage Socrates is casting doubt on Hippias’ claim that he is able to teach 
virtue. This passage is very compatible with the statements made by Socrates in the 
 Translated by Woodruff, P., in Cooper (1997)351
 See 283c352
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Meno where we have seen him arguing that he has never met anyone who actually 
teaches virtue. It was in the Meno also where Socrates mentions the sophists as 
possible candidates for teachers of virtue. Speaking to Anytus he says that of all men 
it is the sophists who ‘profess to be teachers of virtue and have shown themselves to 
be available to any Greek who wishes to learn…’ . This dialogue then concludes in 353
a manner that fully rejects the claim of the sophists to teach virtue: with Socrates 
emphasizing that he has never met a teacher of virtue.  354
What we take from this text is that Socrates noticed that the sophists were claiming to 
have a content of knowledge about virtue which they could impart to their students, 
thereby making them more virtuous. Socrates doubts that this is a credible claim on 
their part. However, this text, like the previous one, gives us no reason to think that 
Socrates held the belief that a teacher of virtue would be required to have expert 
knowledge of virtue that they can impart. 
Let us now consider the third piece of evidence Reeve indicates: 
Laches 186c2-5 
‘…the Sophists, who were the only ones who professed to be able to make a cultivated man 
of me…’   355
This is another occasion when Socrates is developing the point that as far as he knows 
there are no teachers of virtue. He says: ‘…I have had no teacher in this subject. And 
yet I have longed after it from my youth up.’  356
 Meno 91b353
 98c3354
 trans. by Sprague, R., K., in Cooper (1997)355
 Laches 186c356
!  177
Similarly to the previous dialogues discussed, Socrates here says that the sophists are 
the ones who profess to be teachers of virtue. However, this section of the dialogue 
begins in a manner that reminds us of the previous two discussed above. Socrates 
reminds his interlocutors that one ought to be critical of such claims – that someone is 
capable of teaching virtue – and they should examine such people based on their 
actions. Socrates says: ‘…but you would not want to trust them when they said they 
were good craftsmen unless they should have some well-executed product of their art 
to show you - and not just one but more than one.’  357
  
Once again the purpose of this text is to say that sophists claim to be able to make 
people virtuous. The dialogue does not conclude in their favor, and they are not 
recommended as teachers for the youth. However, there is no mention made here of 
the methods of sophists, and there is no technical appraisal of their teaching 
techniques. There is no reason whatsoever to conclude from this passage that Socrates 
held that having expert knowledge of virtue is a part of teaching others to be virtuous. 
In fact, this quote in particular does not even demonstrate the soft claim that sophists 
claim to have expert knowledge of virtue by which they are able to teach. 
Let us now look at the fourth and final reference given by Reeves:  
Protagoras 319a3-7 
Socrates: ‘You appear to be talking about the art of citizenship, and to be promising to make 
men good citizens’ 
Protagoras: ‘This is exactly what I claim, Socrates’  358
This text is of the same sort as the previous three. It is here affirmed that the sophist 
Protagoras claims to make his pupils virtuous through his teaching. From the start of 
 186a357
 trans. by Lombardo, S. and Bell, K., in Cooper (1997)358
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the dialogue we are warned by Socrates, together with Hippocrates, that we need to be 
critical of the claims that sophists make. We must watch, Socrates says, ‘or the sophist 
might deceive us in advertising what he sells…’  359
Socrates warns us that not only they may not be able to deliver that which they 
promise, but that may even have a harmful effect on the soul. By selling us a false 
product in the place of, and in the name of virtue, they can confuse our soul and harm 
our development.   360
In this passage, in a similar sentiment as the previous three, Socrates directly 
challenges Protagoras on his ability to deliver that which he promises. When 
Protagoras declares that he promises to make ‘men good citizens’ Socrates answers 
him in his usual manner arguing that he does not believe that virtue can be taught .   361
However, unlike the interlocutors of the previously discussed dialogues, Protagoras 
here answers Socrates and makes the case that virtue can indeed be taught. It is in fact 
taught everywhere and all the time, Protagoras claims. Protagoras concludes by 
saying that however, some people are better at teaching virtue than others for they are 
themselves more advanced in virtue. He concludes that: he considers himself ‘to be 
such a person, uniquely qualified to assist others in becoming noble and good.’  362
After this declaration on the part of Protagoras Socrates changes his approach and 
challenges Protagoras from a different perspective. He begins to address Protagoras 
much in the same way as he does other interlocutors when they make a claim about 
themselves. He tries to dispute Protagoras using the elenchus. He asks him saying: if 






possess virtue and can pass it on to others, then you ought to be able to say what 
virtue is. He then proceeds to questions him as to the nature of virtue. 
The point that Socrates tries so hard to make in this dialogue is that Protagoras is 
possibly selling a false product. That what he is passing of as virtue might not even be 
virtue at all. The dialogue itself is a bit obscure and in my opinion it is not as easy to 
see Socrates’ success here as it is in other works. 
However, for the purpose of contextualizing the reference taken from here by Reeve, 
we can look at how the dialogue ends. Socrates says the following: ‘Now, Protagoras, 
seeing that we have gotten topsy-turvy and terribly confused, I am most eager to clear 
it all up, and I would like us, having come this far, to continue until we come through 
to what virtue is in itself, and then to return to inquire about whether it can or cannot 
be taught…’  363
It is clear from how the dialogue ends that Socrates himself considered that his 
argument against the claims made by Protagoras regarding the teachability of virtue 
were successful in unsettling his claim and have cast doubt on its truth. Protagoras, 
according to Socrates did not manage to defend his claim that he can teach virtue. The 
audience therefore was meant to have been left with the question open, as to whether 
Protagoras can in fact deliver that which he promises. 
I see no reason to read into this dialogue that Socrates believed that having expert 
knowledge of virtue is the characteristic that allows a teacher to teach it to others. 





‘…to most readers of Plato there seems to be something special about what Socrates does in 
the conversations Plato dramatizes, and something distinctive about the way he does it, but 
scholars have been frustrated in their attempts to reduce its essential and unique elements to 
any simple formula.’  364
 Scott (2002: 2)364
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VI. The 
Question of  
Socrates’ 
method 
We come now to the question of educational process and technology. These final two 
chapters which conclude the thesis deal with the methodology used by Socrates in his 
andragogical project.  
In this chapter we consider the method that is standardly associated with Socrates (the 
elenchus) and find that it does not sufficiently describe the educational processes 
employed by Socrates. We believe that this thesis shows a Socrates who had a rich 
and well developed approach to educating his fellows, and that the limited process of 
the elenchus does not include all of the facets that one might expect from such an 
educator. 
 We try to give some suggestion of what sort of educational processes Socrates would 
have used that would be fitting for the educational persona we have been uncovering 
up to now throughout the thesis.  
We sum this up in chapter VII where we offer, by way of a conclusion, a discussion of 
the methodologies that we consider to be characteristic of the Socrates we have been 
describing thus far. 
VI.I 
Amidst the plethora of voices that describe what they call ‘Socrates’ method’ it is 
perhaps impossible to identify a single unified strand. It is obvious to all that Socrates 
used dialogue and mostly preferred an exchange of short questions and answers. 
Further than this there is no general agreement as to what constituted Socrates’ 
dialectical method, however, many scholars agree to use the term ‘elenchus’ to define 
what is called the ‘Socratic method’ or ‘Socrates’ preferred method’ .  365
 See Nails (2014: URL); Tarrant (2002: 63); Woodruff (2010: URL); Kuperus 365
(2007: 193). Vlastos (1994: 18) refers to the elenchus as ‘Socrates’ only line of 
argument.
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However, describing Socrates’ dialogical practice as the method of the elenchus faces 
two problems. The first problem is that there is no consensus among scholars about 
what the elenchus was and what it achieved. The second problem is that many 
scholars have raised challenges about the adequacy of the elenchus model to describe 
what Socrates did. Its sufficiency as a model has been seriously questioned. 
In what follows we look at some of the key positions taken in the debate regarding the 
elenchus. Our purpose however is to show that the disagreement amongst scholars on 
this topic does not run as deep as might appear. There remains a general agreement 
amongst scholars as to what Socrates did. Our purpose here is to highlight the basic 
character of what Socrates did with dialogue by noticing this agreement. 
Let us begin by considering the first point of contention: what was the elenchus and 
what did it achieve (or at least aim to achieve).  
The elenchus 
‘…all of us ought to be continuously eager to know what’s true and what’s false about the things that 
we are talking about. That it should become clear is a common good to all.’  366
Roughly speaking  the elenchus was a dialogical process by which Socrates brought 367
his interlocutor to examine a set of beliefs he (the interlocutor) held to be true. By 
drawing out the consequences from the beliefs of the set Socrates would show to his 
interlocutor that the beliefs are not consistent with one another and that therefore they 
 Gorgias 505e4366
 A more precise definition would necessarily take a position on questions regarding 367
the elenchus which are disputed. Vlastos’ structure of the ‘standard elenchus’ (2004: 
11) assumes that the starting premise of the process is assumed to have been proven 
false by Socrates. 
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cannot all be true simultaneously. The conclusion was that at least some of these 
beliefs considered must be rejected as untrue .  368
As to its structure, there have been made several attempts to give its basic outline. 
However, as Vlastos (2004: 11) points out: the elenctic method was conducted in 
impromptu debate, and thus it was allowed a sort of waywardness that resulted in 
motley variations. 
How one characterizes the structure of elenctic debate depends on their view of the 
more focal question: what did the elenchus achieve (or aim to achieve)? 
A pivotal paper in this debate has been Gregory Vlastos’ paper: ‘The Socratic 
Elenchus: Method is All’ . Vlastos describes what he termed the ‘standard elenchus’ 369
as follows: a refutand (a premise p that is refuted in the argument) is proven false 
(according to Socrates) when its inconsistency with further premises (which ‘have 
entered the argument simply as propositions on which he and the interlocutor are 
agreed’ and are in themselves ‘logically unsecure’ ) is established .   370 371
   
Vlastos argued that the process of the elenchus was a process of searching; and its 
‘object is always that positive outreach for truth’  in the moral domain . Indeed the 372 373
process has, according to Vlastos, a double objective: ‘to discover how every human 
being ought to live and to test that single human being who is doing the answering – 
to find out if he is living as one ought to live’ . 374
 See for example Vlastos (1994:3)368
 An earlier version of this paper appeared as ‘The Socratic Elenchus’ in 1983369
 1994: 13370
 Vlastos (1994: 3)371
 ibid: 4372
 ibid: 5373
 ibid: 10. Although, it is not clear from Vlastos’ technical analysis of how the 374
elenchus works how it is supposed to achieve this aim of holding lives to a standard.
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The process is a ‘cooperative endeavor for mutual enlightenment’; and it has two 
constraints: (a) that the interlocutor give short, spare, direct, unevasive answers to the 
questions put to them avoiding ‘speechifying’; and (b) that the interlocutor say what 
they believe . 375
The elenctic process on Vlastos’ account is productive and with it Socrates establishes 
a number of thesis . It is not purely a negative (refutative) process, as some would 376
have it . The elenchus then is an instrument of research.  377
With the elenchus, Vlastos argued, Socrates considered that he had ‘proved his thesis 
true’ . In order to make this claim, Vlastos needs to address an obvious objection: 378
According to Vlastos (2004: 11) the structure of the elenchus  is as follows:  379
(1) The interlocutor asserts a thesis, p, which Socrates considers false and targets 
for refutation. 
(2) Socrates secures agreement to further premises, say q and r (each of which 
may stand for a conjunct of propositions). The agreement is ad hoc: Socrates 
argues from {q, r}, not to them. 
(3) Socrates then argues, and the interlocutor agrees, that q & r entail not-p. 
(4) Socrates then claims that he has shown that not-p is true, p is false. 
From this function we can see that Socrates shows that p is inconsistent with q and r. 
If we accept the law of non-contradiction then it follows that p, q and r cannot be held 
to be true simultaneously. The contradiction of premises reveals that there is an 
 ibid: 7375
 ibid: 11376
 Discussed in chapter three of this thesis. See Vlastos (1994: 2-3, 17)377
 1994: 19378
 The ‘standard’ elenchus.379
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inconsistency in the set of beliefs {p,q,r}and that therefore at least some of them must 
be rejected as false. This process of the elenchus however does not prove which of the 
premises is false, only that the set is inconsistent.  
According to Vlastos Socrates uses this process of elenchus to disprove the primary 
claim of the interlocutor, claim p. He does this by showing that it is in contradiction 
with further premises q and r. Socrates can claim that this is achieved, according to 
Vlastos, because he [Socrates] believes that premises q and r are themselves true. 
Not-p is proven true because p is shown to be in contradiction with premises that are 
true. 
Vlastos’ reasoning is this: that that which Socrates himself believes, he takes to be 
true. Socrates has deductive proof of its truthfulness because he has subjected his own 
belief-set to the test of the elenchus for many years and it has proven itself (or at least, 
unlike the belief-sets of others it has not disproven itself) to be consistent. Therefore, 
Socrates believes that his belief-set consists of entirely true belief. Thus, any premise 
p that is shown to be in contradiction with what Socrates believes is proven false (not-
p is proven true) . 380
Two assumptions are being made here. The first is that Socrates believes that all 
falsehood entails self-contradiction and that the truth is wholly consistent . The 381
second is that Socrates believes the arguments he uses in the process of elenchus to be 
true.  
Vlastos argued for this view in opposition to previously prominent views. His paper 
dissents from the following views: 
(a) The view expressed by Roland Hall (1967), I. G. Kidd (1967) and Richard 
Robinson (1953) that Socrates used the elenchus to prove a thesis p to be false 
 1994: 28380
 Vlastos (1994: 27); Brickhouse and Smith (2002: 145)381
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by showing that it was self-contradictory (that it included its own negation): 
that is to say that Socrates used a series of questions and answers to draw 
consequences from a thesis that contradicted it.   
To this view Vlastos answered that Socrates is not seen to draw further premises q and 
r from the thesis p but rather brings them into the discussion without argument . 382
(b) The view that Socratic elenctic stops at showing the interlocutor the 
inconsistency of their belief set: thereby serving a purgative function of 
bringing one’s awareness to the fact that their confidence in a dogma is 
inappropriate. The achievement of Socratic elenchus is seen here as destroying 
the ‘conceit of wisdom’. This view was held (in the past) among others by 
Vlastos himself  and George Grote (1865, 1906). 383
In response to this view Vlastos pointed to passages in Plato’s dialogues where 
Socrates speaks in a manner that reveals his confidence that some truth has been 
established through the dialogical exchange with the interlocutor. Vlastos then 
concludes that Socrates considers that his own method is successful in its search for 
truth, over and above merely revealing the untruth of the interlocutor’s arrogant 
supposition of certainty .  384
Vlastos’ paper has spurred much reaction both from those who have disagreed with 
his position and those who support it; to the point that it has given shape to much of 
the contemporary debate regarding Socratic method .  385
Nicholas White (1995) took issue with Vlastos’ argument that the elenchus researched 
knowledge and particularly with the claim that Socrates considered his own belief set 
 1994: 2-3382
 See Vlastos (1956) and (1958)383
 1994: 17-18384
 Kuperus (2007: 208), footnote 2; and Benson (2002: 101)385
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to be true . White asked why, if we are to take Socrates as having beliefs he himself 386
considered to be true did he engage others in the particular sort of educational enquiry 
that he did. ‘Why does [Socrates] bother telling others to consult their own beliefs’ 
asks White, ‘instead of simply offering himself as an oracle?’   387
Vlastos’ answer to this is well articulated by Theodore Scaltsas (1993: 130) . He 388
notes that according to Vlastos: Socrates’ strongest moral concern was a concern for 
the moral autonomy of his interlocutors. Socrates on this account wanted his 
interlocutors to come to the truth themselves and was not willing to feed them any 
ready-made moral truths.  
The reason for this is a basic axiom of Socrates educational approach and it explains 
how it is that the elenchus achieves knowledge of the truth. It is this: that one comes 
to learn the truth by thoroughly examining their own belief-set and developing 
discernment regarding it. As Scaltsas explains:  
‘The elenctic method presupposes that the interlocutor believes both truths and falsehoods 
and by systematic applications of the elenchus the falsehoods are exposed and discarded. 
Therefore, it is not the aim of the elenchus to get the interlocutor to believe certain truths 
(after a didactic exercise), because the interlocutor already does believe them. Rather, it is 
getting the interlocutor to realize that he/she is committed to a contradiction, and to drop the 
one set of beliefs in favour of the other…. The point here is that knowledge, for Socrates, 
comes by recognition rather than by acceptance.’  389
To place this view in the contemporary context we can say that the elenchus assumes 
both a correspondence theory of truth and a coherentist theory of epistemic 
justification. Socrates relies on a correspondence theory of truth in that his thought 
 A basic premise of Vlastos’ argument (1994: 28).386
 1995: 241387




accepts metaphysical realism: reality is something objective and a proposition can be 
actually and objectively true of false depending on how it corresponds to reality .  390
He combines this with a coherentism in that the elenchus assumes that one is justified 
to hold a belief only if it coheres with their set of beliefs. A contradiction amongst the 
beliefs of a set reveals that at least some of those beliefs are incorrect .   391
A metaphor that brings the two together is the image of making a puzzle. Socrates 
seems to think that true beliefs would sit together and reveal a description of reality in 
the same way that puzzle pieces can be put together. We can say then that the elenchus 
examines individual predicates about reality, turning them this way and that, trying to 
find how they are positioned in relation to other propositions. If a proposition cannot 
be found to fit with others, then it might be that it is not part of the description of 
truth. It needs to be discarded.  
To take this metaphor a little further, we might say that in Vlastos’ view Socrates 
already has sections of the puzzle put together. His beliefs combine coherently to 
depict aspects of truth. He can be confident then that a proposition that does not link-
up with the pieces he already has arranged will not fit in amongst them. 
Hugh Benson defended view (b) against Vlastos arguing that showing ‘that one does 
not know does not require showing falsehood’ . He used the Meno to do this. He 392
argued that Vlastos cannot be correct in saying that the Socrates of the early dialogues 
(the Socrates of the elenchus) had any substantive view of how knowledge is 
acquired, and that his method did not seek to achieve knowledge . 393
 David (2009: URL)390




Benson (1990: 129) held the belief that Plato went beyond Socrates in developing a 
substantive view of how knowledge is acquired. If Vlastos is right, argues Benson, 
that early Socrates already had a method of seeking knowledge then, Plato merely 
developed away from Socrates by ‘substituting one substantive view about how 
knowledge is acquired with another.’ 
Benson brings the case of Socrates exchange with the slave boy in the Meno as 
evidence for his case. He separates that part of the dialogue into four sections and 
says that: the first two sections correspond to what Socrates does with his 
interlocutors in the ‘early dialogues’. He notes that at the end of these two sections the 
slave boy has not yet learned anything but has merely been rid of his false conceit of 
knowledge.  
Benson then argues that the theory of recollection does not get illustrated until the 
third and forth sections of the exchange. He makes the point that it is the theory of 
recollection that is new in the dialogue, and that it is this that is offered as an 
explanation to Meno about how knowledge can be acquired through enquiry into what 
is unknown.  
Benson thus concludes that the first two sections of the exchange show us the early 
Socrates engaged in his elenchus (and that the slave boy learns nothing from this 
process but is shown that he does not know); and that the two latter phases (which are 
intended to explain the theory of recollection) are what help the slave boy to bear 
knowledge, and that these are new . 394
Benson ‘s argument relies on the following: (a) the theory of recollection is what 
explains how knowledge can be acquired through this process of questions and 
answer; (b) that the theory of recollection is illustrated by the third and forth sections 
of the exchange between Socrates and the slave boy and that this TR  is new to the 395
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Meno (it cannot be found in the ‘early’ dialogues); (c) that the first two sections of the 
exchange do not bring the slave boy to knowledge but only rid him of false 
impressions; and (d) that the process used in the first two sections can be paralleled to 
what Socrates does in the ‘early’ dialogues.  
On these grounds Benson concludes that in the Meno Plato introduces a substantive 
theory of how knowledge is achieved that did not exist earlier, and was not merely 
replacing one theory for another . 396
However, I consider that Benson’s argument fails to oust Vlastos’ point for two 
reasons. Firstly, Vlastos can agree that the theory of recollection is new to the Meno 
and that nothing of the sort existed in the ‘earlier’ dialogues. He might also agree that 
the first two sections of the exchange are ‘Socratic’. That is not to say however that 
Plato saw the significance of the introduction of the TR to be that it went beyond what 
Socrates had been doing in so far as it introduces a method whereby knowledge can 
not be achieved.  
Vlastos can have a different explanation of the significance of the introduction of the 
TR and agree with Benson that Plato is giving us something extra in this dialogue. 
Indeed Vlastos says that Plato has taken a ‘giant step’ in introducing the theory of 
recollection in the Meno ‘transforming the moralist of the earlier dialogues in to the 
metaphysician of the middle ones’ .  397
Vlastos could argue however that Plato introduces the theory of recollection to 
explain or justify why it is that Socratic exchange does in fact bear the fruit of 
knowledge. Vlastos can say that Socrates used the elenchus to bring people to 
knowledge but that he never explains why such a method would work. He [Socrates] 
did not do meta-theory. Plato then, being more of a meta-philosopher might be 
introducing the theory of recollection to give support to the Socratic method. The 
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theory of recollection can be an important introduction of the Meno but its 
significance might as well be to support the Socratic method and not to overcome it. 
Notice that this solution is reminiscent of Seeskin’s (1986: 36) claim that some prior 
assumption by Socrates of the theory of recollection was needed to ground his method 
of the elenchus. His reasoning was that Socrates’ confidence that: ‘no one can manage 
to be a complete and consistent immoralist, since their own innate knowledge can 
always be elicited and shown to be inconsistent with whatever immoral position they 
might espouse’  needs to be based on some theory whereby one has innate 398
knowledge of important moral truths. 
We could say that Socrates assumed the premise that one has innate moral knowledge 
that cannot be lost, but that it was Plato who developed the theory of recollection 
(first appearing in the Meno) in order to philosophically support a method that utilized 
such an assumption. Arguably there is much evidence to support the reading that 
Socrates expected that amidst the mess of misconceptions people had true moral 
knowledge hidden. Dialogue might have been a method of excavating the true 
knowledge, and as he tells us in the Theaetetus, of separating the true from the 
false . 399
Smith (1987: 217) raised an objection to this reading: saying that this view assumes 
that Socrates had left his whole philosophic mission groundless and that Plato was 
required to give it any support. Smith finds such an assumption unlikely and 
undermining of Socrates as a philosopher. He suggests instead that we need to take 
seriously the justification for his method which Socrates does give: namely that his 
elenctic philosophizing was good since it was divinely sanctioned.  
 Smith (1987: 216)398
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I would like to avoid too much debate about what is pure scholarly hypothesis and say 
only that Smith’s point about the practice of elenchus being justified essentially (for 
Socrates) by divine command and inspiration need not be incompatible with the 
possibility of Plato later articulating what he might have thought of as ‘the 
metaphysical explanation of why it works’.  
We have no reason to think that for Plato or Socrates the commands of the divine 
were ontologically precarious. The god of Plato, who came to be described as the 
Demiurge of the Timaeus is better understood as one who is in line with metaphysical 
reality . In other words, being commanded to do something by a god, and that 400
something proving to be a metaphysically reasonable act, is acceptable to Plato.    
We also should notice, as Broadie (2004: 66-67) notes, that for Plato, the intelligence 
that caused creation did so with a view of what is good. The Demiurge formed the 
cosmos in such a way that it would be good, beautiful and orderly. Why something is 
the way it is, and the fact of a god commanding people to behave accordingly is 
compatible: since the good way to behave, and the ontologically appropriate way to 
behave are one and the same.  
My second objection to Benson’s strengthens the first. It is this: Benson argues the 
first two sections of the exchange with the slave boy are intended to parallel the 
method Socrates uses in the ‘early’ dialogues . He then argues that the theory of 401
recollection is explained by the final two sections of the exchange, and that it is at this 
point that the slave boy begins to find knowledge . The first two ‘Socratic sections’ 402
 According to Zeyl (2013) a main theme of the description of the Demiurge in the 400
Timaeus is that the way the universe is needs to be the product of the deliberate intent 
of Intellect, since it is so well arranged. 
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are ‘purely destructive in eliminating the slave-boys’ false conceit of 
knowledge…’ . 403
Benson however does not tell us if there is any difference of method being illustrated 
in the first two sections and in the latter two, nor what that difference might be. 
Indeed I see no methodological difference between these two stages. The same 
method of question and answer is used for both.  
Socrates interrupts the exchange with the slave boy at Meno 84a2-d2 to make 
commentary to Meno about what the slave boy had achieved up to that point. This is 
where Benson sets the break between the second section and the third and forth. 
Benson is correct to say that at this point Socrates tells Meno that what his 
interlocutor has achieved is to realize that he does not know the answer and thus to 
become, now aware of his ignorance, more willing to search and learn . 404
The third and fourth stage wherein the slave boy is led to knowledge begins after this 
remark, and the theory of recollection is referred to so as to explain what had 
happened in the latter two sections. However, what occurs between Socrates and the 
interlocutor does not change. The same process of question and answer, which at first 
brought the slave boy to acknowledge his own ignorance, is continued until the boy 
comes to true belief .  405
Plato introduces the theory of recollection to explain how this method works, he does 
not use the TR as grounds for showing a different dialogical method. He does not alter 
in any way the method of the first two stages of the exchange, which Benson is eager 
to assign to the early Socrates.  
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The only difference that we can see between the first two stages (where the slave boy 
is said to have achieved a useful acknowledgement of his ignorance) and the latter 
two (where he is led to true belief and it is suggested that if he continues in the 
process he will achieve knowledge) is the time that has lapsed between them. They 
differ in the fact that section one and two occurred at the start of the exchange and 
sections three and four occurred later into the exchange.  
It is natural then to assume that the experience of having your ignorance revealed to 
you is the introductory experience an interlocutor might have when meeting Socrates 
at first. If one were to stay with Socrates and persist in enquiry with him, then he can 
hope to move beyond this aporia towards knowledge. As Socrates points out: one 
cannot learn when they already think that they know. Such an attitude blocks the 
learner from proceeding in enquiry.  
Benson makes much of the point that the first two sections of the exchange with the 
slave boy are paralleled with the first part of the dialogue between Socrates and 
Meno . Let us remember then that Meno is a foreigner to Athens and he is probably 406
speaking with Socrates for the first time. This dialogue that they are having is 
introductory. Meno questions whether such dialogical enquiry can be productive and 
Socrates tells him that indeed it can, and that one ought to persist in it .  407
In his paper ‘Problems with Socratic Method’ Benson (2002) made another criticism 
of Vlastos’ analysis of the elenchus. He made the claim that the premises of the 
elenchus {q and r} with which thesis p is found to be inconsistent need not be 
premises that Socrates himself believed. Benson claimed that the constraint of 
premise acceptability characteristic of the elenchus is that the interlocutor who is 
being refuted believe the premises. The premises, says Benson, needn’t be believed 





inconsistency among the beliefs of Socrates’ interlocutors’ . Benson calls this 409
characteristic of the elenchus its ‘doxastic constraint’ .  410
Nevertheless, convinced by the evidence of passages throughout the ‘early dialogues’ 
that ‘indicate that Socrates aims to uncover truths and acquire knowledge and to 
encourage his interlocutors to do the same’  which one might consider 411
‘overwhelming’ , Benson states his position that Socrates did more than just the 412
elenchus . He insists that the elenchus itself is limited in its scope and can only 413
reveal an inconsistency within the belief-set of the interlocutor (as he had held in 
1990) since it has the doxastic constraint that does not allow it to do more: but he goes 
on to say that ‘we should not suppose that whenever Socrates behaves philosophically 
– whenever he engages in philosophical discourse – he must be behaving 
elenctically’ .  414
Benson gives the example of the Crito, much of the Apology, and the prologue of the 
Laches as occasions where Socrates cannot be said to be using the elenchus precisely 
because he does not keep to the ‘doxastic constraint’ of the elenchus and does not 
require it that each premise of the argument be agreed upon by an interlocutor . 415
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 The reader might wonder how Benson can square this view with his argument in 413
(1990: 153) that Plato takes himself in the Meno to be providing for the first time a 
substantive view about how genuine knowledge is to be acquired and not to be merely 
replacing a theory already existing in Socrates. If then Socrates in the ‘early 
dialogues’ were already seeking truth, then why on Benson’s view would Plato not 





Benson and Vlastos 
Benson and Vlastos disagree as to whether the elenchus is constructive (whether it 
can establish truth and falsehood of thesis). However, we want to concentrate on a 
feature that the two scholars hold in common. Both agree that dialogue with the 
Socrates of the ‘early’ dialogues can help the interlocutor to achieve two aims: (a) to 
realize that there is a fault in their belief-set and to feel thus the need for further 
enquiry; and (b) to seek a doxastic improvement (learning regarding what is true) in a 
dialogical exchange of question and answer with Socrates at the helm of the enquiry.  
The two scholars disagree about how they delineate what they call the elenctic 
method as they also disagree what occasions of dialogical exchange are to count as 
elenctic. Benson describes the Crito, the Apology, and the prologue of the Laches as 
being outside what counts as elenchus; and Vlastos found the Euthydemus, the Lysis 
and the Hippias Major to have characteristics that place them outside the elenchus . 416
Vlastos thought that the elenchus both counters the conceit of wisdom in the 
interlocutor and acted as a method of research; Benson argues that the elenchus ends 
with the defeat of one’s conceit of wisdom and that research into truth is carried out 
by Socrates out-with the bounds of the elenchus. Both agree that the two processes are 
attempted by Socrates.  
If we move beyond the question of how the elenchus as a method can be defined, and 
we ask instead what it is that Socrates achieves, we find that there is more agreement 
between these two scholars than would appear from the way that Benson sets his 
arguments in opposition to Vlastos’.  
Vasilis Politis (2006) agreed with Vlastos that the Socratic process is a search for 
truth. He does not call it the ‘elenchus’ but in speaking about the process of leading 
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the interlocutor: ‘towards a state of aporia, a mental state of perplexity and being at 
loss, about some ethical subject’ occurring in the ‘early’ dialogues’, Politis is referring 
to the same dialogues that most scholars name elenctic . 417
Politis also argued against the view that the only aim of aporia in these dialogues is to 
purge the interlocutor of the pretense of knowledge . He took however a different 418
approach to that of Vlastos: he acknowledged the phenomenon of Socratic dialogue 
resulting in perplexity (aporia) and argued that aporia ought to be understood as 
having two functions.  
The first aim was cathartic: that is, to disabuse interlocutors of conceptual errors. To 
this extend Politis agrees with those who see the elenchus as destructive of conceit. 
The second aim of aporia, he argues, was zetetic. This term comes from the Greek 
word zitisis meaning to seek something out. Zetetic aporia denotes a sort of aporia 
achieved in Socratic dialogue that is ‘properly a part of searching’. Politis argues that: 
‘Aporia in these dialogues is not only a stimulus towards taking up the search for 
knowledge; it is part of particular searches’ . 419
To explain his point Politis uses a concept found in Aristotle: that having aporiai is an 
act of articulating questions. Research is guided by particular puzzles and problems to 
be solved. We progress in our research, and we recognize our aim if we find it, 
because we are able to formulate dilemmas and enquire regarding them. Studying 
reality involves formulating questions regarding it . Particularly: Aristotle called 420
aporia the puzzle arising when one reasons about both sides of a questions and finds 






Politis argues that the term aporia is used in Plato’s works to mean both: (a) a state of 
mental confusion and bewilderment or helplessness and (b) such a sort of puzzle. He 
finds aporia used in the second sense (b) in the Protagoras ; Apology ; 421 422
Charmides ; and the Meno . 423 424
For our purposes let us say that this insight noted by Politis in effect makes the same 
general claim as we have seen Benson and Vlastos make. Namely: that Socrates used 
dialogue with questions and answers with an interlocutor both for the purpose of 
ridding a person of the conceit of knowledge and of searching for truth. For Politis 
also, further enquiry into the questions discussed with Socrates could bear the fruit of 
knowledge.  
Thomas Schmid (1981) also argued against the view that the elenchus aimed at 
refutation alone and spoke about two products of dialogue with Socrates. However, he 
emphasized that to understand the productivity of the elenchus we must move away 
from examining its logical structure alone and consider the process as a psychological 
experience. 
Schmid made a case that there are two kinds of elenchus. He called the one elenchus 
‘merely destructive’ and the second ‘pedagogical’ . The first, which achieved 425
nothing more than prove that the interlocutor did not ‘know what he was talking 
about’ was purely destructive; and the second, which Schmid also calls ‘genuine 
elenchus’ produced important learning in the interlocutor. 
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Whether one experienced the positive or the purely negative elenchus depended on 
the interlocutors themselves. A person who was genuine enough in their thought to 
have formulated truthful opinions resulting from their own experience of reality 
underwent a pedagogical experience by having these exposed and critiqued by 
Socrates .  426
Alternatively, a person who lacked the intellectual integrity to have a commitment to 
the truth of their opinion, and who in speaking was concerned simply with dialogue as 
a struggle for honor, was unable to have a ‘genuine elenchus’ with Socrates. Such a 
person was merely refuted and shown up as incorrect in their belief set .  427
In this case Socrates refutes his interlocutor for the sake of others. He knew that these 
interlocutors themselves would not benefit from the experience, but by exposing these 
would-be authorities Socrates warned other more truthful minds to avoid their 
influence . 428
Pedagogical elenchus (a) frees the interlocutor to think and choose for themselves; it 
(b) confirms to the interlocutor that the values he had sought to articulate are true 
values; (c) points to new areas of learning for him to pursue; (d) points beyond 
‘knowledge’ that the interlocutor has to both a new understanding of the virtue and a 
new conception of what it means to know; (e) and it involves the interlocutor in the 
commitment to truth as a personal value. 
For Schmid pedagogical elenchus works much the same way that the exchange with 
the slave-boy demonstrates in the Meno. It ‘begins with present knowledge, shows its 
limits…and finally points beyond it to another kind of knowledge, which cannot be 
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understood at present, but which might be understood later, as the dialogue is 
recollected and reexamined in memory’ .  429
In other words, Schmid considered genuine elenchus to be in fact directive towards 
more complex knowledge . The ability of the interlocutor to benefit from the 430
learning available in the exchange depended on their genuineness and willingness.  
Again we can say that Schmid is in agreement with Vlastos, Benson, and Politis in 
that: dialogue with Socrates can (in some cases) be both productive of knowledge or 
merely destructive (disputative). Schmid places the blame for the failure of what 
could have been productive elenchus on the interlocutor. Nevertheless, he gives us a 
picture of a Socrates who achieves both of these aims through dialogue. 
Perhaps the important contribution of Schmid’s position is that the elenchus is not a 
purely logical process. Dialogue with Socrates could function both as either purely 
destructive of one’s conceit of knowledge and as an educational tool bringing about 
learning. The involvement and attitude of the interlocutor decides which it will be. In 
that sense it is as much a psychological process as it is a logical one, and, as Schmid 
complains, if we try to understand what Socrates did by concentrating only on the 
logical structure of the elenchus we fail .  431
Indeed in his paper: ‘Socratic Moderation and Self-Knowledge’ Schmid described the 
elenchus as a ‘psychotherapeutic medical practice which, when applied to oneself and 
others, leads to intellectual and psychic moderation’ . 432
A related argument is made by Robert Reed (2013) who argued that the disruptive 






that it leads to moral maturity. It is a process that leads one to the psychological 
practice of expert knowledge.  
Talisse (2002) took a position against Vlastos’ claim that the elenchus proved thesis to 
be true or false, but he agreed that the method is productive and not purely 
destructive. He agreed with Schmid’s point that the elenchus teaches the interlocutor 
something about the nature of knowing.  
Talisse argued that the reason that the elenchus does not prove a proposition either 
true or false is because it simply does not examine propositions; rather it examines 
persons .  433
Notice that this in itself does not defy Vlastos’ position who, like others , held that 434
the elenchus examined both beliefs and persons . 435
Talisse argued that Socrates practiced the elenchus in order to purge people of false 
claims to knowledge  in order to correct their conception of knowledge. By 436
disputing their views Socrates showed his interlocutors that the basis of knowledge is 
not authority or something like it, but logos itself .  437
Talisse gives the example of the Euthyphro. He points out that even though Euthyphro 
does not learn what piety is, he does learn from Socrates what a definition is; what an 
argument is; what it means to participate in enquiry; that one's knowledge of piety 
runs only as deep as one's account (logos) of piety; that one’s conception of 
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knowledge cannot be grounded in mystical, private experiences; and that the search 
for knowledge is participatory non-dogmatic, anti-authoritarian, and egalitarian . 438
As will be seen, we agree with Talisse that Socrates teaches his interlocutor how to 
participate in enquiry, and hence how to do philosophy. For the moment however let 
us say that this does not need to be the case at the exclusion of any other propositional 
or ethical learning that might occur in dialogue with Socrates.  
Doing philosophy for Socrates was not an abstract activity separated from developing 
the ethical maturity referred to by Reed (2013), or from learning about the true state 
of the world (propositions that are true or false regarding reality). The technical 
practice of philosophy, truth, and conscious virtuous activity all came together for 
Socrates .   439
Carpenter and Polansky (2002) show the compatibility of the views discussed thus far 
by arguing that Socratic cross-examination achieves all of these purposes. Socrates 
examines lives, ideas and claims to expertise; punctures conceit of wisdom; reorients 
lives towards philosophy; and establishes certain views . 440
At the same time, in order to accommodate all of these purposes of Socratic dialogue, 
they conclude that Socrates has no single method of refutation or cross-examination; 
but rather uses a variety of methods to suit the needs of each interlocutor. 
Regarding the question debated between Vlastos and Benson  as to whether the 441
elenchus establishes the truth and falsehood of propositions, or if it merely shows 
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inconsistency in the thought of the interlocutor, Carpenter and Polansky argue that it 
most likely does both, sometimes the one and at other times the other . 442
They offer a universal description of Socratic refutation which makes it sound very 
much like what is called in contemporary theory of logical consequence the method of 
counterexample. 
The method of counterexample is the countering of an argument by ‘manifesting the 
manner in which the premises of the argument fail to lead to a conclusion. One way to 
do this is to provide an argument of the same form for which the premises are clearly 
true and the conclusion is clearly false. Another way to do this is to provide a 
circumstance in which the premises are true and the conclusion is false’ .  443
  
The method of counterexample is as intuitive as it sounds, and its primary success is 
to show that more thought is required regarding the arguments considered. It reveals 
that a solution has not been achieved yet: whether it be by showing that some 
particular premise is false, or by showing some logical inconsistency in a set of 
beliefs. 
Carpenter and Polansky (2002: 90) characterize Socratic refutation so: ‘Given that 
someone has stated a belief…or some belief can be taken as an implication of or be 
construed from what the person has said, refutation occurs when one or more 
statements are made or a series of questions asked that raise a difficulty for holding 
that belief in the way in which the interlocutor does, a difficulty that would, if 
appreciated, require some significant modification of that belief.’  
 2002: 90442
 Beall and Restall (2013: URL)443
!  204
Particularly, Socrates brings people to self-refutation by counterexample through 
engaging the person in a dialogue of question and answer, by allowing them to 
confirm each motion of the argument . 444
By showing how pervasive refutation is in Socratic dialogues, and by highlighting the 
several different approaches taken towards it, Carpenter and Polansky support their 
claim that it is inappropriate to speak of one method of elenchus, as opposed to a 
‘variety of Socratic elenchi’ .  445
They offer us a description of what Socrates does that is broader than any one 
description of the elenctic method; and by showing the prevalence of this ‘method of 
refutation’ in Plato’s dialogues, they show the incapacity of a single concept of 
elenchus to describe Socratic activity. 
  
The insufficiency of the elenchus 
Vlastos, like other scholars has concentrated on analyzing the elenchus because he 
considered it to be the activity that characterized Socrates: he saw the elenchus as 
Socrates’ ‘only line of argument’ .  446
As we have seen already with Carpenter and Polansky, this has raised much 
controversy amongst Socratic scholars. Regarding the elenchus no general agreement 
has been reached about what the elenchus is; and scholars continue to disagree about 
even its most basic defining traits . Alongside this however there has been 447
disagreement as to whether we should accept the elenchus as exclusively ‘that which 
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A notable problem with the view that Socratic dialogical method equals the elenchus 
is that the elenchus as a process – whatever it was – does not occur in all of the 
dialogues that scholars tend to consider (at least somewhat) Socratic. As Vlastos 
himself noted: the standard elenchus is not found in the Euthydemus, the Lysis, the 
Menexenus, or the Hippias Major . Benson argues that the elenchus does not occur 448
in the Crito, the Apology or the prologue of the Laches ; and Kuperus (2007) counts 449
the Protagoras and the Phaedo as non-elenctic.  
Of the eighteen dialogues that are considered early, transitional or early middle 
dialogues at least half have been argued to be non-elenctic in style.  
Due to this and other various problems encountered by scholars who try to interpret 
Socratic dialogical activity within the limited structure of an elenchus, several 
scholars have concluded that the practice of the elenchus is insufficient for describing 
what Socrates did in dialogue. 
Harold Tarrant (2002: 61) agreed with Talisse (2002: 52) that Socrates did not 
examine the truth and falsehood of propositions but rather persons and their belief-
sets.  
He saw the elenchus as a tool of refutation but argued that Socrates only used this tool 
occasionally, when refutation was Socrates’ intention. He did not see this as the 
purpose of each Socratic dialogue (which he calls ‘investigations’) and therefore: 
found it misleading to apply the term ‘elenchus’ to what Socrates did, since it does not 





Tarrant made a case for this by analyzing the vocabulary used in Plato’s texts. He 
notes that when Plato employed the term ‘elenchus’ he did not apply it to what 
Socrates himself was doing. Tarrant’s explanation for this was that the term denotes a 
hostile practice, and Socrates usually had a friendlier, more sensitive approach to his 
interlocutors .   451
By making a list of the verbs used by the author Plato, Tarrant makes the case that 
Plato preferred to describe what Socrates did as ‘exetasis’. Tarrant defined exetasis as 
a process that examined (not truth and falsehood but) knowledge and lack of 
knowledge. It was a process that revealed expertise: ‘Socratic exetasis does not appear 
to lead us to the discovery of truth or falsehood; at best it gives us an indication of 
those whose leadership might ultimately help up to distinguish the one from the 
other.’  452
According to Tarrant ‘exetasis’ was a particular process whereby inconsistency in the 
interlocutor’s belief-set was demonstrated and:  ‘what is revealed when a person’s 
beliefs are demonstrated to be inconsistent is a personal lack of credibility, not the 
presence of a false proposition’ . 453
Tarrant reaches two main conclusions in his research:  
(a) that Socrates used both the ‘elenchus’ and ‘exetasis’ as tools in dialogue with 
people on different occasions. 







One problem I find with Tarrant’s claims is that he makes the same mistake that has 
tormented scholars before him who have tried to maintain that Socrates (using the 
elenchus as his only method) did not search for truth through dialogue.  
This view has faced the problem that several occasions in Plato’s texts show Socrates 
as having a strong longing for truth, and for being ever in search of it. Passages that 
have been quoted against this view include: Gorgias 505e4-505e6; Laches 
201a2-201a7; Apology 29d-30b; and Charmides 166d4-166d6.  
For this reason I consider that we need to accept that a description of what Socrates 
did (regardless of how we name that and how many types of method we distinguish in 
order to characterize it) needs to acknowledge that Socrates (at least sometimes) 
actively sought for truth together with other people through dialogue . 455
A second problem I find with Tarrant’s view is that, although his work attempts to 
expand the conceptual repertoire we use to interpret Socrates (and so make deeper 
also our understanding of him), he still places what I consider to be an arbitrary limit 
on Socratic study.  
Tarrant identifies two processes instead of one: the ‘elenchus’ and the ‘exetasis’. 
However, in the same texts where he finds evidence for these there is also evidence 
that Socrates was doing something more. I am referring to Socrates exchange with 
Callicles in the Gorgias. Here Tarrant notices a pattern that does not fit neatly into 
what he has delineated as ‘exetasis’; and he responds to this by (as he himself 
acknowledges) arbitrarily drawing the line under Socrates.  
He says that this is an occasion of ‘dialectical investigation’, that it is un-Socratic and 
that it was composed at a later date, and added on as a Platonic section . We feel that 456
this attitude amongst scholars to try to find a simple and narrow description of what 
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Socrates did, and to chop-up the dialogues and dismiss whatever does not fit nicely 
into their description as non-Socratic is a problem that prevents us from fully 
appreciating Socratic dialectics.  
Rather, incorporating this ‘dialectical investigation’ into his profiling of Socratic 
method (instead of arbitrarily dismissing it) might have helped Tarrant to respond to 
the criticism that Socrates is described clearly by Plato as seeking truth. 
Finally, Tarrant’s analysis of the ‘elenchus’ as something aggressive and always 
‘unfriendly’ – from which he concludes that we need a kinder term to describe what 
Socrates did (namely the ‘exetasis’) – is in disagreement with the historical 
canvassing of the meaning of the term conducted by Lesher.  
Lesher (2002: 24) found that by the time Plato was writing his works the term had 
come to mean (also) the act of putting a person to the test. This meaning is much the 
same as the one Tarrant has wanted to differentiate with the term ‘exetasis’. If Lesher 
is correct in this then the distinction between ‘exetasis’ and ‘elenchus’ needs to be re-
evaluated.  
Tarrant indeed makes a good case that the  ‘elenchus’ is not usually applied by Plato 
to describe what Socrates did. Nevertheless, the case for what we ought to learn from 
this fact has not, in my mind, been made convincingly as yet .    457
Gerard Kuperus (2007: 193) also made a case that the elenchus does not describe 
what Socrates did: because it is too limited a concept to capture the complexity of 
Socrates’ dialogical activities. He argued that there was no ‘blueprint or standard 
formula’ used by Socrates, and that a close look Socratic dialectic in the Protagoras 
for example, shows that Socrates used a method that was ‘open’ and ‘did not develop 
through a specific plan’. 
 See Also Young (2002) for this criticism of Tarrant.457
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Kuperus also found in Plato’s text a different terminology used by the author to 
describe Socratic dialogical activity: the metaphors of ‘labyrinth’ and ‘navigation’.  
Kuperus applies the metaphor of navigation to the Protagoras  in a manner that 458
arguably many would find difficult since it does not distinguish between Socratic 
thought and Platonic forms. He says: ‘both navigators and philosophers deal with 
“things” that are not ready to hand (navigators with stars, the wind, and the days of 
the year, the philosopher with the ideal forms), and both are dealing with these eternal 
truths within a world that is characterized by change or flux’ .  459
Referring us to the crisis in dialogue between Socrates and Protagoras at 336d 
Kuperus shows that the dialogue takes a conscious turn away from Protagoras’ 
dialogical method and towards Socrates’. The latter is characterized as an art of 
argumentation; dialectic or dialogue; a process of question and answer . 460
It is also suggested that Socrates’ method can teach one to become virtuous. To make 
sense of this we need to understand that Kuperus does not speak of virtue as 
something static (as an achieved state of being that can be had like an object) but as 
something fluid (as a state of becoming through process). That process is philosophy 
itself; and Socratic dialogue is philosophical. 
Kuperus says: ‘One cannot simply be good, but one actually has to do things in order 
to become good. Virtue can only be pursued or taught through praxis. This praxis 
seems for Socrates, first of all, to be actively involved in a dialogue. Virtue cannot be 
learned by simply listening to someone else; one needs to develop one’s own 
knowledge by actively participating in a dialogue. Virtue thus cannot be taught by 
 For our purposes we will discuss only Kuperus’ study of navigation since he uses 458
the metaphor of the labyrinth primarily to study the Phaedo and we would like to 
avoid a debate regarding Socratic and Platonic dialogues for the moment.  
 
 2007: 193-194. Inspired probably from Republic 485b459
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Protagoras’ technē – in which one listens to long monologues – but…by way of 
dialectic. 
In fact, Kuperus says, we see Protagoras becoming better by 318b because through 
dialogue Socrates taught him something he did not know: that virtue cannot be taught 
sophistically . 461
In the place of the formal elenchus, Kuperus describes the characteristics of Socratic 
educational dialectic as a research process that achieves knowledge of first principles: 
A process whereby the philosopher comes to gain knowledge of the things that are 
(forms). This is achieves by ‘leaving nothing untouched’ and doing the research 
needed to become able to give an account of the things that are. This research is: a 
process of enquiry that ‘destroys or does away with hypotheses ‘up to the first 
principle itself in order to find confirmation there’ .’   462 463
For this dialogical process to work the interlocutors need to be willing to change their 
position and accept a new one . Socrates’ makes use of the art, according to 464
Kuperus , of ‘assistants and helpers in the turning around of others’.  465
Linking this view with the Phaedo  Kuperus claims that the philosopher travels with 466
the vessel of logos as navigators travel on ships: and they search for the arguments 
that are ‘best and hardest to disprove’ . Navigation through the complex ‘sea’ of 467
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possible arguments is difficult, and the dialectician finds ways to make an appropriate 
path through these waters . 468
Kuperus’ basic contribution is to find that Plato himself uses the metaphor of 
navigation to describe what the philosopher does in dialogue and to try to apply this 
metaphor instead of our notion of ‘elenchus’. As a result he concludes that: Socratic 
enquiry was a form of research through the destruction of hypothesis; and that it was 
able to search for truths (both of these points agree with Vlastos’ analysis of the 
‘elenchus’). 
Kuperus further wishes to conclude that due to the difficulty of this navigation 
through the vastness of possible arguments, the dialectician remains free to follow the 
path they choose (as a ship has no fixed road carved in the ocean) and that no single 
method (i.e. the elenchus) is systematically applied. However, we find that his 
arguments make more of a case for contextualizing the process of ‘destructive 
interrogation of hypotheses’ (and thus describing it as a process of research into 
truths) than for describing the mechanisms of this research in a way that is different 
from the ‘elenchus’.  
Brickhouse and Smith (2002: 147) concluded that these controversies regarding the 
elenchus are to be expected since no single analysis of ‘elenctic’ arguments can 
capture what Socrates did. Like Carpenter and Polansky (2002) they argue that ‘there 
is no such thing as the Socratic elenchos’.  
Simple categorization of Socrates’ behavior that can yield a unified description of his 
practice has been found problematic by those who share the view of Christopher 
Rowe: that what we find in each dialogue differs from the rest significantly, and even 
though there are some categories of method, structure and content that can be traced, 
the overlap is partial . 469
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Brickhouse and Smith consider that Socrates ‘argues with people in several different 
ways’ and that this variety cannot be captured by a single heading.   
We agree with them on a basic premise of their view: that Socrates spoke differently 
with different people, and that we cannot expect to characterize every philosophical 
act that Socrates achieved through dialogue with a single methodological tool as is the 
elenchus. We furthermore agree with them that the attempt to squeeze everything that 
Socrates did into one methodological tool creates confusion purely because one tool is 
insufficient to describe what Socrates did, no matter how we might try tweak the 
profile of that tool. 
Socrates spoke differently to different people. If you allow me some artistic license: I 
would call Socrates a ‘lonely genius’, always looking for a like mind to speak with. 
Socrates, the lonely genius 
The most natural thing to expect from Socrates is that he would have spoken about 
certain things with some people but not with others. Being an andragogue  who was 470
concerned with others learning – and one particularly concerned with learning 
through dialogue - Socrates would likely have engaged each interlocutor on the level 
they capable of, and about the subjects that were relevant to them in particular. 
Speaking differently to different people is natural. I will speak about what I have been 
learning during my time as a PhD student of philosophy differently to my mother, to 
another philosophy student, or to a child. It is still the case that I have learned the 
same things, but I will engage in dialogue about them differently with different 
 A term used in Adult Educational theory to denote the particular practice of 470
educating adults. See Pratt (1988).
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people, each time discussing these matters in a way that is relevant and accessible to 
my interlocutor.   
That is the nature of dialogue. Dialogue is an event amongst people. Each participant 
to an extent defines how the dialogue will go. If they did not, then it would not be a 
dialogue but a speech. Socrates has made clear on several occasions his preference for 
dialogue rather than speeches. 
I do not go around with a power-point presentation repeating to each person who asks 
me what I learn in academic philosophy. In the same way, Socrates was a philosopher 
who shared his experience of philosophy with others and engaged with them 
philosophically in dialogue. This is particularly to be expected of Socrates who as we 
have seen was not a doctrinaire teacher. His was a pedagogy of dialogue.  
Socrates involved others in philosophy through dialogue. A person (an interlocutor) 
can only become as involved in a conversation as they are capable and willing. For a 
dialogue to proceed in a certain direction, the participants need to be both able to 
follow that direction, and willing to do so.  
Even though Socrates was the same person across the dialogues, his interlocutors 
whom we meet in Plato’s works are various people, each with a variety of abilities, 
attitudinal tendencies, and intentions. Thus it is natural to see a variety amongst the 
dialogues both in form and in content.  
That is not to say of course that Socrates did not challenge people through dialogue 
and pull them into discussing more deeply than they may have liked. Indeed Socrates 
did do so, as we are told by Nicias in the Laches. Speaking to Lysimachus he 
exclaims that anyone who is familiar with Socrates will know that: 
‘…whoever comes into close contact with Socrates and associates with him in conversation 
must necessarily, even if he began by conversing about something quite different in the first 
place, keep on being led about by the man’s arguments until he submits to answering 
!  214
questions about himself concerning both his present manner of life and the life he has lives 
hitherto. And when he does submit to this questioning, you don’t realize that Socrates will not 
let him go before he has well and truly tested every last detail.’  471
However, even though we are told that Socrates pulled people beyond their comfort 
zone, it is still the case that each person has a different limit to what they are 
comfortable with. Socrates pulled people, but he could only pull them as far as they 
were able to go. 
Socrates engaged people in thorough enquiry. Those people who were inclined to 
taking part in such analysis follow Socrates with more ease. Others however found 
Socrates’ probing too invasive since it brought to light things they may have been 
ashamed of. These people tended resist to such enquiry, and felt much more that a 
struggle was taking place between them and Socrates. Nicias goes on to tell us as 
much: 
‘I personally am accustomed to the man and know that one has to put up with this kind of 
treatment from him….I take pleasure in the man’s company…and don’t regard it as at all a 
bad thing to have it brought to our attention that we have done or are doing wrong. Rather I 
think that a man who does not run away from such treatment but is willing… to value 
learning as long as he lives…will necessarily pay more attention to the rest of his life. For me 
there is nothing unusual or unpleasant in being examined by Socrates… but find out how 
Laches here feels about such things.’  472
Socrates refers to this himself in the maieutic simile. He tells Theaetetus that he ought 
not to respond to Socrates’ questions as some people do, who: 
‘…have often before now gotten into such a state with me as to be literally ready to bite when 
I take away some nonsense or other from them. They never believe that I am doing this in all 




don’t do this kind of thing out of malice, but because it is not permitted to me to accept a lie 
and put away truth.’  473
Compare for example the different reactions to Socrates’s questioning displayed by 
Theaetetus and Meno. Meno resists following Socrates in dialogue and this is seen 
throughout the work. When Socrates shows Meno that what he considers himself to 
know regarding virtue is unsupported, he reacts by naming Socrates a torpedo. He 
points out that the effect that Socrates has on people is undesirable. He says: 
‘... you seem, in appearance and in every other way, to be like the broad torpedo fish, for it 
too makes anyone who comes close and touches it feel numb, and you now seem to have that 
kind of effect on me, for both my mind and tongue are numb, and I have no answer to give 
you…. I think you are wise not to sail away from Athens to go and stay elsewhere, for if you 
were to behave like this as a stranger in another city, you would be driven away for practicing 
sorcery.’   474
It is reasonable to expect that Socrates will not be able to carry out a conversation 
with such people that is as involved, as he can with those interlocutors who are 
willing and able to enquire with him.  
Theaetetus on the other hand has a very different reaction to Socrates and is 
particularly willing to be lead by him through conversation. His attitude to Socrates is 
exemplified by responses of the sort: ‘…I ought to answer Socrates, as you and 
Theodorus tell me to. In any case, you and he will put me right, if I make a 
mistake’ . Their encounter notably results in one of Plato’s longest, most 475
complicated and most in depth enquiries. 
To borrow a term from contemporary educational theory, Socrates was a sort of 





continue the metaphor, we might say that Socrates walked with each interlocutor 
towards the same direction – that is, towards understanding the value of piety and the 
divine – but he picked up each person where they were at, and walked with each only 
as far as they could (and were willing) to go with him. With interlocutors who were 
able, Socrates engaged in a more complex analysis of reality that involved several 
considerations and dimensions. With those who were less able, he kept it simple. 
Let us notice that in the ‘simpler’ dialogues where Socrates is discussing with 
interlocutors who are not ready for complex enquiry. Socrates does not refuse to 
speak about more complex questions on the grounds that they are not relevant or 
interesting. Rather, in each case, Socrates makes it clear that they (the interlocutor and 
himself together as one unit) are not ready or able to address such a complicated 
question.  
Socrates is happy for a conversation to evolve in every direction, as we are told in the 
digression of the Theaetetus. Let us remember that here, when Socrates is describing 
the philosopher and distinguishing him from the ‘slave’, the first point he makes is 
this one.  
Theodorus makes the point that they have ‘plenty of time’ and that they can digress 
from their main point of enquiry to pursue a point that had just come up between 
them. Socrates agrees with him and says that this fact here noted reminds him of an 
idea that had often occurred to him: that the philosopher is free, and the non-
philosopher is a slave. He explains: 
‘Because the [philosopher]…has…plenty of time. When he talks, he talks in peace and quiet, 
and his time is his own. It is so with us now: here we are beginning on our third new 
discussion; and he can do the same, if he is like us, and prefers the newcomer to the question 
at hand. It does not matter to such men whether they talk for a day or a year, if only they may 
hit upon that which is.’  476
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Why then is it that we see Socrates restricting some of his interlocutors, refusing to 
discuss with them the questions they bring up, or forcing them to stay upon a question 
that Socrates chooses? As we can see in the Meno it is because Socrates does not 
think that their conversation will be substantial or profitable if they attempt to give 
answers to certain questions. He does not think that they are ready to take on such 
questions. He feels that there is still a lot of groundwork to be done. 
Socrates does not refuse to answer Meno’s questions about virtue because he does not 
care about these matters. He refuses to speak about them because he does not think 
that the conversation is ripe for them in its current condition. 
Consider what Socrates tells Callicles at the conclusion of their conversation in the 
Gorgias. He tells Callicles to come and join him in philosophy so that they may 
‘practice excellence’ together. Then he says: 
‘And then, after we’ve practiced it together, then at last, if we think we should, we’ll turn to 
politics, or then we’ll deliberate about whatever subject we please, when we’re better at 
deliberating than we are now. For it’s a shameful thing for us, being in the condition we 
appear to be in at present – when we never think the same about the same subjects, the most 
important ones at that – to sound off as though we’re somebodies. That’s how far behind in 
education we’ve fallen.’  477
  
Let us now look at the Meno for an example of Socrates refusing to take up Meno’s 
questions. 
The work begins when Meno asks Socrates whether virtue is teachable. We know that 
this is a question that Socrates cares about and has thought about. We see this from 
the conclusion of the Meno where Socrates says that he has made great efforts over 
 Gorgias 527d477
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the years to find teachers of virtue, but that he has not yet met one . Socrates interest 478
in this question is again exhibited in the Protagoras.  
Nevertheless Socrates answers Meno telling him that his question cannot be answered 
as it is being asked. Socrates says that he does not know the answer, whilst making 
the point that he does not expect that Meno, or anyone else who pretends to speak on 
this matter can give a worthwhile rhetorical answer .  479
Meno is taken aback by this. He is confident that he does have answers. Socrates then, 
thinking that Meno’s belief that he knows what in fact he does not know will inhibit 
him from engaging in any substantial enquiry into the matter of virtue, begins a 
refutation of Meno, with the purpose of revealing to him his mistake. In this way he 
intends to rid him of his conceptual handicap (of thinking he knows what he does not 
in fact yet know) . The dialogue becomes what we call ‘elenctic’.  480
After a process of elenctic Meno asks Socrates again to answer whether virtue is 
teachable. Socrates eventually concedes and they begin together an examination of 
the question. However, Socrates only agreed to proceed with this question because 
Meno insisted. Meno’s eagerness to speak about this, and perhaps the fact that Meno 
would be leaving Athens the following day and his time with Socrates was limited, 
convinced Socrates to enquire about this question together with Meno.  
The obvious willingness and desire of Meno to speak about this motivates Socrates. 
However, we know that Socrates himself would normally take a milder approach, and 
would not have taken up such a question with Meno. He would have made sure first 
that a foundation had been laid. As he told Callicles in the Gorgias, he would have 
prepared Meno more thoroughly before taking on such a complex question. We have 
 Meno 89e478
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reason then to assume that, had Meno not insisted, they would not have come to touch 
upon this topic.  
Socrates tells us as much. He says: 
‘If I were directing you, Meno, and not only myself, we would not have investigated whether 
virtue is teachable or not before we had investigated what virtue itself is. But because you do 
not even attempt to rule yourself, in order that you may be free, but you try to rule me and do 
so, I will agree with you…. So we must, it appears, enquire into the qualities of something the 
nature of which we do not yet know.’ 
If we look at Plato’s texts we will see a pattern. That is: when Socrates’ interlocutor is 
someone capable, Socrates is happy to indulge in more complex discussion. When on 
the other hand his interlocutor exhibits behaviors that Socrates considers to be barriers 
to philosophical activity, he makes an effort instead to bring his interlocutor to a level 
from whence he could eventually participate in an authentic enquiry. The dialogue 
between them then is simpler, and deals primarily with the interlocutor’s 
understanding of their own unknowing. 
One example of this is the Protagoras. The dialogue begins with an exchange 
between Socrates and an excited youth  Hippocrates. Socrates quickly shows 481
Hippocrates to be thoughtless, in that he is eager to study under the sophist 
Protagoras, certain that he will benefit from this. Socrates shows that he is eager to 
attain an education which he has not properly evaluated. He has not thought properly 
about the matter but he is entirely willing to give himself over to the sophist. We are 
given to understand that this youth has been careless .   482
The dialogue then that takes place between Socrates and Hippocrates is merely a 




careful and thoughtful and to not assume that he knows what he does not yet know. 
He warns him that such carelessness over one’s soul can be harmful .  483
Socrates then only agrees to approach Protagoras with Hippocrates on the condition 
that the two of them will enquire more seriously into the matter of what sort of 
education it is good to subject one’s self to. ‘Anyway’, he says, ‘these are the matters 
we should look into’. 
‘Having agreed on this’, Socrates tells us, only then did we set out to meet Protagoras. 
In the same Platonic work we see Socrates conversing with Protagoras. Protagoras is 
a very educated and successful sophist. With him, Socrates is able to touch upon more 
complex matters. Together, among other things, they discuss whether virtue is 
teachable; they compare speech giving to the dialogical method of questions and 
answer; the definition of virtue; whether people can be good; the relationship between 
ignorance and evil; the concept of pleasure; cowardice and courage. 
Consider also the Theaetetus. This is a dialogue where Socrates goes into great depth 
and takes great pains to thoroughly examine whether things are relative or whether 
there are universal truths.  
As Socrates explains to Theodorus, this is very much an ethical question. The 
Protagorean axiom: ‘man is the measure of all things’ is being discussed. The 
discussion in the dialogue becomes rather technical and much of it is logical analysis, 
but Socrates is aware that this question is part of a larger question about ethics.  
Socrates tells us this at 172b. He says: 
‘It is in those other questions I am taking about – just and unjust, pious and impious – that 
men are ready to insist that no one of these things has by nature any being of its own; in 
 313b483
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respect of these, they say, what seems to people collectively to be so is true…. But I see, 
Theodorus, that we are becoming involved in a greater discussion emerging from a lesser 
one’. 
Socrates knows that what they are discussing with Theaetetus and Theodorus is a 
technical element of a significant ethical question. Socrates is willing to do this, I 
think, because he is speaking with two men who are very intelligent and particularly 
mathematically minded. Theaetetus shows himself to be capable of going into such 
analytic depth, and Socrates is happy to oblige him. 
The praises of Theaetetus are sung clearly throughout the dialogue. From the very 
start we are told about his excellence. Euclides and Terpsion speak about him and say: 
‘A fine man…. Only now I was listening to some people singing his praises for the way he 
behaved in battle.’ 
‘Well there is nothing extraordinary about that. Much more to be wondered at if he hadn’t 
distinguished himself.’ 
As Euclides remembers, this is an opinion that Socrates shared: 
‘I thought of Socrates and what a remarkably good prophet he was… about Theaetetus. It was 
not long before his death… that he came across Theaetetus, who was a boy at the time. 
Socrates met him and had a talk with him, and was very much struck with his natural ability;
…he repeated to me the discussion they had and it was well worth listening to. And he said to 
me that we should inevitably hear more of Theaetetus if he lived to grow up.’  484
Plato does not stop there in informing us about the abilities of Theaetetus. The main 
body of the dialogue begins with Socrates asking Theodorus if there are any young 
men with exceptional cognitive abilities. Theodorus then introduces Theaetetus by 
praising him very highly.  
 142b7-142d3484
!  222
It is remarked on several occasions that Theaetetus is an exceptionally able learner, 
his teacher saying: ‘But this boy approaches his studies in a smooth, sure, effective 
way, and with great good temper; it reminds one of the quiet flow of a stream of oil. 
The result is that it is astonishing to see how he gets through his work’ . 485
This prepares the reader for what is to come. Together with Socrates, Theaetetus will 
be seen to get through an astonishing work of enquiry. The abilities of the young man 
are so great, that Socrates is not inhibited by his interlocutor. Together they are able to 
indulge in the sophisticated analysis that is the Theaetetus. Socrates here has found a 
fellow enquirer whom he can enjoy. 
What is worth noting is that in this dialogue Theaetetus is compared to Socrates 
himself. First physically by Theodorus , and then cognitively by Socrates. Socrates 486
responds positively to the promise of such a youth. He wants to meet him, and if I 
dare make a conjecture, perhaps Socrates is hoping that with Theaetetus he will 
finally have an exchange that is up to his own standard, one that he might himself find 
fulfilling. This, we might imagine, is something Socrates always longed for and 
looked for, the way every skilled person longs to interact with their equals.  
Socrates says: ‘I wish you would ask him to come and sit with us over here’. This is 
reminiscent of the desire that Socrates shows to speak with Charmides , another 487
youth who is introduced to him as particularly promising .  488
Then Socrates says: ‘Yes, come along, Theaetetus, I want to see for myself what sort 
of face I have.’ To make yet another conjecture, this literary choice by Plato serves 
also as a symbolism for what occurs between Socrates and Theaetetus. For we might 




 Though not to the degree that Theaetetus is presented as excellent.488
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own abilities. Much like a talented dancer can dance with everyone and even teach 
them some dance moves, but they will be able to dance most beautifully and express 
their talent when they have a dance partner who is up to their own standard. 
Socrates is frank about his desire to interact with Theaetetus. From the start of their 
conversation he says: 
‘But supposing it were the soul of one of us [Theodorus] was praising? Suppose he said one 
of us was good and wise? Oughtn’t the one who heard that be very anxious to examine the 
object of such praise? And oughtn’t the other be very willing to show himself off? 
Then, my dear Theaetetus, now is the time for you to show yourself and for me to examine 
you. For although Theodorus often gives me flattering testimonials for people… I assure you 
I have never before heard him praise anybody in the way he has just praised you.’  489
Again, at 146a Socrates again expresses his intense desire to enquire into matters in 
the dialogical company of Theaetetus. He does not expect that in this conversation he 
will merely be addressing the young man’s basic barriers to learning, as we saw him 
do with Hippocrates. Socrates expects that this will be an interesting and involved 
discussion. He expects that he will be able, together with Theaetetus to examine 
matters that interest him deeply. And for this reason their enquiry begins from its 
onset with complex questions. He says: 
‘Now this is just where my difficulty comes in. I can’t get a proper grasp of what on earth 
knowledge really is. Could we manage to put it into words? What do all of you say? Who’ll 
speak first?.... Well why this silence? Theodorus? I hope my love of argument is not making 
me forget my manners – just because I’m so anxious to start a discussion and get us all 
friendly and talkative together?’ 
Given Theaetetus’ exceptional promise, we might say also that it is appropriate that 
Socrates speaks to Theaetetus about himself in a manner that is not seen with any 
other interlocutor. Describing himself as a midwife, Socrates takes the opportunity of 
speaking with an interlocutor who will understand him so well, to speak about his art.  
 Theaetetus 145b489
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Socrates is not able to speak about himself so openly to most people because they are 
not able to understand him. With Theaetetus however, Socrates feels that he is 
speaking with a kindred spirit, and his tongue is loosened. He tells this much to 
Theaetetus saying: 
‘I do [have the art of the midwife], believe me. Only don’t give me away to the rest of the 
world, will you? You see, my friend, it is a secret that I have this art. That is not one of the 
things you hear people saying about me, because they don’t know; but they do say that I am a 
very odd sort of person, always casing people to get into difficulties. You must have heard 
that, surely…. And shall I tell you what is the explanation of that?  490
Such a difficult reputation is one that Socrates is willing to bear. He considers it to be 
the price one needs to pay for living the life of excellence, for Socrates does not 
believe that society welcomes true excellence. We can see this in what he says to 
Callicles at the conclusion of the Gorgias:  
‘So, listen to me and follow me to where I am…. Let someone despise you as a fool and 
throw dirt on you, if he likes. And yes, by Zeus, confidently let him deal you that demeaning 
blow. Nothing terrible will happen to you really are an admirable and good man, one who 
practices excellence’.   491
Nevertheless, we can imagine that Socrates is glad to meet someone who is able to 
understand him and fully appreciate his talents. We also would expect these two to 
enjoy a deeper and more complex conversation than the ones we see Socrates having 
with other people.     
Perhaps a similar explanation could be given of the Republic. The reader will notice 
the following: that in books one and two of the dialogue Socrates encounters a 




degree of interest in enquiry and different attitudinal inclinations. Socrates responds to 
each appropriately.  
As the ability and willingness of the interlocutor increase, the complexity of Socrates’ 
engagement also increases. The exposition of the just state that makes up the Republic 
begins after Socrates is challenged by two brothers, Adeimantus and Glaucon, both of 
whom are praised for their intellectual abilities. Notice also that both brothers are 
entirely willing, and in fact strongly desire, to engage in enquiry with Socrates. At no 
point in the central part of Republic does Socrates encounter any resistance to enquiry 
from his main interlocutor. On the contrary, his interlocutor is willing and able to 
follow Socrates into every detail of the discussion. He even reminds Socrates, and 
prompts him to take up strands of the enquiry which had been put aside. 
 Such a reading of the Republic is possible .  492
So what does all this mean for the elenchus? 
In the previous section we have been saying that: although there is much 
disagreement regarding the details of what should count as the elenchus; what its aims 
are; and whether it is the appropriate name for what Socrates did dialogically; there is 
nevertheless significant agreement amongst scholars about what Socrates did in the 
agora. 
It is widely acknowledge that he: disputed knowledge that was false and addresses the 
conceit of knowledge in this manner; sought some form of knowledge together with 
 In order to apply this sort of analysis to the Republic one needs to enter into the 492
‘Socratic Question’, since it is generally accepted that the main body of the Republic 
is Platonic rather than Socratic. We would like to avoid this question in the present 
thesis, merely for the purpose of not loosing the focus of this work. We wish here only 
to suggest that such a reading is possible. A separate piece of research would be 
needed however to do this matter justice.  
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others through dialogue; and that in the process he probably assessed the lives of the 
interlocutors and made felt to what degree they were pursuing virtue. 
Much of the debate then around Socratic method and the elenchus can perhaps be 
dissolved by making equivocal terms more precise. Much of the disagreement is also 
about what we should name what Socrates did, and how we should delineate the 
elenchus. Less of the debate is in fact about what Socrates actually did in the agora. 
What really interests us in this thesis is what Socrates did in the agora (regardless of 
what we might call it). Can we then take what we have found agreement about and 
dismiss much of the disagreement as dispute about where to draw the line regarding 
the elenchus (and in this sense secondary to describing to what Socrates did)? 
Whether we call it the elenchus or something else? 
To an extend, this is what we will do for the purposes of this particular thesis. 
However, we find that James Doyle (2012) gives us a good reason for wanting to 
delineate Socrates’ methodology. 
Doyle points out that scholars generally accept that (a) that which Socrates was 
commanded to do by the god is the same as (b) that which he urges others to do, and 
shows them how to do by example . 493
He makes the case that this confusion of what Socrates refers to in the Apology as his 
service to Athens (assigned to him by the god) with what Socrates urges and teaches 
others to do is inappropriate . We do not need to rehearse his argument for this claim 494
here, but simply to say that we find his case convincing.  
As an effect we find Doyle gives us grounds for distinguishing between some sort of 




philosophy which he urges everyone to take up. This distinction is vital for us in our 
study of what Socrates did as an educator in the agora. We can say that he engaged in 
something like the elenchus on certain occasions; but that what he taught others to do, 
and urged them to do, was something else: it was the act of philosophy.  
The elenchus might have been a specific tool used by Socrates to examine people; but 
the process of philosophical enquiry that he teaches and promotes is something other, 
and arguably broader. 
Doyle distinguishes the act of philosophy taught by Socrates from the ‘missionary’ 
interrogation (that he himself conducts in obedience to the god) in the following 
ways; and shows these elements of philosophical enquiry by pointing us to the 
Gorgias: 
(a) In a process of elenchus, where Socrates aims to cross-examine his interlocutor, 
Socrates needs to act as the questioner. In the process of philosophy as dialogical 
enquiry, both the questioner and the answerer are engaged in philosophy. They search 
together . 495
(b) In the elenctic process there is a coercive element to the interrogation. Socrates 
insists until the interlocutor is brought to the realization of their error. When Socrates 
is doing philosophy, as we see him do with Gorgias, both parties need to be willing to 
participate in the dialogue .  496
(c) When an interlocutor is being refuted it is necessary that they say what they 
believe so that the refutation can be personal. When persons are participating in 
philosophical enquiry instead, ‘it doesn’t matter which of those present make what 





(d) Finally, in philosophical enquiry it is expected that every participant shares the 
same motivation: the will to truth . 498
Doyle shows that what Socrates is seen doing in the Gorgias is significantly different 
from the act that he describes himself in the Apology as taking up at the behest of the 
god. He calls the one ‘lay philosophy’ and claims that this is what Socrates teaches 
and urges others to do. The second he calls missionary philosophy and claims that this 
is what Socrates himself did in response to the Delphic oracle, and that it is something 
different from what he urges others to do. 
This point is very important because it draws our attention to the fact that  - what 
Doyle calls our ‘monomaniacal preoccupation with Socratic elenchus’  – does not 499
help us necessarily to understand Socrates as an educator. There seems to be good 
reason to distinguish the occasions of Socrates cross-examining his fellow Athenians 
and his practice of philosophy through dialogue with others. 
We want to agree with Werner Jaeger that the elenchus is one method used by 
Socrates. It is something that he utilizes on certain occasions ; but prompted also by 500
Doyle, we feel that in order to understand Socrates as a teacher in the agora, we need 
to look beyond the limits of the elenchus. 
Our findings 
In chapter one I said that Socrates was a teacher. I defined that as: he gave 
intellectual, moral and social instruction, he taught skills, he gave direction, and he 





andragogue. This is not to say something different. It simply indicates more 
specifically that his education was directed at adults rather than children. 
I argued that as an educator Socrates was actively interested in the epistemic state of 
his fellows and that he engaged with all of the following: what the interlocutor knew; 
what they thought they knew; the disputation of any inappropriate claims to 
knowledge which they made; the evaluation of the opinions they held; and in helping 
them to make ‘correct’ steps towards learning; so as to improve their method of 
dealing with knowledge generally. 
We found also that Socrates was not a teacher in the manner of ‘banking education’ – 
where one transmits ready bits of knowledge to others. Rather, he used the process of 
dialogue to bring others to an improved epistemic state. He engaged people in 
philosophy and through this process educated them . 501
In section I.II I argued that Socrates acted as a teacher of others because he cared for 
the wellbeing of their souls. In chapter two made the distinction: that Socrates was not 
a teacher of virtue but a teacher of philosophy. Though as a teacher of philosophy, 
what he taught pertained to helping people lead a virtuous life. As we argued: 
philosophical enquiry and learning were for Socrates an important part of being and 
becoming virtuous.  
In chapter three I examined Socrates’ notion of the soul in order to show that: virtue 
was the health of the soul; caring for the souls of others amounts to helping them to 
become more virtuous; and again, that learning and philosophy are the way which 
Socrates saw for bringing about this health. It is for this reason then that Socrates, in 
caring for the souls of his fellows, engaged educationally with their epistemic state. It 
is for this purpose that he was the andragogue he was. 
 See section I.I of this thesis for all of the above.501
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Following this it was argued that Socrates was an intellectualist and that his 
engagement with others was notably intellectual. We resisted however the view that 
this intellectualism made Socrates neglect the other aspects of a person’s being. We 
made the case that for Socrates, philosophy was a process that involved the entire 
person. One’s intellect as well as their motivation and attitude had to be inclined 
towards philosophy in order to be successful in it. 
Therefore, we argued, Socrates as an educator was involved in ‘turning the person’ to 
philosophy. He tried to spark their love for it as well as turn their mind to it. Socrates 
sought a dedication to philosophy that only comes with a sincere love of truth. This 
was a love he considered most valuable, and he tried to awaken other people to it. 
In section III.I.II we used the Gorgias in order to go into more detail about Socrates’ 
teaching regarding the process of philosophy and the role of the attitude therein. It 
was shown there that Socrates had much to teach his interlocutors about how they can 
engage with and thus benefit from true philosophical enquiry. He taught them how to 
participate in the process of enquiry. In short, he taught what it meant for a person to 
be fully dedicated to truth (a requirement for achieving philosophical enquiry). 
Having prepared thus the ground, we began in chapter four to speak about the 
technicalities of Socrates’ method of teaching. We discussed the widespread view that 
Socrates’ dialogical act was primarily disputative and entirely destructive: that his 
method was to reveal to people that their beliefs were unsustainable. 
We argued that there is good reason to think that this view of Socrates as a disputant 
is limited and that his educational act needs to have been richer and more multifaceted 
than this. We saw that in the Apology where Socrates reflects on his own dialogical 
act in the agora, he uses a variety of verbs to describe what he did, suggesting that we 
need to understand him as doing more over and above showing up problems with his 
interlocutors’ belief-set. At the end of chapter six we referred to James Doyle (2012) 
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who gives us further textual reason to separate Socrates’ ‘negative’ act of disputation 
from his other educational philosophical activities. 
We argued that it would have been out of character for Socrates – who so cared for his 
fellows - if he were to leave them only with a sense of their own ignorance, and not 
strive to give people further training in philosophy. 
At the start of chapter four we made the case that Socrates valued enquiry and 
learning very highly. He might have seen the recognition of one’s ignorance as a 
useful and necessary stage of learning – an awareness without which one could not 
become ‘humble’ enough to be able to participate in philosophy – but the urgency 
with which he sought knowledge and truth brought him to further stages of learning. 
As Doyle (2012) pointed out, it is this pursuit of truth and knowledge that Socrates 
urged others to undertake (and taught them how to carry out). 
In chapter five we emphasized that Socrates was more a teacher of process than of 
content. That is not to say that he never achieved any knowledge through the process 
of philosophy; but that he did not simply pass on any ‘moral facts’ to others. He 
joined them in, and guided them through, a process of philosophical enquiry whereby 
he believed moral truths can be known. We confirmed with this what we had already 
found in chapter II: that Socrates taught people how to do philosophy. 
We argued that Socratic dialogical education can otherwise be called: an 
‘apprenticeship in philosophy’.  
In this chapter (chapter VI) we looked briefly at the problems faced by those scholars 
who have attempted to describe the total (or the essence) of what Socrates did through 
the mechanism of the ‘elenchus’. Our discussion of this vast topic has been by no 
means conclusive; but we suggested that the elenchus is best understood as a part of 
what Socrates did, or, as one tool he employed for his general educational aims. 
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In light of these findings we expect Socrates to have an educative dialogical approach 
to his interlocutors that brought them into the practice of philosophy: where 
philosophy is the love for and pursuit of truth and (thus also of) virtue. A method of 
elenchus would have been useful to Socrates in so far as it serves towards this goal. 
We agree with most of the scholars discussed in this chapter in the sense that we 
consider that Socrates did all of these things: he scrutinized people and tested their 
epistemic states, showing them where they were lacking in knowledge of virtue; he 
examined propositions regarding virtue and sought true knowledge regarding ethical 
matters; and he examined both conceptions of reality and persons.  
In all of these acts Socrates sought to bring to light what is true and how things really 
are for, as he often said, the benefit of all. To know what is true about these matters is 
beneficial for all. 
In our view Socrates was an educator who sought truth in two senses. Firstly he 
examined propositions about the world in order to uncover how reality was 
constituted. He did this in full faith that the way things are inscribe moral reality and 
value. He sought in this way to know the laws of the moral cosmos .  502
We can understand this when we look at Socrates’ claim that virtue is knowledge. A 
person who understood the facts about their existence, the constitution of their soul 
and the inevitable track of moral laws: would see clearly that it is prudent to behave 
virtuously. For this reason, knowing the truth about propositions brings one closer to a 
world view that is true and which (therefore) motivates one to be virtuous. 
Secondly, Socrates sought to show people the truth about their own relationship to 
virtue. On the first hand he alerted people to the fact that pursuing virtue was the most 
valuable activity; and he also urged them to pursue truth in their own lives whenever 
 This is the view of Werner Jaeger (1943: 28, 30-31) who found that: ‘It was natural 502
for a Greek to try to find in the cosmos the principle which he held to be the basis of 
order in human life, and to derive it from the cosmos.’ 
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he found that they were failing to do so. He examined persons in this sense: he tested 
their approach to life and revealed to them their shortcomings in relation to the 
ultimate ideal of living the life of virtue, thus inciting them to turn their whole being 
and become more dedicated to living the virtuous life.  
As he tells us in the Apology : “Most excellent man, are you…not ashamed to care 503
for the acquisition of wealth and for reputation and honor, when you neither care nor 
take thought for wisdom and truth and the perfection of your soul?” And if any of you 
argues the point, and says he does care, I shall not let him go at once, nor shall I go 
away, but I shall question and examine and cross-examine him, and if I find that he 
does not possess virtue, but says he does, I shall rebuke him for scorning the things 
that are of most importance and caring more for what is of less worth.’    504
We therefore find it appropriate that despite the much apparent disagreement about 
the elenchus, there is an underlying general agreement about what Socrates was 
hoping to achieve through dialogue that connects (albeit sometimes loosely) the 
various positions. We consider that Socrates did all of these things. 
Regarding the elenchus itself, we do not intend here to give yet another analysis of its 
specifics. We want merely to say that: as a tool it was useful for Socrates to the extend 
that served his general aims. It was an aspect of what he did. 
We share Brickhouse and Smith’s (2002) conviction that what Socrates did with his 
interlocutors was broader than what an well-defined concept of the elenchus can 
describe; but we are optimistic that we can describe the general approach Socrates 
took. 
In our concluding chapter that follows we try to say something more about Socrates 
andragogigal methodology. We describe it (as has been suggested earlier in the thesis) 
 29d-29e503
 Translation by Fowler (1966)504
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as an andragogy of truth that uses the intuitive and broad method of counterexample 
to stimulate people to participate in philosophy: turning their focus and fixing their 
attention on truth and virtue. 
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VII. So What Did 
Socrates Do In The 
Agora?
VI. 
Socrates’ general educational aims – what he did in the agora – have been approached 
throughout the entire thesis; but we want to say something summative about them in 
conclusion.  
An andragogy of truth 
Socrates’ aim in the agora is told to us completely plainly in the Apology. He wanted 
people to care about virtue, and to turn their attention, their mind, and their life to the 
pursuit of virtue. He wanted them to take up philosophy (philosophy = turning your 
mind away from petty matters towards the pursuit of virtue and truth). As he says in 
the Apology, he never rested from urging people to do this . 505
This is what Socrates did in the agora. He urged people to care about virtue.  
It is in context of this that we need to understand Socrates use of educational tools 
such as refutation, or more specifically, the ‘elenchus’. In so far as refuting the belief-
set of an interlocutor was useful for Socrates to prompt them towards philosophy (and 
it often was), he employed this tool. 
But I want to speak now more generally about Socrates’ approach to his interlocutors. 
I believe that what can be said generally about his attempts to bring his fellows to 
philosophy is so natural, simple and un-technical that it can appear ridiculous to 
 30a505
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propose it as an ‘approach’ at all. Nevertheless I think that we need to state this very 
basic description of what Socrates did in the agora. 
I believe that a problem in Socratic scholarship is that we have tried to characterize 
what Socrates did using concepts that are very narrow and technical - picking on an 
aspect of how Socrates enquired dialogically, isolating it, taking it out of context and 
overemphasizing it. In this way we have very much fragmented the Socrates given to 
us by Plato; and our understanding of him has been made poorer therefore. 
I do not wish to say that analyses of the mechanisms used by Socrates (such as the 
elenchus) have not been fruitful or useful. They have been. Such concentrated study 
of Socrates’ practice has brought much of its detail to our attention, and we can only 
be grateful to the scholars who have achieved this detailed study. 
However, any detailed study of a mechanism used by Socrates can only be fully 
understood in the context of his general practice; and I feel this is unfortunately 
lacking. 
It is my purpose here therefore to say something more general about Socrates 
educational act in the agora. What I will argue might seem too obvious to be worth 
saying: that Socrates urged people to enquire into virtue, and into their own 
relationship to it; but I feel that it needs to be said nonetheless. 
Let us see what Nicias and Laches expect to learn from Socrates in the Laches. 
Socrates has just shown his intent to criticize them for their willingness to give advice 
about the education of the youth ; and they consider whether they are willing to 506
submit themselves to (what Nicias warns will be) a Socratic sort of dialogue. 
Nicias explains that in this dialogical engagement with Socrates he expects:  
 186a-187b506
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- To give an account of himself, of how he spends his days, and of the sort of 
life he chooses to lead. He then expects that Socrates will put ‘all of his ways’ 
to the test .  507
- That Socrates will be frank and critical of him, reminding him of any past or 
present misdoing . 508
- That through this process he will learn from Socrates  and be improved 509
thereby. 
Laches expects: 
- To be cross-examined by Socrates, 
- and to learn from him because of it  510
- That Socrates will also learn from Laches during the exchange . 511
Both enter the conversation expecting to be both taught and refuted ; and the 512
learning they expect is regarding living one’s life virtuously. They expect to be 
improved in this sense: by having their errors pointed out to them and being reminded 
of how they ought to conduct themselves instead. It is this learning that they hope to 
receive from Socrates, and it is for this reason that they willingly submit themselves 
to scrutiny. Because like Solon, they trust that such improvement is beneficial for 







 188b4 and 189a3513
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It is this that Laches explains when he tells the company that he is very willing to 
listen to a man who is himself virtuous and trustworthy; but that he is put off by men 
who can speak well but of whom there is no evidence of virtue. 
Together with this, they are open to learning something about virtue itself if they are 
lacking this knowledge, as Laches expects that Socrates will learn from him if he has 
any knowledge regarding it that Socrates lacks. 
This experience of learning that which is most important through a perusing dialogue 
is precisely what Socrates tells us in the Apology he does for his fellows. Like a 
gadfly on a drowsy horse he prompts his fellows to become more alert and 
philosophically active ; through urging and reproaching each one’  he urges them 514 515
to care for virtue . 516
He talks ‘every day about virtue’ and about these things he examines himself and 
others . In this way Socrates claims to make his fellows truly happy . It is this 517 518
benefit that Nicias and Laches desire in conversing with Socrates.  
I find that a general and yet precise way to describe Socrates’ system of education (a 
way that highlights its defining characteristics) is as offering an apprenticeship in 
philosophy; or in other words: he taught the practical processes of the love of truth. 
As we shall see, truth had two functions for Socrates in his educational aim. The first 
is understood by his claim that virtue is knowledge. Person who truly understands 







beneficial for them. Therefore true understanding is the most direct motivation for 
pursuing virtue.  
Secondly, as we saw with Nicias and Laches, examining one’s self and becoming 
aware of the truth regarding the value of one’s choices reminds the person that they 
need to correct themselves and better position themselves in their attempts to live in a 
virtuous manner. Dialogue with Socrates (we might say) brings one face to face with 
themselves and examines them in the context of virtue. It highlights thus where 
improvement is needed.    
Socrates engaged his fellow men in, and guided them through, a pursuit of truth; all 
the while teaching them how to best participate in such a process. Through a process 
of both correcting their beliefs regarding reality and virtue; and by turning their 
attention to themselves and their shortcomings, Socrates assisted people to live a more 
truthful life. 
His main practice of andragogy had three main elements to it: (i) it raised awareness 
about the value of truth; (ii) it taught people how to seek out of truth; and (iii) it had a 
method for addressing the various intellectual barriers that people face whilst 
searching for truth. 
When I say that his was an andragogy of truth – that Socrates was an andragogue of 
truth – I am merely saying, in a new way, that Socrates was a teacher of philosophy. 
That is, if we understand philosophy – φιλοσοφία – in the way that Plato has used it. It 
literally means the love for wisdom and truth, but as a term denoting a practice, when 
used by Plato, it meant ‘the investigation of truth and nature’ . 519
(i) Teaching the value of truth 
 See entry in Middle Liddell519
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One of the three basic elements of Socrates’ andragogy of truth was that he passed on 
to people an awareness for the value of truth. Socrates himself esteemed truth very 
highly and with his engagement with his fellow men he desired to bring others to 
value truth also. 
We can this for example in the Theaetetus. At 150e we can see that for Socrates 
successful thought is also truthful thought; and this is what Socrates brings forth in 
others. He says: 
‘And after they have gone away from me they have resorted to harmful company, with the 
result that what remained within them has miscarried; while they have neglected the children 
I helped them to bring forth, and lost them, because they set more value upon lies and 
phantoms than upon the truth; finally they have been set down for ignorant fools, both by 
themselves and by everybody else’ 
As we can see from this quote, Socratic andragogy insisted that people keep their 
minds upon the truth; and when someone left Socrates’ influence before they had 
acquired this love of truth for themselves, they would become harmed by becoming 
attracted to ‘lies and phantoms’. 
Again at 19d-e of the Apology Socrates tells the jury that what is characteristic of his 
pedagogical engagement of others is that he is committed to truthfulness. In fact, he 
says, that he chose to not receive a fee for his conversations precisely for this reason: 
he wanted to preserve the right to always be truthful. As Teloh has summarised it: 
‘sophists whose eyes are on their fees must pander to the students, and give them 
what they want…Socrates does not take a fee, and hence he is free to tell the truth, 
even if the truth angers others.’   520
A further example from the Apology comes at 29d-e where Socrates again shows that 
his educational act involves prompting people to think about the truth. He says: 
 1986: 109520
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‘Men of Athens…I will obey the god… and as long as I draw breath and am able, I shall not 
cease to practice philosophy, to exhort you and in my usual way to point out to any one of you 
whom I happen to meet: Good Sir… are you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as 
much wealth, reputation and honors as possible, while you do not care for nor give thought to 
wisdom or truth…?’  521
Finally a third example is found in the Gorgias at 526d. Here Socrates says: 
‘So I disregard the things held in honor by the majority of people, and by practicing truth I 
really try, to the best of my ability, to be and to live as a very good man, and when I die, to die 
like that. And I call on all other people as well, as far as I can… to this way of life, this 
contest, that I hold to be worth all the other contests in life.’ 
Here, as in the above references we can see Socrates explicitly stating that his aim is 
to engage in truthful thought and to bring others to do so also. In the digression of the 
Theaetetus, when speaking about the free man and the slave, he calls this act of 
thinking with truth the life of philosophy . 522
Why then, as Socrates taught, was truth and truthful reflection so very important and 
valuable? What was so valuable about truth? 
For Socrates truth had paramount value. Put simply, Socrates believed that the way 
we live our lives is supremely important. He believed that the way one lives their life 
has serious consequences. We can live it well, or we can live it badly, and this 
impacted accordingly on ones soul and its fate.  
Socrates believed that making the wrong choices and living badly had serious 
ramifications. They ultimately devastated a person. Likewise, living well brought one 
closer to a desirable, healthy and joyful condition. 
 ‘χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλεῖστα, καὶ 521
δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας’
 172c522
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One then needed to take care to make the right choices and to live their life as best as 
they could. They ought to live as consciously as possible, so that the improper way of 
life could best be avoided. Socrates wanted people to take seriously the question of 
what makes a life good, and to make a point of living well.  
As he tells Polus in the Gorgias: ‘…the matters of dispute between us are not at all 
insignificant ones, but pretty nearly those it’s most admirable to have knowledge 
about, and most shameful not to. For the heart of the matter is that the recognizing or 
failing to recognize who is happy and who is not.’   523 524
Socrates thought that the question of: ‘what does it mean to live well’ was extremely 
important, and ultimately he believed that what makes a life good and worthwhile was 
virtue. Therefore, he thought, to know the truth is to know that one ought to live a 
virtuous life. Thus, to seek to know the truth came hand in hand with seeking to live 
well (virtuously). 
Socrates believed that a person who did not know the truth of the matter might hence 
not understand the value of living a virtuous life. Hence unwittingly they could harm 
themselves by allowing themselves to choose to live a life of vice. For this reason 
Socrates called people to seek to know the truth and in the same breath called them to 
strive towards a life of virtue. For this reason he said that he who knows the truth will 
prefer virtue to vice: because to know the truth of the matter was to be aware that the 
only life worth living was the virtuous one.  
 Gorgias 472c523
 The Greek reads: ‘καὶ γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει περὶ ὧν ἀμφισβητοῦμεν οὐ πάνυ 524
σμικρὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ταῦτα περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι τε κάλλιστον μὴ εἰδέναι τε 
αἴσχιστον: τὸ γὰρ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἢ γιγνώσκειν ἢ ἀγνοεῖν ὅστις τε 
εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν καὶ ὅστις μή.’
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The unexamined life, for Socrates, was not worth living because a person who is not 
informed about how to live their life well would live it to their detriment.  
We are told these things in the digression of the Theaetetus where Socrates compared 
the life of ‘the slave’ (a man who does not know what is good and allows himself to 
be preoccupied with vice), and the ‘free man’. The ‘free man’ Socrates tells us is the 
philo-sopher who has sought to know the truth about matters, and who has aligned 
himself with virtue . Let us look again at the relevant text. 525
Of the truth Socrates says the following:  
‘Let us put the truth in this way. In God there is no sort of wrong whatsoever; he is supremely 
just, and the thing most like him is the man who has become as just as it lies in human nature 
to be. And it is here that we see whether a man is truly able, or truly a weakling and a 
nonentity; for it is the realization of this that is genuine wisdom and goodness, while the 
failure to realize it is manifest folly and wickedness.’   526
Furthermore, regarding the most prudent way to live one’s life says: 
‘…a man should make all haste to escape from earth to heaven; and escape means becoming 
as like God as possible; and a man becomes like God when he becomes just and pious, with 
understanding.’  527
Here Socrates said that after their mortal life each person will find a fate that is in 
accordance with the way they had lived their life. Those who loved virtue and strived 
to be virtuous would come closer to the divine which is supremely good and joyful.  





‘…there are two patterns set up in reality. One is divine and supremely happy; the other has 
nothing of God in it, and is the pattern of deepest unhappiness. This truth the evildoer does 
not see; blinded by folly and utter lack of understanding, he fails to perceive that the effect of 
his unjust practices is to make him grow more and more like the one, and less and less like the 
other. For this he pays the penalty of living the life that corresponds to the life he is coming to 
resemble…. Unless he is delivered from this ‘ability’ of his, when he dies the place that is 
pure of all evil will not receive him; that he will forever go on living in this world a life after 
his own likeness – a bad man tied to bad company…’  528
The same claims as these are made just as boldly and definitely by Socrates at the end 
of the Gorgias. Here Socrates is speaking to Callicles about the ultimate 
consequences of living a virtuous or a wicked life.  
Of the man who was found to be without virtue, Socrates says that he is sent to 
Tartarus where he ‘undergoes the appropriate suffering’ . But, Socrates says, if a 529
man’s soul is found to ‘have lived a pious life, one devoted to truth’ then it is admired 
by the judge and he is sent off to the Isles of the Blessed. This is ‘especially’ the case, 
Socrates says, of a ‘philosopher who has minded his own affairs and hasn’t been 
meddlesome in the course of his life’ . 530
‘For my part’, Socrates says, ‘I’m convinced by these accounts, and I think about how 
I’ll reveal to the judge a soul that’s as healthy as it can be. So I disregard the things 
held in honor by the majority of people, and by practicing truth I really try…to be and 
to live as a very good man, and when I die to die like that. And I call on all other 
people… to this way of life’ .  531
It is these truths about reality that inform Socrates andragogy. He calls people to look 






to be virtuous. The virtuous life, Socrates concludes is the one that will be 
advantageous both here and in the next life . Therefore it is the most prudent life to 532
live, and anyone who knows the truth of their existential situation will be informed 
about this. 
This is at the heart of Socrates’ andragogy, and it is for this reason that completes his 
discussion with Callicles by saying: ‘So, listen to me and follow me to where I am, 
and when you’ve come here you’ll be happy both during life and at its end, as the 
account indicates. ’  533
(i) It taught people how to seek out truth 
In order to understand Socrates’ very simple approach to helping people to enquire 
philosophically we need to borrow a notion attributed earlier to Vlastos by Scaltsas 
(1993). Let us remind ourselves of how Scaltsas explained the basic assumption of the 
elenchus: 
‘the interlocutor believes both truths and falsehoods and by systematic applications of the 
elenchus the falsehoods are exposed and discarded. Therefore, it is not the aim of the elenchus 
to get the interlocutor to believe certain truths (after a didactic exercise), because the 
interlocutor already does believe them. Rather, it is getting the interlocutor to realize that he/
she is committed to a contradiction, and to drop the one set of beliefs in favour of the other…. 
The point here is that knowledge, for Socrates, comes by recognition rather than by 
acceptance.’  534
Knowledge comes by recognition rather than by acceptance because a person already 
has the beliefs that they need in order to know truth. The problem, according to 





needs to think thoroughly about what they believe and to sieve out those beliefs that 
do not stand the test of reason.  
Learning is a difficult process of achieving clarity and consistency of thought; and it 
is achieved by meticulous effort and attentiveness to one’s beliefs. Becoming wise, 
we might say, is the process of acquiring discernment through a close examination of 
possible beliefs. 
We are reminded here of what Socrates tells Theaetetus regarding the ‘importance of 
his performance’ that likens him to the midwife: to deliver the patient sometimes of 
phantoms and sometimes of reality; and to distinguish the true from the false 
offspring .   535
  
The information is there. It does not as such need to be constructed. Therefore what is 
most needed is attentiveness and persistence in the process of sorting.  
It is this that Socrates felt was lacking in his fellows. Not that they were unable to 
know the truth, but that they were unwilling and did not apply themselves to the 
laborious process.  
Socrates often lamented this lack of ‘disciplined examination of beliefs’ on the part of 
his fellows. He often pointed out to them that they were failing to do this, that they 
ought to do this, and explained to them what is involved in such a process. This is the 
process – the process of philosophy – that Socrates taught. We can otherwise call it 
the discipline of attentiveness and persistence in enquiry. 
He have already seen this in practice in our study of the Gorgias in section III.I.II of 
this thesis. It is suggested in several of the ‘Socratic dialogues’ but let us consider 
briefly only one where this is ‘positively’ displayed: the Charmides. 
 Theaetetus 150b535
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At 159a Socrates and Charmides begin the enquiry into temperance. Charmides is to 
say what temperance is by reflecting upon his own experience of it and trying to put it 
into words. He makes a formulation that seems appropriate to him (temperance as 
quietness) and Socrates shows him the insufficiency of the formulation through a 
process of counterexample . Socrates merely draws his attention to example cases 536
when quietness would not be a favorable way to behave. 
This difficulty is used to prompt Charmides to think more deeply about the question 
at hand. Socrates indicated to Charmides that he needs to undertake a more thorough 
examination of his beliefs about temperance. 
Again, Charmides is to seek for the answer by reflecting on his own experience of it; 
but as Socrates showed, his reflection upon that which he experiences needs to be 
thorough and will demand Charmides concentration and effort. 
We see this when Socrates tells Charmides: ‘Once more then…Charmides, attend 
more closely and look into yourself; reflect on the quality that is given you by the 
presence of temperance, and what quality it must have to work this effect on you. 
Take stock of all this and tell me, like a good, brave fellow, what it appears to you to 
be.’  537
Then at 160e when Charmides had taken the cue from Socrates to think more deeply 
about the matter, Socrates showed his approval by reporting that Charmides had made 
‘quite a manly effort of self-examination’ .  538
To put it very simply, Socrates’ method of seeking truth was thinking about it. As we 
had said of the analysis of Carpenter and Polansky of Socrates’ method, Socrates 
 159c536
 160d5-160d9. Translations are from Lamb (1955)537
 The Greek reads: ‘καὶ ὃς ἐπισχὼν καὶ πάνυ ἀνδρικῶς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν διασκεψάµενος’538
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encourages and proceeds in the process of dedicated thought via a process much like 
that of counterexample.   
He investigated matters with his intellect seeking to find out what was the truth about 
them. His main method can be described very simply: he cared about it, he valued it, 
and so he sought it. He enquired into matters; with his interest always being, 
undistracted, on what is true. He applied this attentiveness himself; and he urged 
others to do the same. 
Turning our attention towards the truth 
What we are claiming is reminiscent of a point voiced by Socrates in the Republic at 
518c when speaking about the education needed for the enlightenment of cave 
dwellers. Here is explains the concept that we do not put true knowledge into the soul 
that does not possess it as if we were ‘inserting vision into blind eyes’. Rather, people 
have eyes that are capable of seeing. An education enlightens when it turns the person 
towards the truth, so that they can make use of their ‘eye sight’. 
This idea of education as a turning or a re-orienting is standardly attributed to Plato. 
Losin (1996) identifies this ‘orientation’ of the soul in the direction in which it is best 
for it to mature, as basic to Plato’s expounded educational theory. Whilst discussing 
the parable of the cave, he says: 
‘Perhaps the first thing we notice about the prisoners in the cave is that they are looking in the 
wrong direction. Their bonds prevent them from turning their heads away from the rear wall 
of the cave, and what they need to see is behind their heads (51461-2,515a9-b1). The first step 
in the journey out of the cave is to stand up and turn around towards the firelight (periagein, 
515c7), and the first impulse of the freed prisoners upon being made to look towards the 
firelight is to turn back towards the familiar shadows (apostrephein, 515e2). This notion of 
orientation is central to Plato's idea of education: he later describes real education as the art of 
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orientation (techne... tes periagoges, 518d3-4) and the educator's task as that of turning souls 
around (metastrephein, 518d5).’  539
What Losin describes comes directly out of Plato’s texts. At 518d3-d7 of the Republic 
Socrates says the following: 
‘Then education is concerned with doing this very thing, this turning around, and with how 
the soul can most easily and effectively be made to do it. It isn’t the craft of putting sight into 
the soul. Education takes for granted that sight is there but that it isn’t turned the right way or 
looking where it ought to look, and it tries to redirect it appropriately.’ 
At first this might seem to us as a non-method. One might ask: why we would expect 
that ‘if we attend to truth we can hope to find it’ .  540
However, let us say that a method of attentiveness, dedication in enquiry and a focus 
on truth is the natural process with which we approach learning on most occasions. If 
we look at the way we study the subjects of the humanities, we will see that there is 
no formal or magical process that is structured to bring us to knowledge regarding 
them. Instead, we become knowledgeable in the humanities by becoming acquainted 
with them.  
The methods we use are to read as much quality material we can find written on the 
topic of our interest and to critically consider this material . We often read theories 541
and evaluate their truthfulness through a process of counterexample: considering 
whether their claims correspond to reality as we experience it. Furthermore, to assist 
 1996: 52539
 We would like to thank Dr. Andrew Mason for bringing this question to our 540
attention.
 Notice that Xenophon in his Memoirs reports that Socrates: ‘used to go through the 541
‘sages of old’ – i.e. the poets and philosophers – with his young friends in his own 
house in order to extract important passages from them’ (Jaeger 1943: 30). Also in 
Plato’s Phaedo Socrates says that he did just this with the book of Anaxagoras (97b). 
!  250
us in this process, we read the opposing views of other scholars and the counter 
arguments they have proposed regarding the questions at hand. 
Though this process of considering claims and arguments, checking both for their 
logical validity and their truth value (in how they correspond to reality); and through a 
process of setting opposing arguments against each other and considering the merits 
of each, we cultivate in ourselves an understanding of the complexity of the matter at 
hand. 
Coming to understand this complexity is the first real sign of becoming 
knowledgeable in a topic. This complexity then gives us a context in which we can 
evaluate every new argument and proposition we encounter. We become, through 
acquaintance with the topic more able to discern the quality of claims.  
This process is achieved both on one’s own through an internal dialogue with the 
literature and in dialogical exchange with others. We discuss these matters with others 
and pose counterexamples to one another, in this way improving our understanding.  
Conducting this process of learning on one’s own is more difficult and complicated 
than doing it in conversation with others, since it requires the tendency of self-
awareness and self-criticism. It is something that we become better able to do as we 
mature in our ability to learn dialogically (that is: by considering arguments and 
counterexamples).  
The mechanics of it are the same as what we do in the classroom with a teacher as a 
guide or in a critical dialogue with others. What I am describing here is simply the 
process of learning that is used in most schools and universities. It also occurs often 
spontaneously in social groups; and is characteristic of the manner in which most 
intellectuals think.  
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It is really a process of thinking thoroughly about a matter; staying focused on the 
topic; and evaluating claims always caring only for their truth-value. It is a process of 
enquiry through familiarization with and evaluation of concepts through 
counterexample. 
Instinctively we might say that a person who is dedicated to an ideology and who 
spends their time constructing a view that merely reflects that discourse is not 
conducting genuine enquiry in the same way that a person who is seeking the truth 
(and in the process is open to being refuted and having their opinion changed) is.  
Take for example a person who insists that the communist reading of history is the 
most appropriate. They do this because they have invested interests in the communist 
ideology. In their study of materials and in their consideration of the facts occurring in 
history they might ignore anything that casts questions on their general ideology and 
build a world view that employs only those elements that support their ideology. We 
call this propaganda. 
Much study can be conducted by ideologists, and many of humanity’s ideologists 
have been very well educated. Nevertheless, if their aim in study is not truth itself but 
propaganda, we would not say that their enquiry can bear the fruit of truth, except if it 
accidentally corresponds to reality. 
Furthermore: in a competitive debate the two parties say what they can to prove their 
point, but do not interact in the sense of genuinely considering the position of the 
other and adjusting their views accordingly. Their interest is not in the truth of the 
matter but in making their own claim convincingly.  
When watching a debate we can hope to hear some interesting arguments and some 
clever thought-constructions; but we cannot hope to search for truth in that way. 
Except that it, to the extend that the counterexamples the debaters pose to one another 
assist us in our own thinking about what is true. 
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The difference between a dialogue and a debate is that in dialogue the parties involved 
are willing to move together towards the common goal of truth. They might have their 
own strong beliefs, but in dialogue they need to either offer support for these beliefs 
and defend them against the logic of counterexample, or they need to be willing to 
reconsider them. Defending your claim at all costs does not allow you to participate in 
enquiry into truth. 
In both examples given here a person fails to enquire into truth because they are not 
interested in it. It is not what they have their mind’s eye set upon. This is the point 
that Socrates makes: that if you want to know the truth you need to want to know the 
truth indeed. It needs to be that which you seek; it needs to be the purpose and aim of 
your enquiry and of your dialogue.  
If you do not seek you will not find, except accidentally perhaps. Even accidentally, 
one might wonder if without what Politis (2006) described as the aporiai that guide 
an enquiry, how would you recognize the truth if not as that which answers 
satisfyingly to your dilemmas? In any case, we can conclude that the person who does 
not actively seek the truth with their enquiry will have more difficulties finding it. 
I propose that this is an intuitive fact; and I propose that much of what Socrates did 
was intuitive. He was not a teacher in the sense that he had developed some magical 
pedagogical technology, but in the sense that he applied himself to the process of 
assisting others through the processes of learning. Most teachers are teachers for this 
same reason. 
Sharing learning with an intellectual 
Socrates was an intellectual. He spent a lot of his energy thinking about matters and 
trying to understand them. He did not engage in enquiry simply in order to appear 
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learned, but because he had a genuine interest in the matters and a thirst for 
understanding. This is where he saw his fellows failing in their thought process: in 
that they prioritized other desires over the desire for truth . 542
He enjoyed enquiry, both on his own and in the company of others through dialogue. 
He profited from enquiry personally. This was genuinely so for Socrates, and thus, 
when he was in dialogue with another, he was a dedicated interlocutor who kept 
focused at the matters at hand. He pursued inquiries and strands of thought to their 
completion as far as one can, and he was not distracted from this process by any 
attachment to other things.  
Socrates prioritized enquiry and did not compromise its pursuit for the sake of honor, 
reputation, wealth, or any other such benefit. Like the philosopher he describes in the 
digression of the Theaetetus Socrates does not care whether he has the ‘goods’ that 
people generally pride themselves in. 
Socrates did not compromise his pursuit of truth for the demands made on us by such 
socially accepted ‘goods’ because simply, he does not value them. He found truth to 
be more fulfilling and satisfying than any of these things can ever be: and thus he 
found the pursuit of truth incomparably more worthwhile than spending time on such 
‘trivial matters’ could ever be. 
Socrates’ mind was on his wealth and his wealth was philosophy.  
As he told Theodorus: 
‘…he does not hold himself aloof from them in order to get a reputation, but because it is in 
reality only his body that lives and sleeps in the city. His mind, having come to the conclusion 
 Remember our discussion of the Gorgias on these point (section III.I.II of this 542
thesis). 
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that all things are of little or no account, spurns them and pursues its winged way… tracking 
down by every path the entire nature of each whole among the things that are…’  543
  
Socrates lived the best life he could possibly come up with. He spent his time 
primarily doing that which according to him was the most worthwhile activity 
available to people. He engaged with his mind with things that are akin to the divine 
as these are the most valuable things he can manage to engage with. He asked: what is 
the truth about these things? 
As he told Theodorus: ‘…a man should make all haste to escape from earth to heaven; 
and escape means becoming as like God as possible; and a man becomes like God 
when he becomes just and pious, with understanding.’  544
Or again, as he told Callicles in the Gorgias: ‘I disregard the things held in honor by 
the majority of people, and by practicing truth I really try, to the best of my ability, to 
be and to live as a very good man…. this way of life, this contest, that I hold to be 
worth all the other contests in life.’   545
Socrates lived the philosophical life practicing truth, as he tells us, to the best of his 
ability. As a part of such a life Socrates engaged in dialogue with other people. These 
were an element of his philosophical life and grew out of his personal love and 
practice of philosophy. As Doyle (2012) pointed out, it was in this way that Socrates 
offered himself as an example to his fellows; and it was in these ways that he urged 
them to imitate him. 





‘…by practicing truth I try, to the best of my ability, to be and to live as a very good man…. 
And I call on all other people as well, as far as I can…to this way of life, this contest, that I 
hold to be worth all the other contests in this life.’   546
In his preoccupation with truth, and his teaching of it, Socrates used dialogue. That is, 
he engaged with other people in the examination of concepts through logos. Dialogue 
with his fellows had three functions for Socrates. 
The first was that he learned about the world and about himself through a process of 
learning about others. As Socrates enquired into the way things are, he inevitably also 
enquired into people and their epistemic states. As people are a part of the world, 
Socrates came across them in his examination of truth. 
We can see this particular function discussed in the Apology. Consider the section 
where Socrates is speaking about the Oracle at Delphi and the proclamation that he is 
the wisest of men. The report of this proclamation caused Socrates to wonder. He 
became interested in finding out what the oracle meant in how it spoke about wisdom. 
A dilemma was created for him and he wished to enquire into it. 
He says: ‘When I heard of this reply I asked myself: ‘Whatever does the god mean? 
What is his riddle?’…. For a long time I was at a loss as to his meaning; then I 
reluctantly turned to some such investigation as this; I went to one of those reputed 
wise, thinking that there, if anywhere, I could refute the oracle….’  547
Furthermore he says: ‘After that I proceeded systematically. I realized, to my sorrow 
and alarm, that I was getting unpopular but I thought that I must attach the greatest 
importance to the god’s oracle, so I must go to all those who had any reputation for 





An example of such a search might be the Ion. Here Socrates approaches a successful 
rhapsode. We are told that Ion had won the first prize for his performance at the 
Epidaurean festival of Asclepius.  
As a rhapsode Ion would have been the voice that delivers the wisdom of the poets to 
the people. Socrates questions him, showing us that this man did not have any 
understanding of the poetry he was delivering, and that he had no ability to discern 
the truth or falsehood of what he repeats.  
Socrates begins by asking him: if he is ‘so wonderfully clever about Homer alone, or 
also about Hesiod and Archilochus? He then proceeds to ask if he understands the 
subjects and would be able to explain the verses well. Particularly, he asks, would you 
be able to explain what the poets say about divination?  
Ion agrees that he is indeed clever about these things and very able to carry the 
meaning of the poets . However, Socrates immediately begins to question Ion and to 549
show that he has not such abilities whatsoever.   
By 538 Socrates has built the case that Ion does not have the slightest ability to 
discern and discriminate what the poets say. He is not able to judge whether what he 
delivers in his performances is true or false, just like: ‘a person who has not mastered 
a given profession will not be bale to be a good judge of the things which belong to 
that profession, whether they are things said or things done.’ 
The short dialogue is then brought to an end with Socrates saying: ‘You aren’t even 
willing to tell me what it is that you’re so wonderfully clever about, though I’ve been 
begging you.’ He tells Ion that he does not seem in fact to have the wisdom that he 
claims to have. He agrees with Ion that he is indeed talented at his performance work, 
but that this is not because, as he claims, he has any knowledge about the subjects of 
 See Ion 531549
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which he speaks. He has a skill, but this is not to be puffed up into a pretension of 
having knowledge about other matters also.  
Socrates points this fact out to Ion and thus offers him the opportunity to become 
aware of it, but Socrates also learns this for himself as he examines Ion. This 
particular dialogical preoccupation of Socrates is educational, both for himself and for 
others. Socrates learns about the world; at the same time, those around him who 
interact with him, are given the opportunity to learn along with him. As Socrates goes 
about his business of enquiring and questioning, people crowd around him and learn 
with him. 
Alongside learning about the world and about people, dialogue serves the second 
function of Socrates learning about the world with others. Dialogue is a shared 
enquiry. It is the act of enquiry conducted with the active involvement of more than 
one person. 
This is one of the reasons that Socrates wishes to converse with his fellows. Granted 
we might be able to say that Socrates is often disappointed in this desire, as he finds 
even the most reputed intellectuals to be unable or unwilling to follow him in 
discussion. Nevertheless, if we are to take Socrates on his word, this co-searching is 
something that he often hopes for in a dialogical exchange. 
A good example of this in the Theaetetus at 146a where Socrates says to Theodorus 
and Theaetetus: 
‘Now this is just where my difficulty comes in. I can’t get a proper grasp of what on earth 
knowledge really is. Could we manage to put it into words? What do all of you say? Who’ll 
speak first?’ 
This is also seen on occasions when Socrates speaks about what he wants to get at 
during a discussion. Socrates is sometimes accused by an interlocutor of wanting to 
win the argument and humiliate the other, to which Socrates always explains, 
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earnestly I think, that what he really wants is to have a conversation that will get to 
the truth of the matter of which they are speaking. 
Rather preemptively Socrates explains this to Gorgias saying: ‘You should know that 
I’m convinced I’m one of those people who in a discussion with someone else really 
want to have knowledge of the subject the discussion’s about’ . 550
Again, at 457e Socrates says: 
‘So, I’m afraid to pursue my examination of you, for fear that you should take me to be 
speaking with eagerness to win against you, rather than to have our subject become clear. For 
my part, I’d be pleased to continue questioning you if you’re the same kind of man I am, 
otherwise I would drop it. And what kind of man am I? One of those who would be pleased to 
be refuted if I say anything untrue, and who would be pleased to refute anyone who says 
anything untrue; one who, however, wouldn’t be any less pleased to be refuted than to refute.’  
This sort of dialogue – the co-searching by means of logos – is again education, both 
for Socrates and for others. Like every enquiry, it produces some learning for the 
participants. Whether it be that what they learn is that what they had presumed to 
know they do not in fact know (as in the Theaetetus), or whether some conclusions 
are drawn (as in the Crito and the Gorgias) Socrates and his interlocutors learn from 
this shared process.  
Indeed it is often Socrates who is the authority in the discussions, though this does not 
make them any less shared. Much like if I were to go on a canoe trip with an 
experienced instructor and had spent the weekend being directed by him: it would still 
be correct to say that we went canoeing together and traversed ground together. 
The third and final function that dialogue had with Socrates was the explicitly 
instructive function. Socrates, who was an experienced enquirer (philosopher), 
actively helped other people to enquire. He assisted them through the process of 
 Gorgias 453b550
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enquiry. Engaging in dialogue with Socrates was something like going fishing with an 
expert. He could see what people were doing wrong within the process of enquiry and 
he could correct them. 
As we have been saying: the main barrier that people had to enquiring about the truth 
that we can deduce from what Socrates says is that they did not seek it. Socrates spent 
his life exhorting his fellows to engage in dialogue.  
The problem was not to get people to speak. We do not see any occasion in Plato’s or 
even Xenophon’s corpus where someone refuses to speak and Socrates has to 
convince him to take up the activity of speaking. 
Rather the problem was that people did not seek the truth about matters. They are 
happy to engage in speaking with others, but not in genuine enquiry. We often see 
Socrates having to deal with interlocutors who are very happy to engage in rhetoric 
and eristic. The people of Socrates’ time were happy to converse with others, often for 
the purpose of showing off, keeping company, or gaining some benefit. The problem 
was that they did not think deeply or honestly about matters.  
Socrates tried to turn people’s focus and interest to truth. He tried to get them to 
enquire about it. 
We are told of this in the Apology. Socrates says: ‘I was attached to this city by the 
god… as upon a great and noble horse which was somewhat sluggish because of its 
size and needed to be stirred up by a kind of gadfly…. I never cease to rouse each and 
every one of you, to persuade and reproach you all day long’ . 551
 Apology 30e551
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He continues saying that he went beyond human nature in having neglected all of his 
own affairs always concerning himself with his fellows: ‘approaching each one of you 
like a father or an elder brother to persuade you to care for virtue’ . 552
As we saw in our analysis of the Gorgias  and briefly in the Charmides: Socrates’ 553
main method was to organize the discussion and to keep the other person focused on 
the discussion. He did not allow his interlocutors to speak lightly about matters, but if 
they spoke empty words he drew their attention to the actual meaning and 
consequences of what they were saying. He shone a light at what they were saying 
and assuming, revealing its inadequacy.  
However, as Socrates often said, his purpose was not to show up the shortcomings of 
the other. He pointed out their cognitive faults in an attempt to help them to improve 
what it was they were saying. For this reason Socrates focused primarily on how a 
discussion (and the thought process exhibited therein) could be improved. He 
concentrated on those mistakes that acted as barriers to learning. We will discuss these 
further in the following section. 
This third function that dialogue had with Socrates was the one scholars most 
frequently identify as pedagogical. Socrates served this role, of putting his fellows 
through a sort of ‘apprenticeship’ in enquiry, wherever it was needed. Being an expert 
enquirer, wherever he perceived an inability in another to participate in philosophy, 
Socrates would help his interlocutor to overcome this. 
His method was straightforward and frank. He pointed out the fault. 
As he says in the Apology at 23b: ‘Therefore I am still even now going about and 
searching and investigating at the god's behest anyone, whether citizen or foreigner, 
 31b552
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who I think is wise; and when he does not seem so to me, I give aid to the god and 
show that he is not wise.’ 
His method was to care and to bother to engage with others despite the difficulties it 
caused him. His method was to dare to be difficult and often unpopular by 
challenging people: by thinking deeply about what they say and believe and pulling 
them up on it. His method was to focus and to thoroughly examine matters. 
Socrates sought truth and he sought it also with other people. Depending on the level 
of his interlocutor, this co-searching took on different forms. With his experienced eye 
for enquiry Socrates helped others to enquire into the truth. He showed them what 
they were doing wrong. He did this, not in order to humiliate them by revealing their 
ignorance, but so as to help them, and to keep them on the course to truth – the course 
of enquiry. 
(iii) Socrates had a method for addressing the various barriers to truth that 
people face 
Let us end by saying something about a possible role for refutation in all of this. 
As has been said already, Socrates helped people to overcome barriers to the seeking 
of truth by keeping them concentrated on the enquiry at hand, and by pointing out to 
them each time that they said something to avoid genuine enquiry. 
The biggest barrier people faced in seeking to know the truth is this: that they did not 
actually seek it. If you do not look for the truth you will not find it. If you are not 
genuinely enquiring, but if you are using speech acts in order to pose, you will not get 
any quality of thought. You will not get more out of it than you put in. 
Socrates’ method was to get people to focus and to enquire seriously. He managed the 
enquiry so that it would keep to its task. 
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In the Gorgias we are told that a person will fail to enquire if they do not exhibit the 
characteristics required of a philosopher . A person who does not exhibit the traits of 554
a genuine enquirer into truth is not able to become virtuous through dialogue (and 
achieve truth) because in fact they do not seek this. They are merely speaking because 
they are in some manner attached to pleasing people. They are flatterers. 
Socrates has a practical solutions to barriers to enquiry. First of all he makes it 
painfully obvious to you that you are being petty. If need be he lets you know that you 
have no right to be obnoxious. 
We see this for example in the conversation with Polus  on occasions where 555
explains precisely how Polus is failing to participate in inquisitive dialogue. At 448e 
Socrates says that Polus does not answer the question posed to him; at 461e he mocks 
him for wanting to use long rhetorical forms of speech; at 462d he points out to him 
that he has not concentrated enough on the point discussed to achieve and answer 
from Socrates; at 471e-472d he corrects him on his manner of refutation; and so on.  
Together with this ‘correcting’ Socrates gave people hope. He told his interlocutors, as 
he told Meno, that of one thing he is certain: that they should persist in enquiry 
because it will profit them. He said: 
‘the belief in the duty of inquiring after what we do not know will make us better and braver and less 
helpless than the notion that there is not even a possibility of discovering what we do not know, 
nor any duty of inquiring after it—this is a point for which I am determined to do battle, so far as I am 
able, both in word and deed.’  556
 Please see section III.I.II for our analysis of the attitudinal points of the Gorgias.554
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 Meno 86b-c. The Greek reads: ‘οἶδά τοι, ὦ ἑταῖρε. ἓν µέντοι τι αὐτοῖς συµβέβηκεν: ὅταν ἰδίᾳ 556
λόγον δέῃ δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι περὶ ὧν ψέγουσι, καὶ ἐθελήσωσιν ἀνδρικῶς πολὺν χρόνον ὑποµεῖναι 
καὶ µὴ ἀνάνδρως φυγεῖν, τότε ἀτόπως, ὦ δαιµόνιε, τελευτῶντες οὐκ ἀρέσκουσιν αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς περὶ ὧν 
λέγουσι, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκείνη πως ἀποµαραίνεται, ὥστε παίδων µηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν. περὶ µὲν οὖν 
τούτων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάρεργα τυγχάνει λεγόµενα, ἀποστῶµεν—εἰ δὲ µή, πλείω [177ξ] ἀεὶ ἐπιρρέοντα 
καταχώσει ἡµῶν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον—ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ ἔµπροσθεν ἴωµεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ.’ 
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Socrates kept bringing his interlocutors back to the point. He helped them to 
concentrate, and he showed them what they were saying.  
Socrates began to speak about this method of his at the end of the digression in the 
Theaetetus. Unfortunately though, he cuts the discussion of this short. Speaking to 
Theodorus about men who do not love truth or seek it he says: 
‘Yes, my friend, I know. However, there is one thing that has happened to them: whenever they have to 
carry on a personal argument about the doctrines to which they object, if they are willing to stand their 
ground for a while like men and do not run away like cowards, then, my friend, they at last become 
strangely dissatisfied with themselves and their arguments; their brilliant rhetoric withers away, so that 
they seem no better than children.’  557
 This is the process Socrates uses. He focused their attention. He made them look.  
In this process of turning the attention Socrates used various tools of refutation, at 
times what we call the ‘standard elenchus’, and at other times general 
counterexamples. In order to understand what role refutation might have played in 
helping people to overcome particular barriers to dialogue we need to emphasise what 
Socrates saw as the problem. 
  
Socrates believed that the greatest barrier people have to enquiring into truth is that 
they do not care for it and are not preoccupied with it. This is because they are caught 
up in other, less important matter. It is because, according to Socrates, they have a 
narrow understanding of their self-interest.  
Socrates addresses this problem by pointing out to his interlocutors that that which 
they esteem as valuable is incorrect. Consider the conclusion of the dialogue between 
Callicles and Socrates in the Gorgias. After a long discussion where Callicles reaches 
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the point that he agrees in fact with Socrates regarding virtuous behavior, Callicles 
says: that even though Socrates’ statement seems right, and it has been reached 
through logos, he cannot believe him. 
Socrates answers him that his soul cannot follow his mind towards the truth because 
his soul is trapped by a love of the demus . However, Socrates promises him, if he 558
were to persist in such reasoned examination of what is true, he would soon turn also 
his soul towards philosophy and become better able to accept truth. 
Notice how Socrates describes the difference between the philosopher and the slave of 
vice to his friend Theodorus in the digression of the Theaetetus. The philosopher 
represents the ideal that Socrates seeks to promote among his fellows. 
Firstly, the philosopher is superior in the choice of matters that he concerns himself 
with. The philosopher seeks familiarity with the essence of things. He is free and 
upward-bound (residing like Thales not on earth but in the heavens ) because he 559
disregards superficial thought and conversation and shuns vain aspirations for worldly 
glory and power. 
Instead he is inquisitive and enquires into the nature and essences of things. He does 
not ask questions of the sort: ‘my injustice towards you, or yours towards me’. Rather 
he examines justice and injustice themselves: ‘what they are, and how they differ from 
everything else and from each other’ .  He is not guided in his thought by the 560
pettiness of self-interest but by an interest in truth. 
He does not ask: ‘whether a king who possesses much gold is happy’. Instead he 





two things are, and what, for a human being, is the proper method by which the one 
can be obtained and the other avoided’ . 561
The philosopher applies his mind to the truth, and he is not distracted or limited by 
any narrow ideas of self-interest or attachment to vanity. These are the greatest 
barriers to truthful thought that Socrates sees. And he targets these by (a) pointing 
them out; and (b) by negating the views that give these inclinations a basis. 
Disputation of false moral ideas (through a process of counterexample and at times 
the elenchus) breaks down the basis of, what Socrates considered, inappropriate and 
harmful attachments to vanity. 
As he tells Theodorus: 
• The ‘philosopher, unlike the slave, grows up without knowing the way to the 
market-place, of the whereabouts of the law courts or the council chambers or 
any other place of public assembly. Laws and decrees, published orally or in 
writing, are things he never sees or hears. The scrambling of political cliques 
for office; social functions, dinners, parties with flute girls – such doings never 
enter his head…’ .  562
In saying this, Socrates is speaking metaphorically and not literally. Of course, in a 
city the size of Classical Athens, it would have been extremely unperceptive and dull-
minded of a person if they were to reach maturity without actually knowing the literal 
location of political activity in their own city. What Socrates means to say however is 
that the philosopher has no interest in these matters (in the attainment of political 





• Nor is he interested in the various ways in which people ascribe prestige and 
glory to one another. He considers these to be vainglorious and he has better 
ways to expend his intellect. ‘So with questions of birth – he has no more idea 
whether his fellow citizen is high-born or humble, or whether he has inherited 
some taint from his forebears, male or female, than he has of the number of 
pints in the sea as they say’ .   563
• He considers these distinctions to be petty and irrational. He holds himself 
aloof to them – not in order to get a reputation of being high-minded, but 
because he really is concerned with more important and interesting things. 
‘His mind, having come to the conclusion that all these things are of little or 
no account, spurns them and pursues its winged way… throughout the 
universe, ‘in the deeps beneath the earth’ and geometrizing its surfaces, ‘in the 
heights above the heaven’, astronomizing , and tracking down by every path 
the entire nature of each whole among the things that are, never 
condescending to what lies near at hand. ’ 564
The philosopher wants to know what things are. He is deeply curious about the world. 
But he does not put his mind to trying to achieve appraisal from his fellows, or in 
ascribing any such petty praise to others. He considers such social practices as vain, 
trivial and unreasonable.  
• The philosopher does not deign to participate in the social games of 
undermining or attributing glory to people. He does not gossip; ‘he knows 
nothing to the detriment of anyone’. Nor does he know how to pay 





• He is not interested in the glory of this world ‘that is in front of him’ ‘at his 
very feet’. He is not impressed by status and political power. ‘When he hears 
the praises of a despot or a king being sung, it sounds to his ears as if some 
stock-breeder were being congratulated.’ He considers such men to be heavy-
laden with cares and thus effectively imprisoned .  566
• He is not impressed by wealth. ‘When he hears talk of land – that so-and-so 
has a property of ten thousand acres or more, and what a vast property that is, 
it sounds to him like a tiny plot, used as he is to envisage the whole earth.’ 
This is so because he has a love for things that are truly valuable. Thus, in 
comparison, he can see how little worth and significance belongs to the things 
that the society values. 
• Likewise, he does not think it is reasonable to esteem people based on family 
lineage. In fact he thinks of this as unreasonable. ‘When his companions 
become lyric on the subject of great families, and exclaim at the noble blood 
of one who can point to seven wealthy ancestors, he thinks that such praise 
comes from a dim and limited vision, an inability, through lack of education, 
to take a steady view of the whole, and to calculate that every single man has 
countless hosts of ancestors, near and remote, among whom are to be found 
rich men and beggars…’   567
The philosopher has this distance from the normal attributions of glory because he 
loves real beauty and he knows where real glory and value belong. Thus, ‘when men 
pride themselves upon a pedigree… they seem to him to be taking a curious interest in 





‘How ridiculous, he thinks, not to be able to work that out, and get rid of the gaping 
vanity of a silly mind. Having experience of greater things, the philosopher thinks that 
the glory of this world is vanity, and that it is a consequence of small-mindedness, 
ignorance and inexperience of the good, on the part of people, that allows them to 
value such vanities.   
• The philosopher lives in a different realm from others. His is on a higher level. 
He is not concerned with appearances – with the hypocritical nature of things 
– but with their real essences . 569
• He has been ‘brought up in true freedom and leisure’. Thus it is no disgrace to 
him to appear simple and good-for-nothing when he is presented with petty 
matters. He does not know how to make a flattering speech, because flattering 
does not concern him; rather truth concerns him. In a sense then, Socrates is 
suggesting that the love of truth and a curiosity for the essential gives the 
philosopher a nobility that is not to be had otherwise .    570
  
This is a love of truth that is more dear to the person than any love of vanity. This love 
sets the philosopher free and enables him to pursue truth uninhibited. Disputation of 
false moral ideas could have been a method of Socrates’ of helping people turn their 
attention to philosophy by showing to them that their attachment to ‘non-
philosophical interests’ was unfounded. He undermined, using the logos the 
foundation which they felt these attachments to have.  
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